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ABSTRACT
Quintilian’s Theory of Certainty and Its Afterlife in Early Modern Italy
Charles J. McNamara
This dissertation explores how antiquity and some of its early modern admirers under-
stand the notion of certainty, especially as it is theorized in Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria,
a first-century educational manual for the aspiring orator that defines certainty in terms
of consensus. As part of a larger discussion of argumentative strategies, Quintilian turns
to the “nature of all arguments,” which he defines as “reasoning which lends credence to
what is doubtful by means of what is certain” (ratio per ea quae certa sunt fidem dubiis
adferens: quae natura est omnium argumentorum, V.10.8). These certainties, he later spec-
ifies, include not matters of scientific demonstration or objective fact, but the agreements
of various communities: the laws of cities, local customs, and other forms of consensus.
As the foundation of persuasive rhetoric, these consensus-based certainties situate ar-
gumentation as the practice of crafting agreements rather than demonstrating necessary
conclusions.
Taking as its point of departure Quintilian’s novel understanding of certainty, this
study looks to some of Quintilian’s intellectual forebears as well as his later readers to
show how his work is both a nexus of earlier intellectual developments as well as an
important inspiration for later accounts of certainty, even into the early modern period.
After illustrating in the first chapters of this dissertation how Quintilian’s manual incor-
porates elements from Aristotelian notions of dialectic and rhetoric as well as from Ci-
ceronian skeptical approaches to epistemology, I show how Quintilian’s curriculum for
the orator shapes the thought of Italian humanists, especially that of Lorenzo Valla (1406–
1457), a reformer of scholastic logic and dialectic, and Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), an
influential Neapolitan jurist. Adopting Quintilian’s rendering of certainty as a matter of
agreements and conventions, these later authors elaborate their own novel approaches
to various fields—including law, language, and logic—through this ancient understand-
ing of certum. Contrary to modern notions of certainty as objective or scientific fact,
Quintilian’s humanist readers continue to root this concept in consensus, both within the
courtroom and without.
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Introduction
In his 1689 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the English philosopher John
Locke insists that “the highest probability, amounts not to certainty; without which, there
can be no true knowledge.”¹ At least for Locke and his like-minded contemporaries, the
notion of certainty is identified with unassailable knowledge: what is certain is invari-
able and assured. And as Locke explains later in his essay, his understanding of certainty
extends to matters within ethics and politics as well as to other matters, for he insists
that “moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty, as mathematics.”² This notion of
certainty in the English language as empirically verified knowledge persists throughout
the thinking and writing of later philosophers as well, a tradition that continues within
contemporary discussions of science and politics alike. From Benjamin Franklin’s maxim
that “nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes” to Werner Heisenberg’s
contributions to quantum physics, in which “uncertainty” points to the instability and
imprecision of laboratory measurements, the status of certainty in modern English in-
tellectual discourse—whether in matters of taxes or physics—is closely tied to notions of
predictability, immutability, and so-called scientific objectivity.
¹IV.12. Citations of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding are taken from Kenneth Win-
kler, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996).
²IV.7.
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But this notion of certainty—what is certum—has not always carried this valence of
stable, objective knowledge, especially as it was understood by the Roman rhetorical tra-
dition. While empiricist reformers of the seventeenth century like Locke will claim that
“impartiality [should be] expected of judges as much as of scientists,” several earlier au-
thors view the rhetorical certainty of the ancient orator and the demonstrative certainty of
the modern physicist as essentially separate categories of knowledge.³ Particularly within
one influential thread of rhetorical thinking, the ancient understanding of certainty does
not point to unimpeachable fact but instead toward matters of consensus. This more un-
stable conceptualization of certainty likely motivates Francis Bacon’s remarks in his 1605
Advancement of Learning that caution, “if a man will begin with certainties, he shall end
in doubts.”⁴ Only a few decades before Locke writes of his utmost confidence in the epis-
temic value of certainty as “true knowledge,” Bacon shows an anxiety about its reliability
for grounding scientific discovery.
While Bacon cautions against using certainties as the foundation for proofs, one
prominent tradition within ancient rhetorical thought advocates for certainty’s indis-
pensable role in argumentation. At the center of this tradition sits Quintilian’s Institutio
Oratoria, a first-century rhetorical manual whose twelve books aim to educate the ideal
rhetorician: the “good man skilled in speaking.”⁵ As part of a larger discussion of the
nature of rhetorical proof, a discussion that starkly contrasts with Bacon’s warning about
³Shapiro (1983, p. 190).
⁴V.8. Citations of Francis Bacon are taken from The Works of Francis Bacon, James Spedding,
Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, eds. (New York: Garrett Press, 1968).
⁵Sit ergo nobis orator quem constituimus is qui a M. Catone finitur vir bonus dicendi peritus,
XII.1.1. Translations of Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria are adapted from D.A. Russell, ed. and
trans. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
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certainty’s reliability, Quintilian remarks that it is “the nature of all arguments” to begin
with certainties, not truths, and that these arguments “lend credence to what is doubtful
by means of what is certain (certum).”⁶ Not leaving the epicenter of his argumentative
framework undefined, Quintilian lays out several categories of such certa:
Now we regard as certain things perceived by the senses, for example what
we see or hear (Signs come under this head); things about which common
opinion is unanimous (consensum): the existence of the gods, the duty of re-
specting parents; provisions of laws; what has been accepted as moral cus-
tom, if not the belief of all mankind, at least in that of the city or nation where
the case is being pleaded—many matters of right, for example, involve cus-
tom rather than laws; whatever is agreed between both parties; whatever has
been proved; lastly, whatever is not contradicted by our opponent.⁷
While Quintilian’s catalog will be treated in more detail in the third chapter of this disser-
tation, it is worth highlighting here the predominance of agreements throughout many of
its elements: Quintilian understands as certum unanimous beliefs of all mankind, the cus-
toms of a city, and even the more particular agreements of two parties in a legal dispute.
Far from Locke’s rendering of certainty as a kind of assurance “without which, there can
be no true knowledge,” Quintilian’s notion of certum appeals to the notion of consensus
from its widest to narrowest examples. Taking Quintilian’s catalog of certa as its point
of departure, this dissertation traces the philosophical and rhetorical traditions surround-
ing certainty that culminate in the Institutio, an ancient work that would inspire later
⁶ratio per ea quae certa sunt fidem dubiis adferens: quae natura est omnium argumentorum,
neque enim certa incertis declarantur, V.10.8.
⁷Pro certis autem habemus primum quae sensibus percipiuntur, ut quae videmus audimus, qualia
sunt signa, deinde ea in quae communi opinione consensum est: ‘deos esse,’ ‘praestandum pietatem
parentibus,’ praeterea quae legibus cauta sunt, quae persuasione etiam si non omnium hominum, eius
tamen civitatis aut gentis in qua res agitur in mores recepta sunt, ut pleraque in iure non legibus sed
moribus constant: si quid inter utramque partem convenit, si quid probatum est, denique cuicumque
adversarius non contradicit, V.10.12-13.
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authors to position certainty—understood as consensus or customary agreement—within
their own rhetorical and legal frameworks.
Looking both backward to Quintilian’s sources and forward to his later readers, this
chronology parallels the structure of the study at hand: while the first half of my disserta-
tion shows how Quintilian synthesizes his notion of certainty from the philosophical and
rhetorical texts that precede him, the second half highlights the Roman schoolmaster’s
singular influence on Renaissance and early modern theories of persuasion and argument.
My first chapter uncovers the extent to which Quintilian’s thought takes inspiration from
Aristotle’s works on rhetoric and dialectic, for Quintilian’s interest in a variety of Aris-
totelian rhetorical elements positions his understanding of certa as a Roman rhetorical
refashioning of the concept of homolegoumena, or matters of agreement. Looking first to
the Topica, where Aristotle defines dialectic as a branch of inquiry related to but funda-
mentally separate from scientific demonstration, my study points to Peripatetic efforts to
ground proof and argument in shared premises. In contrast to scientific demonstrations
(apodeixeis) that reason from “primary and true premises” (prōta kai alēthē), Aristotelian
dialectical argument takes as its starting point so-called endoxa: beliefs that are shared
by all, by many, or by the wise.⁸ Building on this Aristotelian foundation of endoxa and
the related concept of rhetorical homolegoumena, Quintilian’s manual grounds proof not
in demonstrated truths but in matters of consensus, matters which Quintilian renders in
Latin as certa. These certa, in turn, form the building blocks of enthymemes, the rhetorical
syllogisms aimed at changing the minds of an audience. By grounding forensic rhetoric
in Aristotle’s interest in shared beliefs and the enthymemes that deploy them, Quintil-
⁸Topica 100b21-23, Rhetoric 1356b33-35.
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ian thus merges two notions that may seem disjunct to modern readers: certainty and
persuasion.
After this preliminary discussion of Aristotle, who lays the philosophical groundwork
for Quintilian’s use of agreement as the basis of rhetorical argument, I turn to the Latin
tradition and its earlier understandings of certum. My dissertation, however, does not
attempt to provide a complete account of this Latin adjective and its various uses. As its
nearly twenty-eight columns of text in the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae illustrate (not even
including the fifteen columns devoted to the adverbial forms certe and certo), the mani-
fold history of certum is an object of study beyond the scope of a single work.⁹ Within
this long history, so the editors of the TLL have found, certus in Latin covers four major
semantic areas: the word can signify a matter that has been completed or definitus (I), a
matter that has been settled or statutus (II), a matter that is proven or probatus (III) if not
outright true or verus (III.A3), and a matter that is trustworthy or fidus (IV.A).¹⁰ Even with
these four broad categories at one’s disposal, it can be difficult to understand the conno-
tations of certainty in Latin texts. Take, for example, the well-known line of the pater
familias of Roman literature, Ennius, who advises that “a certain friend (amicus certus) is
discerned (cernitur) in uncertain circumstances (in re incerta).”¹¹ While the TLL lists this
fragment of Ennius as the first example of certus as fidus, one might also understand the
adjective here as “proven” or “true,” and perhaps even “settled.” The meaning of certainty
⁹The TLL entry for this word includes certus, certa, and certum all under the heading of the
masculine singular lemma, but as we shall see in the second chapter in partcular, earlier lexico-
graphical compilations do not place all genders of the adjective stem cert* within the same lexical
grouping.
¹⁰For comparison, see also the fourteen definitions of certus in the Oxford Latin Dictionary.
¹¹amicus certus in re incerta cernitur, 351 (Jocelyn 2008, p. 148).
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in even the earliest Latin texts already welcomes various interpretations and a good deal
of connotative uncertainty, so to speak.
Not aiming to provide a comprehensive history of this word, this study’s turn toward
the Latin tradition examines important predecessors to Quintilian’s rhetorical manual, es-
pecially concerning its theories of forensic argumentation as well as its advocacy for skep-
tical approaches to epistemology. In my second chapter, I look to Ciceronian antecedents
of Quintilian’s influential rendering of certum, antecedents that emerge in Cicero’s stud-
ies of Academic skepticism and treatments of rhetorical invention. More specifically, the
second chapter of this dissertation argues that Cicero’s writings anticipate Quintilian’s
decoupling of certum and verum, for Cicero’s texts use the former to denote unreliable
sensory experience. In his refashioning of Hellenistic debates regarding epistemology—
debates that question the “criterion of truth,” the irrefutable sign of the accuracy of sen-
sory perception—Cicero maintains that such perceptions are only reliable if they exhibit
notae that are at once certae and propriae. Impressions that are merely certain but not also
propria, he cautions, may exhibit a kind of persuasive clarity, but they nevertheless fall
short of indisputable, reliable truthfulness. Drawing a careful distinction between what is
merely certum and what is undeniably verum, then, Cicero paves the way for later discus-
sions in Quintilian’s treatise where what is certum is understood as a matter of consensus
rather than truth.
Cicero’s discussion of certainty extends beyond these epistemological debates and into
technical discussions of rhetorical invention. As his several oratorical works show, the
same pair of adjectives at the center of his philosophical discussions—certum and pro-
prium—bears on Cicero’s rendering of status theory, a Hellenistic framework for struc-
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turing forensic arguments, pioneered by Hermagoras of Temnos in the second century.
While authors often provide their own versions of Hermagoras’ system, it almost always
includes three central issues (that is, three statūs) that attempt to define the precise point
of dispute in a forensic case—whether something happened (an sit), what happened (quid
sit), and what sort of thing happened (quale sit). The reappearance of this adjective pair
throughout these discussions of status theory compels us to consider what connections
might exist between forensic argumentation and discussions of epistemology as well as
between certainty and property. Hardly a matter of scientific demonstration or even
rhetoric alone, Cicero’s capacious rendering of certainty foreshadows the wide applica-
tion of certum to all kinds of arguments in Quintilian’s text.
Although my first two chapters incorporate discussions of Quintilian’s work, both
in its interest in Aristotelian homolegoumena and Ciceronian writings on sense percep-
tion and rhetoric, the third chapter directs its attention to the Institutio itself in order to
uncover its development of these two Ciceronian concerns: one regarding skeptical ap-
proaches to epistemology and another regarding the theory of status. Rather than limit
his discussion of certainty and its epistemic limitations to technical discussions among
the Stoic and Academic schools, Quintilian positions his understanding of certum at the
center of a variety of intellectual disciplines. As part of his claim that it is “the nature of
all arguments” to begin with certainties, generally understood as customs and consensus,
Quintilian boldly extends the reach of certainty to subjects as wide-ranging as grammar,
geometry, and natural philosophy, asserting that they all also take as their foundation and
aim an understanding of what is merely certum rather than verum. Not just interested in
philosophical disputes regarding sense perception, Quintilian applies the measured confi-
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dence in certainty found in Cicero’s texts to the range of topics a student might encounter
in his education.
Like Cicero, Quintilian also takes an interest in status theory and the place of certainty
in rhetorical invention. Quintilian expands the forensic role of certum in his rendering of
Hermagoras’ framework, for he relies on the vocabulary of certainty to describe a variety
of agreements in rhetorical practice, a development that aligns with his more explicit
efforts to begin all arguments with certa. By more firmly positioning what is certum as a
central concern of rhetoric as well as by arguing for the place of certainty in a variety of
intellectual disciplines, then, Quintilian’s manual thus shows an attempt to collapse the
distinctions among several types of argumentation and to render them all as discussions of
consensus or custom. Traditionally seen as a manual for training young rhetoricians, the
Institutio thus advocates for a novel approach to all types of argumentation, both inside
and outside the courtroom, as investigations of agreement rather than of truth.
The Institutio’s discussions of consensus-based certainty as an epistemically modest
category of knowledge constitute a robust theorization of the meaning of certum, and
readers in the following centuries would take an interest in these novel developments.
Quintilian’s treatment of certainty as both the foundation and aim of argumentation as
well as his understanding of status theory in terms of certum resurface over a millen-
nium after the publication of the Institutio, for it was only then that his complete work
was rediscovered and read by an eager audience of Renaissance humanists. In its fourth
chapter, my dissertation turns to Lorenzo Valla (1406–1457), one of Quintilian’s most ad-
miring readers, who takes on the task of editing the damaged manuscript of the Institutio,
found by his literary rival Poggio Bracciolini in 1416. While writers before Poggio’s dis-
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covery still highly regard Quintilian’s text, even if their copies are merely fragmentary,
Valla’s access to the complete Institutio catalyzes several of his contributions to Renais-
sance humanism. Incorporating Quintilian’s forensic strategies into a range of original
writings, including the Elegantiae, a discussion of proper Latin style, and the Dialecticae
Disputationes, a treatise on logic, Valla both amplifies Quintilian’s reliance on certainty as
the bedrock of status theory and also makes more explicit the separation of certum from
verum. In his Disputationes, Valla uses status theory to replace Aristotle’s system of modal
logic with a novel brand of syllogism rooted in the difference between truth and certainty.
Rejecting the complex logical frameworks of medieval scholasticism, Valla turns to this
rhetorical strategy of invention as a tool for reorienting dialectic more broadly around
the tools and strategies of the orator. And this rhetorical reorientation, so Valla explains,
takes a search for certainty and consensus, not truth, as its aim. Indeed, Valla attributes
his own resuscitation of status theory and his interest in the widespread applicability of
certainty to the influence of his ancient Roman model: “In each kind of inquiry—rational,
moral, natural, and many others—our practice is to ask whether it is, what it is, and what
it is like, which is almost explicit in the words of Quintilian.”¹²
The influence of Quintilian’s theory of certainty, however, does not cease with Valla’s
interaction with the then-recently rediscovered treatise on rhetorical education. In fact,
the importance of Quintilian’s theory of certainty may reach its culmination in the years
surrounding the early modern scientific revolution, when the meaning and reliability of
¹²praeterea in singulis—rationali, morali, naturali, et sique sint alia—quaerere solemus an sit, quid
sit, quale sit, ut propemodum exQuintiliani verbis palam est, II.19.25. Translations of Valla’s Dispu-
tationes are adapted from Copenhaver, B. and L Nauta, eds. and trans. Dialecticae Disputationes
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).
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certainty become topics of great interest, as Francis Bacon and John Locke show in this
introduction’s first paragraphs. Taking the efforts of Descartes to align certainty with
scientific truth as its point of departure, my final chapter turns to the early modern legal
theorist Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), who maintains the rift between certum and verum
established in the writings of his ancient and early humanist predecessors. While he
attributes to Descartes “some rare and exquisite truth which requires the meditation of a
great philosopher to invent,” a kind of knowledge he calls scientia, Vico defends the value
of certitudo, an “ordinary knowledge available to even a person without any learning.”¹³
Paralleling the discussions of certa in Quintilian’s Institutio, Vico’s defense of certitudo
similarly roots this concept in matters of broad consensus. Not far from Quintilian’s
definition of certum as something “about which common opinion is unanimous,” Vico
also points to the accessibility and wide acceptance of certitudo by even those without
philosophical training as its defining feature.
But Vico’s discussions of certainty do not merely parrot Quintilian’s text, and in fact,
one discussion in his Scienza Nuova, a 1725 work on the philosophy of history, seems to
contradict Quintilian’s rendering of certainty as a kind of “ordinary knowledge.” In that
text, Vico explains that “in good Latin, certum means particularized, or as the schools
say, individuated; so that, in overelegant Latin, certum and commune, the certain and the
common, are opposed to each other.”¹⁴ While Vico appears to draw his notion of certainty
¹³Sed certitudinem, quod cogitet, conscientiam contendit esse, non scientiam, et vulgarem cogni-
tionem, quae in indoctum quemvis cadat; ut Sosiam; non rarum verum, et exquisitum, quod tanta
maximi Philosophi meditatione egeat ut inveniatur, De Antiquissima Italorum Sapientia I.2. Trans-
lations of Vico’s De Antiquissima are adapted from Jason Taylor, ed. and trans. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2010).
¹⁴in buon latino significa “particolarizzato” o, come le scuole cidono, “individuato”; nel qual
senso “certo” e “commune”, con troppa latina eleganza, son opposti tra loro, §322. Translations of
10
from the catalog Quintilian proposes in the Institutio, where certum is tightly coupled with
notions of consensus and agreement, his definition of certum in the Scienza Nuova presents
a kind of certainty opposed to the “common.” To navigate this paradoxical understand-
ing of certainty—vulgaris but not commune—I turn to Vico’s legal and rhetorical works,
which show how Vico’s understanding of certainty is coupled with his understanding of
civil law and the foundations of language, topics he understands through the lens of Quin-
tilian’s text. Not merely an epistemological study or an attack on the rise of Cartesianism,
Vico’s work also elaborates a legal framework built upon certainty in language, a theory
discussed in both Quintilian and Valla’s commentary on the Institutio, two sources that
inspire Vico to render certainty as the customs of communities. Vico’s texts thus show
the enduring complexity of the notion of certainty, a complexity that arises from the rich
tradition in which Quintilian serves a most influential role.
By tracing the intellectual genealogy of this forensically oriented brand of consensus-
based certainty, a brand I call “humanist certainty,” this dissertation undertakes to uncover
a long tradition surrounding certum that stands at odds with its empiricist renderings
which persist even into the twenty-first century. Not aligned with Locke’s understanding
of certainty as “true knowledge” and at odds with lexica that render certum as verum, the
discussions of certainty in these several texts illustrate the difficulty of understanding this
ancient concept. From its earliest appearances in Ennius to its fundamental role in Vico’s
refutation of Cartesianism, the notion of certainty shows its protean character and ability
to capture the interest of several key authors across a variety of disciplines. Through
Vico’s Scienza Nuova are adapted from Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch, eds. and
trans. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968).
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this dissertation, I show not only that one prominent meaning of ancient certainty, that
of consensus, has its roots in the earlier traditions of antiquity but also that it exerts a
lasting influence on the thinkers of even the more recent past.
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Chapter 1
Aristotle’s Enthymeme and the Role of Agreement in Rhetoric
The mere fact that Quintilian looks to agreement as the basis of rhetorical argumentation
does not in itself point to an Aristotelian basis for his work. In fact, philosophical interest
in consent and widespread agreement is at least as old as Homer, and Socratic dialectic
often begins with popular beliefs, even if it looks to them with a critical eye, poking holes
in common assumptions to uncover inconsistencies and falsehoods.¹ Plato’s most famous
student, however, did not see widespread beliefs through such a critical lens: while Plato
turns away from shared beliefs as reliable foundations for philosophical inquiry, Aristotle
embraces them as points of departure for several disciplines, and he notably incorporates
such beliefs into his radically non-Platonic understandings of dialectic. In turning away
from Plato’s notion of dialectic, defined by one account as “the synoptic…science of re-
ality [that] studies reality as it really is,” Aristotle lays the groundwork for a theory of
dialectic rooted in “real” beliefs held by “real” audiences.² And at the center of this dis-
¹For a recent discussion of consent and agreement in Homer’s Iliad, see Elmer (2013). Elmer
notes that an Indo-European root *kens-, at the heart of the Greek word kosmos and its deriva-
tives, underlies Homeric notions of “speaking authoritatively” and praising (ibid., p. 55). Elmer ar-
gues that the order and harmony of social agreement serves as the basis for authoritative speech.
Although Socrates occasionally appeals to consensus in the works of Plato and Xenophon, the
Theaetetus, highlights problems in allowing communities to create arbitrary legal codes where
“what seems just to a state is just to it” Barker (1976, p. 458). For a discussion of Socrates’ appeals
to consensus, see Obbink (1992, p. 196).
²For a study of the differences between Platonic and Aristotelian notions of dialectic, see Smith
(1997, p. 7). Plato claims that all arts other than dialectic “have opinions and desires and men as
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tinction between the methods of Plato and Aristotle is the latter’s reliance on endoxa,
beliefs that include—at least in part—those that are held by all or even most people. Since
Aristotle uses such beliefs as the foundation for dialectical argument, and since scholars
have sometimes even defined rhetorical arguments themselves as endoxic, it is tempting
to see Quintilian’s certa as a mere translation of Aristotle’s endoxa. This adoption of Aris-
totelian terminology would be perhaps unsurprising given Quintilian’s incorporation of
several Aristotelian concepts elsewhere in the Institutio, including loci as rhetorical com-
monplaces in addition to pathos and ēthos as elements of rhetorical appeal.³
But Aristotle’s understanding of endoxa extends beyond matters of consensus and
wide agreement, and in fact, endoxa can include matters that are unintuitive, technical,
and even outright unpopular. This second dimension of Aristotelian endoxa shows how
such beliefs are not merely what is broadly accepted, for in his Topica, Aristotle notes
that endoxa are not just what all or many believe, but also what the wise believe.⁴ And
the term endoxon appears only rarely in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. In what ways, then, can
one see Quintilian’s notion of rhetorical argument as an Aristotelian one at all? What
their object, but those who are ‘to determine in all cases what each thing really is’ are to rely upon
nothing else than ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις,’ an abstract and universal art of dialectic” (McAdon
2001, pp. 116-117). The kinship of dialectic and rhetoric constitutes a radical departure for Aristotle
from his Academic predecessor. Plato’s conception of dialectic, moreover, rejects the particularity
of Aristotle’s endoxa: for him, dialectic is “universal in its scope…[and] is distinguished from other
forms of intellectual activity in purity and precision and also in having no particular subject mat-
ter” (Evans 1977, p. 7). For a recent discussion of doxa in Platonic epistemology, see Vogt (2012,
pp. 51–96).
³For a discussion of loci in Quintilian’s work and their Aristotelian foundations, see Ophuijsen
(1994). For a discussion of pathos and ēthos in Quintilian’s text, see Fortenbaugh (1994).
⁴For a survey of various translations of endoxa and problems surrounding these translations,
see Evans (1977, pp. 77-78). For a discussion of the relationship between endoxa and phainomena
in Aristotle’s Physics, see Owen (1961). Aristotle’s treatment of endoxa in the Nicomachean Ethics,
too, includes beliefs that are not merely unpopular but even inconsistent. For a helpful discussion
of contradictory and unintuitive endoxa in the Nicomachean Ethics, see Frede (2012, pp. 188-189).
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continuities exist between the Roman schoolmaster’s notion of argumentation, rooted
largely in agreement and “certainty,” and the Aristotelian tradition from which it seems
to borrow so much?
This chapter uncovers the Aristotelian foundations underlying Quintilian’s under-
standing of rhetorical proof, for even if certa and endoxa are not interchangeable terms,
both writers appeal to agreements in their rendering of rhetorical practice. The first task
of this chapter is to understand better endoxa, a term that rarely appears in Aristotle’s
Rhetoric but one that nevertheless seems at first to approximate the role of certa in the
Institutio. We find, however, that Aristotle’s capacious rendering of endoxa, which al-
lows him to include not only “popular” beliefs but “reputable” if counterintuitive ideas
under this single label, extends beyond the concerns of rhetoric. A closer look at Aris-
totelian enthymemes constitutes this chapter’s second task, whereby Quintilian’s inter-
est in agreement finds closer antecedents in Aristotle’s rhetorical doctrine. A common
interest and similar renderings of the enthymeme underscore an important Aristotelian
foundation of Quintilian’s own theory of rhetoric and argument, particularly as it relates
to homolegoumena, beliefs similar to dialectical endoxa but particular to the needs of the
rhetorician. Finally, this investigation looks at how the Aristotelian interest in audience
psychology—theorized in both the Rhetoric and the Poetics—underlies Quintilian’s views
on the nature and function of rhetorical arguments. By casting rhetorical argumentation
as a science of both drawing out and changing an audience’s beliefs, Quintilian reveals
how his understanding of certainty is indebted to—but not wholly identifiable with—the
doctrines of his Peripatetic predecessor.
After this dissertation’s introductory survey of the role of certainty in Quintilian’s In-
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stitutio and its attention to consensus, the first chapters of Aristotle’s Topica seem familiar
on account of their interest in the argumentative place of agreements. The work consti-
tutes Aristotle’s most comprehensive discussion of dialectical arguments, and the adver-
sarial element of dialectic allows Aristotle to distinguish this practice from other methods
of inquiry, particularly scientific demonstration. At its outset, the Topica explicitly defines
its brand of competitive dialectic as a close relative to demonstration but fundamentally
separate from it.⁵ Aristotle establishes two distinct kinds of reasoning—apodeixis and the
dialectical syllogism—and while the former, so Aristotle explains, begins with “premises
which are primary and true” (dia tinōn prōtōn kai alēthōn), the latter instead begins with
endoxa:
Reasoning (syllogismos) is a discussion in which, particular things hav-
ing been laid down, something other than these things necessarily results
through them. Reasoning is demonstration (apodeixis) when it proceeds from
premises which are true and primary or of such a kind that we have derived
our original knowledge of them through premises which are primary and
true. Reasoning from endoxa is dialectical.⁶
Aristotle’s apodeixis is the tool of demonstrative science, which is “didactic rather than
⁵See Smith (1997, p. xi) for a discussion of these adversarial dimensions of Aristotelian dialec-
tic. Aristotle’s dialectic (διαλεκτική), again, should not be understood as the same dialectic (also
διαλεκτική) that we find in the Platonic dialogues. Plato’s dialectic looks outward at reality and
“is the highest form of intellectual activity and is universal in scope” (Evans 1977, p. 7). It aims
at truth and knowledge of the Forms. See Evans (ibid., pp. 94-103) for a discussion of the role of
Plato’s dialectic in discovering knowledge of the Forms. Aristotelian dialectic, by contrast, has
competitive aims: “to show [an opponent] that his expressed opinions lead to an absurdity, or at
least to a proposition he rejects, is to show him something important about his views” (Smith 1997,
p. xiv).
⁶Ἔστι δὴ συλλογισμὸς λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης
συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν κειμένων. ἀπόδειξις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων. ὁ συλλογισμὸς
ᾖ, ἢ ἐκ τοιούτων ἃ διά τινων πρώτων καὶ ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνώσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφεν,
διαλεκτικὸς δὲ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων συλλογιζόμενος, 100a25-30. Translations of Aristotle’s
Topica are adapted from E. S. Forster, ed. and trans. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1960) unless otherwise noted.
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interrogatory” and which proceeds from premises which are not merely believed but true.⁷
Apodeictic reasoning, then, resembles something like modern mathematical proof, which
begins with a set of given axioms and proceeds not only to demonstrate but also to teach
the necessary conclusions of those premises.⁸
A dialectical syllogism, by contrast, aims to interrogate, critique, and investigate
rather than to teach.⁹ Even if apodeictic reasoning is a close cousin of the dialectical
syllogism (a kinship that motivates Aristotle’s careful distinction of them here), Aristotle
sees that this separation of the demonstrative syllogism from the dialectical syllogism is
an essential one, stemming from both their different aims and also their different begin-
nings. Aristotle takes care to separate the “true and primary” premises of demonstration
from the endoxa of dialectical syllogisms, noting that each type of premise is suited for its
own brand of reasoning:
Things are true and primary which command belief through themselves and
not through anything else.…endoxa on the other hand, are those which com-
mend themselves to all or to the majority or the wise—that is, to all of the wise
or to the majority or to the most well-known people of high repute (endoxoi)
among them.¹⁰
An easy or straightforward definition of endoxa continues to elude scholars, perhaps be-
cause here Aristotle provides not one definition but three, and from these three defini-
⁷For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between these two kinds of premises, see
Evans (1977, p. 32).
⁸And in fact, according to (Smith 1997, p. xvi), apodeictic demonstration may have served as
a model for the mathematical proofs in works such as Euclid’s Elements.
⁹Aristotelian dialectic, Evans writes, “can demolish claims to knowledge but positively it is
unable itself to produce knowledge” (1977, p. 12).
¹⁰ἔστι δὲ ἀληθῆ μὲν καὶ πρῶτα τὰ μὴ δι’ ἑτέρων ἀλλὰ δι’ αὑτῶν ἔχοντα τὴν πίστιν…ἔνδοξα δὲ
τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς
μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις, 100b18-23.
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tions, there seem to be two general dimensions of endoxic beliefs.¹¹ On the one hand,
Aristotle notes that endoxa are dependent on widespread acceptance: endoxa can include
materials that are a matter of universal agreement or beliefs to which most, but not all,
people assent. These beliefs must seem agreeable (dokounta) to all (pāsin) or to the many
(tois pleistois).¹² But on the other hand, endoxa include beliefs that are not only unpopular
but contradictory and counterintuitive: opinions held by “the most well-known people
of high repute (gnōrimos).”¹³ This second kind of belief, perhaps not accepted by many
people but at least accepted by someone of a certain estimation, “seems to have exploited
a certain ambiguity of the meaning of endoxon in ordinary Greek: it refers to someone
or something well known, famous, of repute, but leaves open the justification of such
prominence.”¹⁴ This notion of reputation as the kernel of endoxon appears in texts pre-
dating Aristotle, where the term “indicates that the cities, families, individuals or their
actions in question enjoy a certain doxa, a reputation or fame that is due to their role
in history, but also to their wealth, nobility, or power.”¹⁵ Endoxa, then, can be seen as a
“special” or “extraordinary” belief, one worthy of consideration not for its popularity but
for its perceived outstanding nature.
¹¹For attempts to define endoxa, see, for example, Smith (1997, pp. xxiii-xxiv), Evans (1977,
pp. 77-85), and Most (1994). See also the etymological account of Chantraine (1968, 1:290-291)
which connects endoxa to δοκέω and the notion of “good opinion.”
¹²For a discussion of the approaches of Hellenistic philosophical schools to finding beliefs that
are truly believed by all, see Obbink (1992).
¹³This second adjective, gnōrimos, underscores this focus on reputation and not mere popular-
ity: the word can signify both “notable” or “distinguished” in addition to what is “well-known” or
“familiar.” See LSJ, gnōrimos 2.I-III.
¹⁴Frede (2012, p. 199). Frede also notes that “apart from these dialectical contexts, Aristotle
rarely uses endoxon, and if he does, he does so in the customary meaning of ‘famous’ or ‘well
known’ as epithets of persons or actions of repute” (ibid., p. 197).
¹⁵Frede (ibid., p. 193).
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A more careful look at the use of the masculine form of the adjective endoxos in Aris-
totle’s defintion shows how people themselves can be considered endoxic, suggesting this
understanding of the word as “reputable” and not just “agreed upon.” In his first two cate-
gories of endoxa, Aristotle points to beliefs that all people or the majority of people assent
to. But in Aristotle’s third definition, he defines endoxa as those beliefs that are held by
people who are themselves gnōrimos and endoxos; one sees that the term endoxon is not
strictly limited to its use as a substantive referring to an opinion that is itself believed. By
using endoxos to refer to people instead of things, Aristotle shows how endoxoi who have
a reputation of being wise merit the same consideration as opinions that are reputable on
account of their popularity.¹⁶ He argues that endoxa must be collected from those who
are either the majority of people themselves or, if from a more limited class of individuals,
at least a class that is gnōrimos and endoxos to others.¹⁷
Unlike the “primary and true” premises of the apodeixis which “command belief
¹⁶Smith (1997, 79, n.64) argues that Aristotle uses endoxos and endoxon as derivatives of the
same root much in the same way that he uses gnōrimos and gnōrimon.
¹⁷Aristotle’s definition, thus, employs a kind of recursion. In the case of beliefs of the wise, Aris-
totelian endoxa are beliefs that are reputable on account of being espoused by reputable individuals
(endoxoi). See Obbink (1992) for a helpful survey of how different philosophical schools (including
Epicureans and Stoics) define the community from which one derives universal consensus. Obbink
argues that, like the Stoics, Aristotle “talks less often of universal consensus than of ὑπολήψεις or
ἔνδοξα” and believes that “what makes a belief reputable…is taken to be either that it is what most
people think or that it has philosophical backing” (ibid., p. 225). See McAdon (2001, pp. 124-126)
on the comparative reliability of endoxa associated with different groups. Aristotle includes ap-
peals to what all people believe, but it should be noted that truly universal belief—ideas that were
held by literally all people—was treated as a problematic concept among Hellenistic philosophical
schools. Epicurus appears to consider a belief a matter of universal consensus if these “views are
reached after a process of reflection,” and thus he “is relieved of the onerous burden of appealing
to any kind of actual or empirically verifiable consensus” (Obbink 1992, p. 201). Similarly, Stoic
“common notions” (or koinai ennoiai) are subject to confirmation by phantasiai and are considered
“criteria [of truth] only after a process of reflection” (ibid., p. 205). Aristotle avoids these questions
surrounding the true universality of endoxic beliefs.
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through themselves and not through anything else,” therefore, the endoxic premises of the
dialectical syllogism are beliefs qualified with a social or personal dimension.¹⁸ They are
contingent on the assent of a given community or at least such a community’s confidence
in such a belief’s supporters. The broader public may not agree with Socrates’ view that
no one knowingly commits a wrongdoing, for example, but on account of Socrates’ repu-
tation, the view merits consideration. Aristotle thus defines endoxa as beliefs to which a
given community subscribes, but the identity of this community—both regarding its size
and its type—can vary.¹⁹
Equipped with this understanding of Aristotelian endoxa, one can see how this cate-
gory of belief underlying dialectical arguments could bear on Aristotle’s study of rhetoric
and, in turn, some of Quintilian’s own notions of rhetorical argument. Both Aristotelian
dialectic and rhetoric take an interest in beliefs held by actual people, and both dialectic
and rhetoric aim at persuasion, but perhaps with a caveat that dialectic operates through
logical argument alone and not with the elements of emotional appeal germane to Aris-
totelian rhetorical practice.²⁰ These conceptual similarities between dialectic and rhetoric,
however, do not manifest in the words of Aristotle himself: endoxa seem to be of only pe-
¹⁸Frede writes that “endoxic premisses hold, then, a middle position between those [proposi-
tions] that are obviously true and those that are obviously false” (2012, p. 194). See McAdon (2001,
pp. 120-124) for a helpful discussion of the “true, primitive, prior, and better known” premises that
serve as the foundation of the apodeixis and of how they differ from the endoxic premises of a
dialectical syllogism, specifically regarding their relationship to people and societies.
¹⁹As Evans (1977, p. 81) cautions, “we should not forget whose view is being examined” when
dealing with Aristotelian endoxa.
²⁰Aristotle’s particular visions of dialectic and rhetoric “involve other actual people, while the
concepts of pure logic contain a reference only to an ideal cognitive subject” (ibid., p. 75). For
a discussion of the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric, see Liebersohn (2010, p. 31). The
similarity between rhetoric and dialectic—at least the Aristotelian conception of dialectic—was
noticed in antiquity as well. According to Liebersohn (ibid., 32 n.35), Cicero writes that Aristotle
was the first to employ dialectic in rhetorical practice.
20
ripheral interest to the Rhetoric since forms of the word appear only seven times through-
out its three books.²¹ This relative absence of a key Aristotelian term of shared belief in
his rhetorical treatise bears on our study of Quintilian, too, for if Aristotelian rhetoric
does not concern itself with endoxa, one must consider whether Quintilian’s notion of
certainty stems from some non-Aristotelian concept of shared belief.
Even if endoxa are rarely mentioned by name in the Rhetoric, one nevertheless finds
that they are helpful points of comparison for understanding the role of widespread belief
in Aristotelian rhetorical doctrine. As we shall see, the field of rhetoric—similar to dialec-
tic but fundamentally separate from it—relies on what is homolegoumenon, that which is
agreed upon, and not what is more broadly endoxic. Aristotle’s conception of the en-
thymeme, or rhetorical syllogism, depends in particular on the widely held beliefs of an
audience. These syllogisms, therefore, look to a set of materials related to but not identical
to the “reputable” content of dialectical endoxa, for the enthymeme, a crucial tool for the
Aristotelian rhetorician, must attend not only to the logical cogency of an argument but
also to the psychological frame of his audience. And as we shall see, Quintilian’s interest
in the enthymemes and his understanding of their Aristotelian roots orient his under-
standing of rhetoric as a science built on homolegoumena, not on the more capaciously
defined collection of endoxa.
Even if the term endoxa appears infrequently in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, it is clear that
dialectic as a whole is relevant to a discussion of this second genre of argumentation.
The first sentence of Aristotle’s Rhetoric reminds readers that the philosopher conceives
²¹Aristotle mentions endoxa in the Rhetoric at 1355a17, 1356b34, 1357a10, 1357a13, 1368a21,
1368a24, 1402a34.
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of a kinship between rhetoric and dialectic, for there he calls rhetoric the “counterpart”
(antistrophos) of the latter. And while scholars still debate the exact nature of this corre-
spondence, it is nevertheless clear that Aristotle understands that dialectic and its endoxic
materials bear on rhetorical practice to some degree.²²
While similarly puzzling in its efforts to connect rhetoric and dialectic, the Topica
suggests that these practices are both concerned with the beliefs of groups rather than
one particular individual.²³ Early in the Topica, Aristotle alludes to some commonalities
of medicine, rhetoric, and dialectic, explaining that “we shall have a complete grasp of
our method [of dialectic] when we are in the same condition as in the case of rhetoric,
medicine, and other such abilities.”²⁴ This kinship, he continues, is rooted in the possibility
of failure in these activities, even by skilled practitioners: “the rhetorician will not con-
vince under all circumstances, nor the physician heal; however, if he leaves out nothing
that is possible, then we shall say that he has a sufficient grasp of his craft (epistēmē).”²⁵
Like a medic who fails to cure a mortally wounded soldier or a rhetorician who cannot
persuade a stubborn audience, the skilled dialectician, too, will sometimes encounter an
²²McAdon argues that this opening sentence is a pointed refutation of Plato. For Socrates,
McAdon writes, “rhetoric is the counterpart (ἀντίστροφον) of cookery [since] it is detrimental
to the soul of the state” (2001, pp. 129-130). Jacques Brunschwig suggests that the features of
dialectic—“the absence of determined subject matter, its elaboration on earlier empirical practice,
the explication of its aims or ends…and so on—can [all] then easily be transposed to the analysis of
rhetoric” and that “the reader is assumed” to understand these commonalities” (Brunschwig 1996,
p. 35).
²³Brunschwig (ibid., p. 36) writes that “whereas the Rhetoric often refers to the Topics, to dialec-
tic and its typical concepts, the Topics contains no reference at all to the Rhetoric, and very few
references to the art of rhetoric as such.”
²⁴Ἕξομεν δὲ τελέως τὴν μέθοδον ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχωμεν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ῥητορικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς καὶ
τῶν τοιούτων δυνάμεων, 101b. This translation is adapted from Smith (1997, p. 3).
²⁵οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου πείσει οὔθ’ ὁ ἰατρικὸς ὑγιάσει, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν τῶν
ἐνδεχομένων μηδὲν παραλίπῃ, ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην φήσομεν, 101b8-10.
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adversary whom he cannot defeat in argument.²⁶ According to the Topica, then, rhetoric
and dialectic are connected by the possibility of failure, even by their expert practition-
ers.²⁷
Despite these few allusions to the similarities between rhetoric and dialectic, dialec-
tic’s reliance on endoxa does not correspond to a similar interest in endoxic materials in
Aristotle’s explicitly rhetorical writings. As mentioned earlier, forms of endoxon in fact
²⁶Smith contrasts this allowance for failure with sophistic speech: “the sophist seeks only vic-
tory in argument, even if that requires fallacious arguments and deceptive reasoning” (1997, pp. 55-
56).
²⁷This fallibility stems from the concern of rhetoric and dialectic with generalized knowledge,
not knowledge of particulars. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle explains that “rhetoric does not consider
what is endoxon to the individual, such as Socrates of Hippias, but what is so to a sort of people,
as does dialectic” (οὐδὲ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἔνδοξον θεωρήσει, οἷον Σωκράτει ἢ Ἱππίᾳ,
ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοισδί, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτική, 1356b33-5). The phrase kata to hekaston demands
our careful attention here: to hekaston, an Aristotelian catchphrase, refers to what is particular in
contrast to what is to kathalou, what is general or univeral (Grimaldi 1980, 1:90). The rejection
of particularity or pertinence to individuals regarding endoxa has two sides. First, Aristotle is not
interested in what is endoxon “to some one individual,” but rather what is endoxon to a class or
type of person. Aristotle here does not mean what is merely persuasive to an individual person.
See Grimaldi (ibid., 1:52) for a discussion of Aristotle’s notion of the “suasive” (to pithanon) and of
how Aristotle is interested in how materials might be endoxon to a particular class of individuals
(toioisdi). As we have seen in the Topica, Aristotle also considers endoxa to represent beliefs that
are already accepted by a group of people, not simply what is likely to be accepted by such a
group. J.D.G. Evans understands from this passage that unlike demonstrative sciences, the arts of
dialectic, rhetoric, and medicine all collect actual opinions of the multitude in order to extrapolate
broader claims about types of people. These opinions “may be interesting because they are those
of the majority, or they may be interesting because they come from some specially well-qualified
individual or group” (1977, p. 77). Aristotle “contrasts his position [on both rhetoric and dialectic]
with that of the extreme relativist by maintaining not that the concept should be studied in its
absolute and unqualified form, but that it should be studied in its qualified form; qualified by
reference not to random individuals but to types of individual which are selected as specially
relevant” (ibid., p. 77).
This eye toward knowledge about groups rather than individuals fits into broader concerns of
Aristotle’s epistemology, where knowledge about individuals is impossible. As Grimaldi sees it,
“what is at issue here is Aristotle’s theory of what we know and how we know it.” He further
explains that looking for knowledge about groups is rooted in Aristotle’s understanding of matter,
which Aristotle considers “unknowable”: “Rhetoric can train one to discern such material [that
is persuasive to groups], but it cannot determine specifically that which is suasive or probable to
this individual because it is the this-ness which ties the individual into matter and therefore into
the unknowable” (1980, 1:52-53).
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only appear in the Rhetoric seven times, but despite the absence of clear textual evidence
linking endoxa to rhetorical practice, modern scholars sometimes treat endoxa as though
their place in Aristotelian rhetoric is uncontroversial and perhaps even obvious.²⁸ Such
accounts seem misaligned with the text itself: while Aristotle provides several categories
of materials suited for crafting enthymemes, including topoi, semeia, eikota, anagkaia, and
idia, nowhere does he recommend using endoxa.²⁹
Scholars are not entirely unjustified, however, in positioning endoxa as a concept
somewhat related to Aristotelian rhetorical theory. At one point, the Rhetoric connects
endoxa and enthymemes in a discussion of the difficulty of using complex proofs in ora-
tory:
Now, it is possible to draw conclusions and inferences partly from what has
been previously demonstrated syllogistically, partly from what has not, which
however needs demonstration, because it is not endoxon. The first of these
methods is necessarily difficult to follow owing to its length, for the judge
is supposed to be a simple person; the second will obtain little credence, be-
cause it does not depend on what is either admitted (ex homolegoumenōn) or
reputable (ex endoxōn). The necessary result is that the enthymeme and the
example are concerned with things which may, generally speaking, be other
than they are, the example being a kind of induction and the enthymeme a
kind of syllogism (syllogismon); for if any one of these is well known (gnōri-
mon) there is no need to mention it, for the hearer can add it himself.³⁰
²⁸Glenn Most, for example, writes that endoxa are crucial components in constructing Aris-
totelian enthymemes. While “the ethico-political endoxa often include philosophical belief (the
“things said” by the wise) even if they conflict with popular belief (the “things said” by the many),
the rhetorical endoxa seem to include philosophical doctrines only where these may be claimed
to coincide with popular belief” (1994, p. 178). Aristotle wants to use endoxa as premises, “not
because he thinks they are true or despite his confidence that they are false, but simply because he
recognizes in them protaseis from which rhetorical enthymemes can be constructed” (ibid., p. 181).
²⁹See McAdon (2003) for a helpful survey of terms understood to be the materials used to con-
struct Aristotelian enthymemes. See also McAdon (2006), which postulates that this wide array of
materials used to construct enthymemes may have arisen from the editorial work of Andronicus
in the first century BC.
³⁰ἐνδέχεται δὲ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ συνάγειν τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλελογισμένων πρότερον, τὰ δ’ ἐξ
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The passage here makes two separate but related remarks about the importance of us-
ing commonly understood subject matter in rhetorical enthymemes. On the one hand,
Aristotle cautions against an over-abundance of demonstration itself. If rhetorical prac-
tice is burdened by great length (mēkos) of demonstration, owing to the unfamiliarity of
material or subtlety of argument, the audience may not understand the rhetorician’s line
of reasoning.³¹ On the other hand, Aristotle also discourages the use of material that is
not endoxon, or as this passage more precisely specifies here, material that is not derived
from beliefs that are already agreed upon (ex homologoumenōn). Aristotle’s appeal to ma-
terial that is gnōrimos also recalls the definition of endoxa from the Topica, where Aristotle
claims that endoxa can be gathered from the gnōrimoi, those who are “notable” or “famil-
iar.”³² In this discussion in the Rhetoric, then, Aristotle recommends that the rhetorician
use what is gnōrimon, material that is “notable” and “familiar” to the audience and that
can be omitted in the rhetorician’s otherwise lengthy enthymemes.³³
But Aristotle’s close coupling of endoxa and homolegouemana underscores the im-
portance of common beliefs in particular as the foundation for rhetorical practice, and
ἀσυλλογίστων μέν, δεομένων δὲ συλλογισμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔνδοξα, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν
μὴ εἶναι εὐεπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ μῆκος (ὁ γὰρ κριτὴς ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἁπλοῦς), τὰ δὲ μὴ πιθανὰ
διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ὁμολογουμένων εἶναι μηδ’ ἐνδόξων, ὥστ’ ἀναγκαῖον τό τε ἐνθύμημα εἶναι καὶ τὸ
παράδειγμα περί τε τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν ἄλλως, τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγὴν
τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος
συλλογισμός· ἐὰν γὰρ ᾖ τι τούτων γνώριμον, οὐδὲ δεῖ λέγειν, αὐτὸς γὰρ τοῦτο προςτίθησιν ὁ
ἀκροατής 1357a7-19. Translations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric are adapted from J. H. Freese, ed. and
trans. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1947).
³¹As Aristotle cautions, the judge may be haplous, understood as “unsophisticated” or “sim-
ple,” a meaning also found at 1356a7 (Grimaldi 1980, 1:56). Grimaldi also notes here that kritēs,
the “judge,” can be understood more generally as an akroatēs, a “listener” (ibid., 1:56). See also
Aristotle’s criticism of the excessive length (mēkos) of some plots at Poetics §7.
³²See Topica 100b.
³³LSJ explains that gnōrimon can mean both what is “distinguished” (3.II) but also what is well-
known or familiar (1).
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while this passage suggests that endoxa and homolegoumena are related concepts, they
are nonetheless different in important ways. Rather than rely on a category of reputable
beliefs that may be unintuitive or even contrary to the opinions of the many, Aristotle
here associates rhetorical premises with these homolegoumena, materials that are “agreed
upon” or “allowed or granted by common consent.”³⁴ By positioning homolegoumena
and endoxa in syntactically parallel positions in his discussion of the proper use of en-
thymemes, Aristotle suggests that rhetoric should build its arguments not just on beliefs
that are reputable for any reason, but more specifically those that derive their argumen-
tative force from their popularity.
Specifying that rhetorical endoxa should in fact be homolegoumena supports the con-
cern for audience psychology in the second half of Aristotle’s discussion here, for avoiding
uncommon beliefs aims at reducing confusion or even boredom in an audience. In order
to establish the validity of unfamiliar claims, the rhetorician would need to incorporate
lengthy and therefore tedious demonstration into his speech. In other words, if material is
not endoxon or more properly homolegoumenon, it must be demonstrated at great length
(deomenon de sullogismou) to make it credible to an unbelieving audience. Aristotle there-
fore suggests that the enthymeme should begin with conventional materials and that to
do otherwise risks rejection by the audience on account of either confusion or an incred-
³⁴See LSJ ὁμολογέω C1 for these definitions of homolegoumena and other passive forms of this
verb. In the Pseudo-Aristotelian Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, in fact, a homologēma is defined as a
“custom which is common to a city,” a definition that approximates one of Quintilian’s under-
standings of certum as the customs or laws of a city (νόμος ἐστίν ὁ ὁμολόγημα κοινόν, Rhetorica
ad Alexandrum 1422a2). For Quintilian’s inclusion of laws and customs as categories of certa, see
Institutio V.10.13. See LSJ ὁμολόγημα for several examples of this word and its relatives conveying
“agreement,” “compact,” or “confession.”
26
ulous attitude.³⁵ Even if endoxa do not receive thorough treatment in the Rhetoric, this
passage nevertheless points to their importance in constructing enthymemes that convey
a “quick, solid, and comprehensive grasp of the argument.”³⁶ On account of the flexibility
of the definition of endoxa in the Topica and its place in Aristotle’s discussion of the psy-
chological dimensions of enthymemes here, I suggest that endoxa are largely absent in the
Rhetoric because rhetorical endoxa ought to be limited to beliefs of widespread assent and
do not include these reputable but unintuitive claims from people who are themselves
endoxoi. Rhetorical endoxa appear here qualified and redefined as homolegoumena, for
the latter term clarifies that rhetoric should draw its premises from this related but more
specific subset of beliefs.
The appearance of homolegoumena elsewhere in the Rhetoric underscores the impor-
tant role of this subgroup of endoxic material in Aristotle’s rhetorical framework. In a
later discussion of the two types of enthymeme—the demonstrative and the refutative—
Aristotle specifies that both types should begin with materials that appeal to common
assent—that is, from homolegoumena.³⁷ The Aristotelian enthymeme, as a kind of syl-
logism, shares its inferential character with demonstration: beginning from premises, it
³⁵While it is true that Aristotle here also mentions example (paradeigma) and is not solely
interested in the enthymeme as a unique tool of rhetorical persuasion, the “enthymeme enjoys
a dominant role” throughout Aristotle’s treatise (Grimaldi 1980, 1:57). On the other hand, “there
is no indication in the text here, which is primarily a quest for the source material for argument
by enthymeme, that this same material is not also to be used for argument by paradeigma” (ibid.,
1:57). It should be noted here that the truth of an enthymeme’s premises is not required: mere
acceptance is sufficient. See a discussion of the tension between what is “probable” (endoxos) and
what is “necessary” (anankaios) in the Aristotelian enthymeme in Burnyeat (1994, pp. 33-34).
³⁶Grimaldi (1980, 1:58).
³⁷Let us recall a point of contrast from the opening of the Topica where Aristotle notes that a
reliance on endoxa separates dialectic from scientific demonstration. In that text, the apodeixis, we
are told, is demonstrative, didactic, and based on premises that are “true and primary.” Here in the
Rhetoric, Aristotle addresses the demonstrative enthymeme, not scientific demonstration itself.
27
reasons toward a conclusion. Aristotle points to this essential character of the enthymeme
when he defines two kinds of enthymematic reasoning: the demonstrative (deiktikon) and
the refutative (elenchtikon):³⁸
There are two kinds of enthymemes, the one demonstrative, which proves that
a thing is or is not, and the other refutative, the two differing like refutation
and syllogism in dialectic. The demonstrative enthymeme draws conclusions
from admitted premises (homolegoumena), the refutative draws conclusions
disputed by the adversary (anologoumena).³⁹
Aristotle again points to a general kinship between dialectic and rhetoric, but here he
avoids the term endoxa entirely in discussing the premises of rhetorical arguments. Rather
than adopt the terminology of dialectic, here Aristotle explains that the premises of a
rhetorical syllogism are “things that are agreed upon” (homolegoumena), not endoxa. Even
when the refutative enthymeme comes to conclusions that contradict the conclusions of
an opponent (anonologoumena), it too begins from premises that are held in common.⁴⁰
Broadly considered, then, all Aristotelian enthymemes reason from homolegoumena, be-
³⁸Aristotle calls his enthymeme a “rhetorical apodeixis” at 1355a6-7. Brad McAdon writes that
contemporary scholarship tends to treat the enthymeme as an instrument more dialectical in char-
acter than demonstrative, but it shares characteristics more with the demonstrative arguments of
the Prior Anaytics and Posterior Analytics than with the dialectical arguments of the Topica (2003).
Grimaldi notes that this division of enthymemes into two types parallels syllogism and refutation
in Aristotelian dialectic (1980, 2:287).
³⁹ἔστιν γὰρ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εἴδη δύο· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δεικτικά ἐστιν ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, τὰ
δ’ἐλεγκτικά, καὶ διαφέρει ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἔλεγχος καὶ συλλογισμός. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν
δεικτικὸν ἐνθύμημα τὸ ἐξ ὁμολογουμένων συνάγειν, τὸ δὲ ἐλεγκτικὸν τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα
συνάγειν, 1396b22-27.
⁴⁰I disagree with McAdon’s reading which suggests that “the refutative enthymeme draws its
conclusions from those [premises] which are not admitted or inconsistent” (2003, p. 228). This
interpretation would require ex anomologoumenōn, but our text uses the accusative case rather
than the genitive. Both Cope (1877, 2:223) and Grimaldi (1980, 2:287-288) correctly interpret this
accusative case. In his Loeb translation, Freese similarly explains the distinction: “The demonstra-
tive enthymeme draws its conclusion from facts admitted by the opponent; the refutative draws
its conclusion from the same, but the conclusion is one which is disputed by the opponent” (2006,
pp. 294-295).
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liefs which are shared by the speaker and his adversary, not just beliefs that both parties
consider reputable.⁴¹
The appearance of homolegoumena in Book II’s explanation of enthymematic materials
recalls Aristotle’s comments in Book I on the role of endoxic materials in constructing en-
thymemes discussed earlier in this chapter. There he argues that conclusions lack persua-
sive power (mē pithana) when they are drawn from premises that are not homolegoumena
or endoxa, and the close connection of these two words suggests not two separate cate-
gories of materials but rather two nearly synonymous characterizations of enthymematic
propositions.⁴² When Aristotle defines the materials of both demonstrative and refutative
enthymemes as homolegoumena in Book II, he again refers to the subgroup of endoxic
materials at the heart of enthymemes in the first book of the Rhetoric—more specifically,
endoxa that are believed by the many or by all. It is only the unintuitive endoxa of the wise
that do not belong in rhetorical practice. Indeed, one can imagine the difficulty of win-
ning over an audience if the speaker were to ground his argument in the Socratic maxim
that no one does wrong knowingly: such a statement may be endoxic and perhaps fit for
a dialectical argument between two learned specialists, but it is not fit for persuading the
many in the jury or the assembly who have not adopted Socrates’ belief themselves.
As Aristotle continues his discussion of enthymemes in Book II and the source for their
⁴¹Freese’s translation adds “by the adversary” to his translation of anolegoumena and homole-
goumena, but as seen in Aristotle’s aforementioned of endoxa and homolegouemena at 1357a7-19,
it is better to understand a broader audience (such as a judge or a jury) with which one may share
beliefs.
⁴²For Aristotle’s suggestion that premises that are not endoxon or homolegoumenon are “not
persuasive,” see Rhetoric 1357a12. As stated in note 34, homolegoumenon carries the sense of being
granted “by common consent.” See LSJ, ὁμολογέω C1 for examples of this sense from Xenophon
and Plato.
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materials, he suggests that enthymematic homolegoumena are closely related to dialectical
endoxa by reusing language from his definition of the latter term, and this suggestion can
help us understand both the coupling of rhetoric and dialectic that begins his work as
well as his occational references to endoxa in his treatise. Although there may be several
varieties of opinions available to the rhetorician for his argumentative premises, Aristotle
concedes that one “must select out of the vast range…[only] those which happen to suit his
immediate purpose.”⁴³ And the criterion for selecting such opinions is widespread belief:
in rhetorical argument “one must not argue from all possible opinions, but only from those
that are definite and admitted, for instance, either by the judges themselves or by those
of whose judgment they approve.”⁴⁴ Aristotle’s recommendations to the rhetorician recall
the guidelines for using notable authorities (endoxoi) as a source for endoxa in the Topica,
for a rhetorician should appeal to his audience’s own opinions or the opinions of those it
esteems.⁴⁵ Indeed, a similar notion underlies Aristotle’s recommendation in the Rhetoric
here: the rhetorician must work with opinions from the audience members themselves
or from those the audience approves (apodechontai).
In the sentence that follows this recommendation, moreoever, Aristotle emphasizes
⁴³In his commentary, Cope (1877, p. II.224) references the similarity between dialectic and
rhetoric merely in that they are both “unlimited,” but he does not draw attention to the similarity of
the concern expressed in this passage of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and his discussion of selecting endoxa
in the Topica. Grimaldi (1980, 2:278-279) does note, however, that both texts share this concern
for commonly held beliefs. Those who judge (κρίνουσιν) in this passage “may be extended to the
decision of audiences in all three branches of Rhetoric, the assembly, the judges, and the θεαταί or
θεωροί” (Cope 1877, 2:224).
⁴⁴οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν δοκούντων ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν ὡρισμένων λεκτέον, οἷον ἢ τοῖς κρίνουσιν ἢ οὓς
ἀποδέχονται, 1395b31-1396a1.
⁴⁵In his Topica, let us recall, Aristotle defines endoxa as things which are believed by all, by
many, or by the wise (ἔνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις
ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις, 100b25-30).
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the particular relevance of widespread beliefs—not merely beliefs of reputable sources—
for constructing rhetorical syllogisms: “in fact, it must be clear that the opinion offered is
the view held by all or most people.”⁴⁶ Like Aristotle’s definition of endoxa in the Topica,
where he appeals to truths that are apparent (dokounta) to an audience, his appeal here
to unanimous or majority belief in rhetorical proof similarly gathers materials from what
appears to be true (phainetai).⁴⁷ The enthymeme’s reliance on such widespread belief,
futhermore, establishes a kinship between the methods of dialectic and rhetoric and sep-
arates rhetoric from scientific demonstration.⁴⁸ While Aristotle may call the enthymeme
a rhetorical apodeixis, it differs from a scientific apodeixis in its reliance on a brand of en-
doxic material in place of “true and primary premises.”⁴⁹ But rather than rely on dialectical
⁴⁶καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ὅτι οὕτως φαίνεται δῆλον εἶναι ἅπασιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις. The text varies among
editions. In his OCT, David Ross writes διότι to replace δὴ ὅτι even though the latter is attested
in many manuscripts. Grimaldi (1980, 1:279) surveys the many variations in punctuation across
editions but notes that “the variant punctuation does not affect the meaning.” He supplies the
translation provided here.
⁴⁷This reliance on beliefs that appear to be true for an audience underlies a fundamental dis-
tinction between Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of dialectic: “Plato conceived dialectic
as essentially involving a search for definitions, and he regarded it as a scientific activity.…But
Aristotle maintains that dialectic does not involve the search for definitions” but instead involves
hypotheses and beliefs set out by an audience. (Evans 1977, p. 50).
⁴⁸Burnyeat (1994, p. 21) agrees that both dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms “take their
premises from endoxa, propositions that enjoy good repute.” The partial alignment of dialectical
endoxa and rhetorical homolegoumena recalls Aristotle’s opening sentence of the Rhetoric, where
he calls rhetoric the counterpart (antistrophos) of dialectic. Scholars have long debated the nature
of this relationship, and the study in this chapter does not aim to settle the interpretive difficul-
ties in Aristotle’s cryptic statement. What the relationship between endoxa and homolegoumena
illustrates, however, is that rhetoric and dialectic share at least some kinds of premises. Their
materials are not identical—we might even define homolegoumena as a type of endoxa—and their
aims are not identical either. See Frede (2012, p. 195) who calls Aristotelian dialectic “a kind of
intellectual game” where the object is “to find a way to argue about any proposed topic on the
basis of reputable premisses, and when defending a thesis, not to get trapped in contradictions.”
⁴⁹For Aristotle’s definition of the enthymeme as a rhetorical apodeixis, see Rhetoric 1355a6-7.
For Aristotle’s claim that scientific demonstration uses “true and primary premises,” compare the
similar distinction between apodeixis and dialectical syllogism made at Topica, 100a-100b.
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endoxa as the source of rhetorical materials, Aristotle specifies further that a subgroup of
endoxa—those found among all or among the many—is particuarly relevant to rhetorical
practice.
As a matter of concluding this discussion of homolegoumena and their role in rhetor-
ical argument, it is worth noting how they allow the rhetorician to use enthymemes as
persuasive tools appropriate for his audience members and their own participation in his
logic. This participation allows the orator to omit materials he knows that his audience
grasps well, and in fact, scholars have often pointed to the resulting brevity as the defin-
ing characteristic of an enthymeme. Such a suggestion is not without merit: Aristotle
writes that an enthymeme is “a kind of syllogism, and deduced from few premises, often
fewer than the regular syllogism.”⁵⁰ Aristotle’s definition here is the “locus classicus for
the common interpretation of the enthymeme as a truncated syllogism,” since here Aris-
totle highlights the ability of the enthymeme to leave out premises which are known to
that audience (ean gar ē ti touton gnōrimon, oude dei legein).⁵¹ But we must construe the
negative oude in this second clause with great care. Aristotle does not negate the object of
⁵⁰τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος
συλλογισμός· ἐὰν γὰρ ᾖ τι τούτων γνώριμον, οὐδὲ δεῖ λέγειν, Rhetoric 1357a16-18.
⁵¹Grimaldi (1980, 1:57-58). Unfortunately, a rigid, almost quantitative definition of the en-
thymeme has maintained great influence in scholarship and commentary on Aristotle, in both
modern and ancient authors. The precise meaning of the enthymeme has been marked by its “mis-
perception…as both a reductive and a rigidly deductive proceeding” (Green 1995, p. 20), defined
strictly by its omission of widely held, endoxic premises. There is such a definition for enthymeme
in the Prior Analytics, where Aristotle characterizes it as “an incomplete (ateles) sullogismos from
likelihoods or signs” (Burnyeat 1994, p. 6). Burnyeat finds that this definition is repeated three
times in the Rhetoric (1.2.14, 1357a32-33; 1.3.7, 1359a7-10; 2.25.8, 1402b13-20), but he ultimately
rejects this statement as an “essence” rather than a full definition of enthymeme. He concludes
that its definition is “a sullogismos of a kind and a demonstration of a kind, a deduction from which
you cannot expect everything you would normally expect from a valid deductive argument” (ibid.,
p. 30).
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dei; that is, he does not write that “it is necessary not to say something if it is something
widely-known.” He instead gives the rhetorician the freedom to decide whether proposi-
tions that are gnōrimon should be stated explicitly: “it is not necessary to say something
widely-known.”⁵² The enthymeme, we must remind ourselves, takes as its aim not an ideal
internal structure but the persuasion of an external audience.⁵³ We should not, therefore,
define a successful enthymeme by formulaic or mechanical omission of premises. Conci-
sion is not the enthymeme’s goal. It is its method. And this concision, as we have shown
here, can only occur when rhetorical syllogisms are grounded in homolegoumena, not
endoxa more broadly.
Our final task in our examination of endoxic material in Aristotle’s rhetorical doc-
trine aims to connect the rhetorician’s ability to omit widely understood materials and
the rhetorician’s ultimate goal of persuasion. We find in Aristotle that brevity can be a
persuasive strategy in itself: by encouraging an audience to fill in gaps in an argument,
the speaker produces a kind of psychological pleasure in his listeners. Allowing listeners
to supply their own beliefs promotes their receptiveness, perhaps by preventing boredom
or allowing them to construct arguments that make sense on their own terms. And as
we shall see, this understanding of the pleasure of enthymematic argument is central to
⁵²Here I take gnōrimon as a close substitute for endoxon. In his definition of dialectical endoxa,
Aristotle describes the authoritative men from whom one can derive endoxa as gnōrimois kai en-
doxois (100b23). Burnyeat (1994, p. 23) writes “Aristotle certainly does not say that an enthymeme
must have a premise omitted, on pain of not being an enthymeme at all. An enthymeme must be
brief, if it is to fulfill its function, but this can be achieved by a suitable choices of premises rather
than by their suppression.” By contrast, Cope (1877, p. II.221) takes the more rigid approach to the
construction of enthymemes. He writes that “the rhetorician never expresses all three” proposi-
tions in a rhetorical syllogism, for “if he did, his enthymeme would become a regular syllogism.”
⁵³Burnyeat (1994, p. 23) writes that “a ‘good’ enthymeme is to be understood, again by reference
to the function of rhetoric, as one that is effective with an audience of limited mental capacity.”
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Quintilian’s own understanding of rhetorical practice.
A foundational component of the connection between brevity and persuasion is Aris-
totle’s notion of the intellectual pleasure of inference, a pleasure he alludes to in the
Rhetoric:
Since learning and admiring are pleasant, all things connected with them
must also be pleasant: for instance, a work of imitation, such as painting,
sculpture, poetry, and all that is well imitated, even if the object of imitation
is not pleasant. For it is not this that causes pleasure (charei) or the reverse,
but the inference (syllogismos) that the imitation and the object imitated are
identical, so that the result is that we learn something.⁵⁴
Aristotle here remarks that learning (manthanein) is pleasant, and he cites the apprecia-
tion of imitative arts as an occasion for such learning. More specifically, he writes that
the experience of an inference (syllogismos) is what causes pleasure in the reasoner. The
result clause, introduced by hoste, shows how through a “flash of insight [the listener]
infers new knowledge from something given, and [he feels] the pleasure which comes
from the illumination.”⁵⁵ In his Poetics, too, Aristotle similarly notes that “people enjoy
(chairousi) looking at images, because through contemplating them it comes about that
they understand and infer (syllogizesthai) what each element means.”⁵⁶ The mental activ-
ity of inference as practiced by audience members, whether the audience of tragedy or
⁵⁴ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι, οἷον τό τε
μιμούμενον, ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητική, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ᾖ,
κἂν ᾖ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο
ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει, 1371b4-10.
⁵⁵See Grimaldi (1980, 1:264).
⁵⁶διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ
συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, 1448b15-17. D. W. Lucas writes that the verb here signifies “the in-
tellectual pleasure of solving a puzzle” and that “it has no relevance to the aesthetic enjoyment
of a picture” (1968, p. 72). D. Montmollin writes that this instance of syllogizesthai should be
understood as “infer by syllogistic reasoning” (1951, pp. 35, 204).
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rhetoric, engenders a kind of enjoyment. In both the Poetics and the Rhetoric, Aristotle
relates this experience of pleasure to the syllogism.⁵⁷
Aristotle’s association of inference and pleasure bears on his theory of the place of
emotions in rhetorical practice, and defining the proper role of emotions in rhetoric, in
fact, is a central concern of Aristotle’s treatise. Early in the Rhetoric, he bemoans the
status of the “art” (technē) of rhetoric because its practitioners are not concerned with
proof itself, which he believes is the speaker’s primary and proper tool. Instead, these
practitioners focus on mere emotional manipulation:
Proofs are the only things in [the art of rhetoric] that come within the
province of art; everything else is merely an accessory. And yet [current
practitioners] say nothing about enthymemes which are the body of proof,
but chiefly devote their attention to matters outside the subject; for the arous-
ing of prejudice, compassion, anger, and similar emotions has no connection
with the matter in hand, but is directed only to the judge.⁵⁸
Aristotle here appears to connect the enthymeme strictly with logic and to sequester
emotional appeal to peripheral status (prosthēkai). These emotional aspects of rhetoric
are not concerned with “the matter in hand” (peri tou pragmatos) but rather directed out-
wardly toward the audience, or more specifically here, the judge. The following section of
the Rhetoric, however, contradicts this purely logical rendering of the enthymeme. Even
though Aristotle informs his readers that “proofs (pisteis) are the only things in [the art
of rhetoric] that come within the province of the art” and gives the impression that the
⁵⁷Here Aristotle is concerned with the audience’s experience of pleasure. There are, of course,
other emotions that could inspire receptiveness in an audience, perhaps the fear and pity so central
to the psychological basis of his theory of tragedy. Compare the discussion of pity in Rhetoric II.8.
⁵⁸αἱ γὰρ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν εἰσι μόνον, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα προσθῆκαι, οἱ δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων
οὐδὲν λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα
πραγματεύονται· διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ
πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν, 1354a13-18.
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enthymeme is an emotionally disinterested method of proof, he later defines emotional
appeal as one of the forms (eidē) of proof available to the rhetorician:⁵⁹
Now the proofs (pisteis) furnished by the speech are of three forms. The first
depends upon the moral character of the speaker, the second upon putting
the hearer into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the speech itself, in so
far as it proves or seems to prove.⁶⁰
Aristotle here explicitly couples pistis with his tripartite division of proof into logical,
ethical, and emotional dimensions. And yet, a few sentences later, Aristotle reaffirms
his position that “all orators craft proof (tas pisteis poiountai) by employing either exam-
ples or enthymemes and nothing else.”⁶¹ He therefore seems to present two contradictory
accounts of the role of enthymemes: while earlier Aristotle explicitly rejects emotional
manipulation in favor of strictly informative or logical enthymematic proof, his explana-
tion of pistis here both endorses emotional appeal and yet forbids the use of tools other
than the enthymeme.
In light of this apparent contradiction, it is helpful to recall Aristotle’s psychology of
learning and pleasure. In our earlier discussion of the pleasure of inference, we see how
syllogisms themselves can generate emotionally positive experiences. Aristotle revisits
the emotional impact of rhetorical reasoning in his discussion of the emotional manipu-
⁵⁹αἱ γὰρ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν εἰσι μόνον, τὰ δ’ἄλλα προσθῆκαι, 1354a13-14. Aristotle’s phrase
sōma tēs pisteōs here emphasizes the self-contained nature of proof. Aristotle contrasts the en-
thymemes as “body” of proof with other elements that are “outside the subject” (ex tou pragmatos),
including the arousal of emotions in an audience. See Rhetoric 1354a and also LSJ, σῶμα, IV for
similar usage in Longinus.
⁶⁰τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη ἔστιν· αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ
λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ
φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι, 1356a1-4.
⁶¹πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ παραδείγματα λέγοντες ἢ ἐνθυμήματα,
καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν πως, 1356b6-8. For Aristotle’s division of proof into logical, ethical and
emotional sources, see also Rhetoric I.2.7.
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lation of judges, where he stresses that the judge in a forensic case should similarly rely
on his own reasoning, not on the speaker himself:
For there is no need to warp the judge’s feelings, to arouse him to anger,
jealosy, or compassion, which would be like making the rule crooked which
one intended to use. Further it is evident that the only business of the litigant
is to show that the fact in question is or is not so, that it has or has happened
or not; whether it is important or unimportant, just or unjust in all cases
in which the legislator has not laid down a ruling, is a matter for the judge
himself to decide; it is not the judge’s function to learn from those arguing
the case.⁶²
Aristotle here contrasts the proper function of the rhetorician—“to show that the fact
in question is or is not so.” Rather than rely on the rhetorician at all for “learning”
(gignōskein), Aristotle’s ideal judge looks only to be acquainted with the facts of the case.
Aristotle’s discussion, moreover, provides space for emotional appeal enacted through
rhetorical demonstration itself. The final sentence of this passage calls attention to the
proper kind of learning that occurs in the courtroom: the judge must “not learn from
those arguing the case” (ou manthanein para tōn amphibētountōn), but instead learn from
the arguments themselves. This critique of faulty rhetoricians exposes the absence of en-
thymemes in the speeches of the technologoi who aim directly at emotional manipulation
of the judge and not at an emotional appeal rooted in the pleasure of reasoning. Aristotle’s
proper rhetorician does not rely on “nondiscursive means, like cries, tears, gesticulations”
among other gestures to elicit emotional responses from the audience.⁶³ Rather, so Aris-
⁶²οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργὴν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον· ὅμοιον γὰρ
κἂν εἴ τις ᾧ μέλλει χρῆσθαι κανόνι, τοῦτον ποιήσειε στρεβλόν. ἔτι δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν
ἀμφισβητοῦντος οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔξω τοῦ δεῖξαι τὸ πρᾶγμα ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ γέγονεν ἢ οὐ
γέγονεν· εἰ δὲ μέγα ἢ μικρόν, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὅσα μὴ ὁ νομοθέτης διώρικεν, αὐτὸν δή που τὸν
δικαστὴν δεῖ γιγνώσκειν καὶ οὐ μανθάνειν παρὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, 1354a24-30.
⁶³Brunschwig (1996, p. 46). Brunschwig concludes that Aristotle juxtaposes seemingly contra-
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totle later explains, “the orator persuades by means of his hearers, when they are roused
to emotion by his speech (hupo tou logou).”⁶⁴ The genitive of agent clarifies that emotional
effects are not brought about by “those arguing the case” (para tōn amphibētountōn) as
cautioned against in Aristotle’s discussion of the manipulation of the judge. Emotional
appeal instead should arise from the speech itself, likely through the pleasure of syllogistic
reasoning that Aristotle discusses in his works elsewhere.
Aristotle develops this distinction through his separation of “atechnical” and “entech-
nical” rhetoric.⁶⁵ In contrast with “atechnical” methods of emotional appeal (the “cries,
tears, and gesticulations” which Aristotle ascribes to the technologoi), “entechnical” meth-
ods allow a speech itself to serve as an instrument for emotional arousal.⁶⁶ Aristotle reit-
erates this very distinction in the first chapter of his Rhetoric, accusing the technologoi of
“only…[putting] the judge into a certain frame of mind. They give no account of the en-
technical proofs (entechnōn pisteōn), which make a man a master of rhetorical argument.”⁶⁷
In Aristotle’s view, then, there is no disagreement about whether emotional components
dictory statements on the role of emotions in rhetoric “because he wanted to show his reader the
theorizing process that had led him from his starting point to a different but not incompatible
position” (1996, p. 45).
⁶⁴διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν, 1356a14-15.
⁶⁵For Aristotle’s distinction between these two types of rhetoric, see Brunschwig (ibid., pp. 45–
47).
⁶⁶Using the speech itself as a source for effects is “the general criterion of ‘entechnicality’: the
atechnical proofs preexist the speech [and] the speaker can only ‘make use of them,’ whereas en-
technical proofs are those that he brings out with his method, in and through his own speech”
Brunschwig (ibid., p. 46). Aristotle similarly criticizes flatterers in his discussion of pleasure:
“flattery and the flatterer are pleasant, the latter being a sham admirer and friend” (καὶ τὸ
κολακεύεσθαι καὶ ὁ κόλαξ ἡδέα· φαινόμενος γὰρ θαυμαστὴς καὶ φαινόμενος φίλος ὁ κόλαξ ἐστίν,
1371a22-24).
⁶⁷οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πραγματεύονται πλὴν ὅπως τὸν κριτὴν ποιόν τινα ποιήσωσιν, περὶ
δὲ τῶν ἐντέχνων πίστεων οὐδὲν δεικνύουσιν, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ὅθεν ἄν τις γένοιτο ἐνθυμηματικός,
1354b19-22.
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should be allowed in rhetoric; he takes issue with how and from where these components
arise.⁶⁸ Emotional appeal, he insists, must emerge from argumentation but not through
the addition of peripheral emotional elements.
Aristotle’s theory of enthymematic reasoning integrates emotional appeal, homole-
goumena, and proof into a coherent theory of rhetorical syllogism. The widespread ac-
ceptance of homolegoumena allows the enthymeme to maintain its cogency when such
materials are omitted, and as discussed earlier in this chapter, this opportunity for omis-
sion is not merely a matter of formal structure: it is fundamentally intertwined with
Aristotle’s theory of inferential learning and intellectual pleasure. By allowing an au-
dience to use their own beliefs to complete an abbreviated enthymeme, the rhetorician
also catalyzes the pleasure of inference. The audience’s participation in syllogism, Aris-
totle argues, brings with it an emotionally positive experience: the logical-inferential and
emotional-pleasurable components of rhetoric are inseparable.
Turning now to Quintilian’s rhetorical treatise, we unearth a debt to specifically Aris-
totelian rhetorical concepts, particularly in Quintilian’s understanding of the enthymeme,
for the relationship between audience emotion and enthymematic structure constitutes an
⁶⁸Brad McAdon, however, finds that the contradictory accounts of emotion in enthymematic
reasoning do not lend themselves to reconciliation, and he argues that the inconsistencies in
Rhetoric I.1 and I.2 are “deeper and more irreconcilable than has been acknowledged by most
commentators” (2004, p. 308). He notes that the enthymeme in the Rhetoric is defined both as a
rhetorical syllogismos and a rhetorical apodeixis and that these terms are not actually interchange-
able (ibid., p. 315). His discomfort with these discussions in the Rhetoric derive from comparisons
with a similar set of terminology used in other works of Aristotle, primarily the Prior and Poste-
rior Analytics. Reading the Rhetoric’s understanding of the enthymeme against other Aristotelian
texts is problematic, though, since their aims are dialectical and the Rhetoric’s is not. In fact,
even finding a precise definition of the enthymeme within just the Rhetoric may be impossible.
McAdon admits that there is “confusion and inconsistency of the text itself” which preclude any
exact categorization or definition of the enthymeme in the first place (ibid., p. 323).
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important element of Quintilian’s theory of rhetorical proof. Quintilian adopts an Aris-
totelian vision of the enthymeme even if competing definitions of its structure and func-
tion exist in his lifetime.⁶⁹ Despite the significant influence of Stoic thought, our Roman
schoolmaster ultimately places at the center of his work an Aristotelian notion of proof,
rooted both in certa that approximate homolegoumena as well as in Aristotelian theories
of audience psychology and the pleasure of inference. While Quintilian’s understanding
of the enthymeme undoubtedly shows the influence of other schools, particularly the Sto-
ics, we nevertheless see his continued use of an Aristotelian understanding of rhetorical
proof, centered around a novel understanding of certainty.
Like Aristotle, Quintilian begins his treatise on rhetorical proof, the fifth book of the
Institutio, with a discussion of the proper role of the emotions in oratory and the contro-
versies surrounding these emotional components. While Aristotle supports the judicious
use of emotional appeal through the enthymeme, other theorists, so Quintilian reports,
uncompromisingly reject the emotional dimension of rhetoric:
There were some famous authors for whom the only apparent duty of an
orator is to teach, for they thought that emotions needed to be excluded for
two reasons: first, because every disturbance of the mind is a moral fault,
and second, because it is not proper for a judge to be kept from the truth by
pity, favor, wrath, or similar emotions. And they thought that to seek the
delight of the audience members, since speaking is done for the sole purpose
of winning, is not only pointless for the one pleading the case, but is also
hardly befitting a man.⁷⁰
⁶⁹For evidence of these competing traditions, one need only look at the enthymeme’s several
definitions that Quintilian himself lists at Institutio V.10.1-5.
⁷⁰Fuerunt et clari quidem auctores quibus solum uideretur oratoris officium docere (namque et
adfectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant, primum quia uitium esset omnis animi perturbatio,
deinde quia iudicem a ueritate depelli misericordia gratia ira similibusque non oporteret: et uolup-
tatem audientium petere, cum uincendi tantum gratia diceretur, non modo agenti superuacuum, sed
uix etiam uiro dignum arbitrabantur), V.pr.1.
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Unlike Aristotle, who merely cautions against the use of manipulative emotional appeal
without any grounding in logos, some “famous authors” present a more radical position
regarding the exclusion of emotional appeal in rhetorical practice: for them, “every dis-
turbance of the mind is a moral fault.” They advocate a wholesale rejection of emotion in
rhetorical practice, and thus stand in opposition even to Aristotle’s measured advocacy
of emotional appeal strictly through inferential pleasure.
While Quintilian gives no names of these “famous” authors, it is likely that the Stoics
constitute this rhetorical camp opposed to emotional appeal. Scholars treat the Stoic re-
jection of emotional rhetoric as common knowledge, a generalization corroborated in the
work of Plutarch, a rough contemporary of Quintilian.⁷¹ Emotional appeal for the Stoics
is not even an “accessory” component to proof as was the case in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, but
is incompatible with proof entirely. Such a rejection would preclude the Stoic use of the
Aristotelian enthymeme, and accordingly, there exists no discussion of the term among
early Stoic authors.⁷²
These Aristotelian and Stoic traditions influence Roman rhetorical theorists, even if
the two schools of thought contradict each other on important points. In his own Topica,
⁷¹For an example of the widespread belief in Stoic rejection of emotion in rhetorical practice, see
Solmsen (1941, p. 178). In his On Moral Virtue, Plutarch reports that, for the Stoics, “emotion is a
worthless and unbridled form of reasoning [λόγος] derived from simple and misguided judgment
which has taken on more vehemence and strength.” (καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν
καὶ ἀκόλαστον ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβούσης,
441D).
⁷²James McBurney records that foundational Stoic figures like Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysip-
pus, “either because they lacked ready access to Aristotle’s writings or because they sought to
develop an original logical and rhetorical system, do not appear to have maintained the en-
thymematic conception” (1936, pp. 68-9). In fact, Aristotle’s understanding of the enthymeme
seems to have fallen out of study among the early Stoics, whose “extant fragments reveal no refer-
ence to the enthymeme despite the fact that they are known to have written treatises on rhetoric”
(ibid., p. 69).
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for example, Cicero defines the enthymeme in purely formal terms as an “affirmative
disjunctive syllogism,” otherwise known as modus ponendo tollens or the “third form” of
Stoic syllogism.⁷³ Immediately following this definition, Cicero reports that this kind of
reasoning is more appropriate for philosophical inquiry than rhetorical persuasion, and
in fact, Cicero writes that when rhetoricians use this logical template in their orations,
they merely apply this thoroughly philosophical tool in an oratorical context. The third
form, he argues,
has doubtless a relation to your discussion when you give answers on le-
gal problems, but it more closely concerns the philosophers, who share with
orators that method of drawing a conclusion from contradictory statements
which the dialecticians call the third form, and the teachers of rhetoric, the
enthymēma.⁷⁴
Cicero’s enthymeme is at once dialectical and rhetorical, a coupling which resonates with
Aristotle’s understanding of the close relationship between these two intellectual prac-
⁷³Such argumentation can be summarized in the following basic form:
1. Not both p and q
2. p
3. Therefore, not q
A classic example of such an argument reads as follows:
1. It is not both day and night.
2. It is day.
3. Therefore, it is not night.
Cicero explains this form of reasoning as follows: “when you deny that certain things are con-
nected and assume the truth of one or more, so that the remaining statement must be excluded,
this is called the third form of reasoning” (cum autem aliqua coniuncta negaris et ex eis unum aut
plura sumpseris, ut quod relinquitur tollendum sit, is tertius appellatur conclusionis modus, Topica
§54).
⁷⁴Hoc disserendi genus attingit omnino vestras quoque in respondendo disputationes, sed
philosophorum magis, quibus est cum oratoribus illa ex repugnantibus sententiis communis conclusio
quae a dialecticis tertius modus, a rhetoribus ἐνθύμημα dicitur, (Topica §56). Translations of Cicero’s
Topica are adapted from Reinhardt, ed. and trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
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tices. But the enthymeme as a so-called “third form” or “conclusion from contradictory
statements” has drifted far from Aristotle’s original terminology. Absent are the concerns
for homolegoumena and for an audience’s inferential pleasure. Cicero’s refashioning of
the enthymeme, then, sits firmly in the domain of dialectic and merely cites the Greek
term as a rhetorician’s label for a logician’s tool.⁷⁵
More evidence of this dialectical, un-Aristotelian understanding of the enthymeme
comes from Sextus Empiricus, whose discussion of the “conclusion from contradictory
statements” does not speak of the rhetorical enthymeme at all but merely presents it in
the context of “non-demonstrable arguments so much talked of by the Stoics.”⁷⁶ Among
these non-demonstrable arguments is this tertius modus that Cicero cites in his Topica,
which Sextus Empiricus describes as follows:
The same reasoning applies also to the third non-demonstrable argument. For
either it is pre-evident that it is impossible for the clauses in the coupled pre-
miss mutually to co-exist, or else it is non-evident. And if it is non-evident we
shall not grant the negative of the coupled premiss; but if it is pre-evident, at
the moment of positing the one clause the other is annulled, and the negative
of the coupled premiss is redundant when we propound the argument in the
form “It is day, therefore it is not night.”⁷⁷
Sextus Empiricus, too, thinks of these methods of argumentation as elements of the Stoic
⁷⁵Cicero presents these formal methods of argumentation in his Topica as a “topic for the di-
alecticians” (locus dialecticorum, §53).
⁷⁶οἱ θρυλούμενοι παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἀναπόδεικτοι ἀσύνακτοι εὑρεθήσονται, (Outlines of
Pyrrhonism, 2.156). Translations of Sextus Empiricus are adapted from R. G. Bury, ed. and trans.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
⁷⁷ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου ἀναποδείκτου. ἤτοι γὰρ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐκ
ἐνδέχεται τὰ ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ συνυπάρξαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλον, οὐ δώσομεν
τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλον, ἅμα τῷ τεθῆναι τὸ ἕτερον ἀναιρεῖται τὸ λοιπόν,
καὶ παρέλκει τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς, οὕτως ἡμῶν ἐρωτώντων ‘ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα νὺξ
ἔστιν’ (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 2.161).
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dialectical (rather than the rhetorical) tradition.⁷⁸ This firmly dialectical grounding in
Sextus Empiricus for the third form allows readers to see clearly Cicero’s exclusively di-
alectical understanding of the enthymeme in his Topica, an understanding that contradicts
Aristotle’s tripartite rendering of enthymematic proof into logical, emotional, and ethi-
cal components. For the preeminent Roman orator, the enthymeme has morphed from
Aristotle’s “rhetorical syllogism” into a strictly dialectical method of proof, the modus
ponendo tollens.⁷⁹ Aristotle’s term, for Cicero at least, now only serves as a rhetorical
footnote concerning an otherwise strictly dialectical topic.⁸⁰
Quintilian navigates between these two competing understandings of the
enthymeme—one of Aristotelian rhetoric, the other of Stoic dialectic—particularly
regarding the proper place of emotion as a tool for rhetorical persuasion, and this
controversy surrounding emotional appeal stands at the center of this chapter’s final
section. As noted above, the opening of Quintilian’s Book V resembles that of Aristotle’s
⁷⁸Sextus Empiricus cautions his readers that “if [these non-demonstrable arguments] are de-
molished [then] the whole of dialectic is overturned” (ὧν ἀναιρουμένων ἡ πᾶσα διαλεκτικὴ
ἀνατρέπεται, 2.156).
⁷⁹Lawrence Green argues that Cicero “makes it clear late in his career that—whether he is
eclectic, confused, or inspired—he sees no reason for the orator to choose between Aristotelian
and Stoic logic; they are more or less interchangeable” (1995, p. 32). This interpretation of Cicero,
however, derives not from a definitional equivalence of the Stoic and Peripatetic enthymeme, but
rather from Cicero’s own practical considerations: “I advise whoever is led on by the praise of
eloquence not to be unprepared entirely in these affairs but rather to be educated in either the
ancient [Aristotelian] teaching or this teaching of Chrysippus” (Ego eum censeo qui eloquentiae
laude ducatur non esse earum rerum omnino rudem sed vel illa antiqua vel hac Chrysippi disciplina
institutum, Orator §32.) The orator, according to Cicero here, if he wishes to receive praise for his
speaking abilities, should be well-versed in either the Aristotelian or Stoic rhetoric; both schools
reach toward a common end, and it is this end, not the means, that is Cicero’s concern).
⁸⁰This conflation was perhaps not Cicero’s own innovation. James McBurney has noted that the
“most renowned rhetorician in the Stoic school,” Hermagoras, had an influence on Cicero whereby
Cicero had a “tendency to confuse the enthymeme and the logical syllogism” (1936, p. 69). We
return to Hermagoras’ influence on Cicero in the following chapter, particularly as it bears on
Cicero’s understanding of status theory.
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Rhetoric: Quintilian acknowledges the controversies surrounding emotional appeal
and swiftly moves from a discussion of emotion to one of proof. Although Quintilian
initially seems to adhere to an anti-emotional, Stoic-influenced view of the primacy
of the logical enthymeme as laid out in Cicero, we shall see that he later focuses on
the emotional, Aristotelian elements of proof. His view of the rhetorical syllogism,
in other words, on the one hand recognizes Stoic developments but rehabilitates a
fundamentally Aristotelian notion of proof and argumentation. And on account of
these pronounced Aristotelian elements, one more easily understands how the Rhetoric’s
notion of homolegoumena underlies Quintilian’s own understanding of certa.
When Quintilian introduces the enthymeme, he ascribes to it five possible meanings.
These definitions include the following:⁸¹
1. A thought
2. A maxim backed by a reason
3. A certa conclusion of an argument either (a) from consequents or (b) from contraries
4. A rhetorical syllogismus
5. An incomplete syllogismus, with not as many of its constituent parts ditinguished
as a non-rhetorical context would require⁸²
⁸¹Burnyeat (1994, p. 39) helpfully provides this five-part outline of Quintilian’s definition.
⁸²Nam enthymema (quod nos commentum sane aut commentationem interpretemur, quia aliter
non possumus, Graeco melius usuri) unum intellectum habet quo omnia mente concepta significat
(sed nunc non de eo loquimur), alterum quo sententiam cum ratione, tertium quo certam quandam
argumenti conclusionem uel ex consequentibus uel ex repugnantibus: quamquam de hoc parum conu-
enit. Sunt enim qui illud prius epichirema dicant, pluresque inuenias in ea opinione ut id demum
quod pugna constat enthymema accipi uelint, et ideo illud Cornificius contrarium appellat. Hunc alii
rhetoricum syllogismum, alii inperfectum syllogismum uocauerunt, quia <nec> distinctis nec toti-
dem partibus concluderetur: quod sane non utique ab oratore desideratur. V.10.1-3. Demetrius first
presents definition 3 as the meaning of enthymema in On Style (§30): τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα διάνοιά τις
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The Aristotelian roots of the fourth definition are evident, whereas the third defintion
is rooted in the Stoic tradition.⁸³ Some scholars argue that Quintilian is concerned here
only with logical indemonstrables and mentions the enthymeme’s rhetorical roots only
as a historical gloss.⁸⁴ This suggestion is not without merit: Quintilian himself places all
the aforementioned definitions of the enthymeme under the umbrella of the argumentum
(nunc de argumentis), a term which he later defines as ratio probationem praestans, a “ra-
tional process which furnishes proof.”⁸⁵ At the conclusion of Quintilian’s discussion of the
enthymeme here, he emphasizes its role as a rational method of proof with practically no
discussion of its history as a term related to Aristotelian emotional appeal, and he turns
ἤτοι ἐκ μάχης λεγομένη <ἢ> ἐν ἀκολουθίας σχήματι. In On Style, however, Demetrius also in-
vokes definition 4 (καὶ καθόλου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τίς ἐστι ῥητορικός, §32), but
the qualifying phrase “in general” (καὶ καθόλου) suggests that Demetrius considers definition 3 to
be a specific type of “rhetorical syllogism.” Cicero writes in his Topica §55 that a “thought” could
be considered an enthymeme, but a more accurate and meaningful definition is an inference from
contraries. The appearance of certam…conclusionem supports Quintilian’s statement at V.10.12
that all arguments take premises that are certa to make certain an incertum conclusion.
⁸³See Rhetoric 1356a34-1356b11 for Aristotle’s definition of the enthymeme as a “rhetorical
syllogism.” The Stoic third form is “from contraries” as Cicero and Sextus Empiricus illustrate
above. Burnyeat notes that “enthymemes in [the sense of definition 3 above] exemplify the Stoic
indemonstrable, which is the form ‘Not p and q; p; therefore, not q’ [and that] they exploit a
contrariety” (1994, p. 42). Such enthymemes are “a far cry from Aristotelian syllogistic” (ibid.,
p. 42). So Burnyeat argues: “Although Cicero uses the word conclusio rather than syllogismus,
it is Stoic syllogismi that both he and Quintilian are talking about. So when Quintilian gives
imperfectus syllogismus as the fifth meaning of ‘enthymeme,’ it is the Stoic, not the Aristotelian,
notion of syllogismus he has in view” (ibid., p. 42). Other scholars have noted the various sources
for Quintilian’s definitions of the enthymema. See, for example, Seaton (1914).
⁸⁴He writes “some people called the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and others called it
an imperfect syllogism because it is constructed with parts that are neither distinct nor equal
in number” (hunc alii rhetoricum syllogismum, alii inperfectum syllogismum vocacerunt, quia nec
distinctis nec totidem particus concluderetur (V.10.3). Walton and Reed (2005, pp. 339-340) take
Burnyeat’s suggestion that Quintilian sees the enthymeme primarily in logical terms.
⁸⁵Quintilian begins his discussion of the enthymeme, epicheireme, and apodeixis all under the
heading of argumenta at V.10.1. For Quintilian’s discussion of argumentum as a ratio probationem
praestans, see V.10.11. Quintilian also specifies that an argumentum more generally is the means
through which steps of deductive argument are “connected” (colligitur, V.10.11), verb that refers
specifically to Stoic inference in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations 4.54. See OLD, colligo 11a.
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away from his discussion of the enthymeme in order to discuss the example (paradeigma),
the second, subordinate concern in Aristotle’s treatment of rhetorical proof.
This first discussion of the enthymeme, however, is not Quintilian’s last. In the fi-
nal chapter of Book V, Quintilian revisits the enthymeme and expands its definition to
accommodate a stylistic component, not just a particular logical structure:
They, therefore, call an enthymeme both the argument itself, that is the thing
(res) which is applied to the proof of another thing, and also the expression
(elocutio) of the argument, and this expression, as I said, has two forms: from
consequents…[and] from contrary terms.⁸⁶
Quintilian adjusts his initial definition of the enthymeme as a type of argumentum to
include the elocutio of those arguments, a stylistic orientation of the enthymeme not
unprecedented in earlier rhetorical manuals.⁸⁷ It is worth emphasizing, however, that
Quintilian does not use elocutio to signify the florid rhetoric of a theatrical orator. His
understanding of the term still verges on the dialectical: he refers to “expression” as an
arrangement of propositions (ex consequentibus…ex pugnantibus) and not as pleasurable
or even artful prose.
This first suggestion of the importance of rhetorical style in enthymematic reasoning,
however, expands into a full recommendation for attention to the psychological dispo-
⁸⁶Igitur enthymema et argumentum ipsum, id est rem quae probationi alterius adhibetur, appellant
et argumenti elocutionem, eam vero, ut dixi, duplicem: ex consequentibus…ex pugnantibus, V.14.1-2.
The argument from contrary terms has its roots in the Stoic third form whereas the argument from
consequents may be a general term for syllogistic reasoning.
⁸⁷The Rhetorica ad Herennium places argumentum within its discussion of inventio in Book II
(II.V); its discussion of elocutio, however, begins in Book IV, where one finds a discussion of “an
argument from contraries” (IV.XVIII). For a discussion of elocution within the broader structure of
the Rhetorica ad Herennium, see Caplan (1954, xlviii and liv). Thomas Conley, too, notes that the
enthymeme is “unashamedly stylistic” in the Rhetorica ad Herennium (1984, p. 179), and Francesca
Piazza finds stylistic attributes of the enthymeme in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (2011, p. 316).
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sition of an audience when using enthymemes. Quintilian draws attention to the im-
portance of the audience’s emotional state in his distinction between the enthymeme
and the epicheireme, where he clarifies that the enthymeme stands in opposition to the
epichirema, which for Quintilian is “in no way different from the syllogism, except that
syllogisms have more species and infer truth from truth, whereas the epichirema is most
often used with propositions which are merely probable.”⁸⁸ His enthymeme, by contrast,
“is only intent on being understood”: it looks not just inward to its own logical structure
but also outward to its audience.⁸⁹
Quintilian’s turn away from formal rigidity toward a more pragmatic, audience-
focused definition of the enthymeme recalls the Aristotelian conception of the rhetori-
cal syllogism. And Quintilian’s concluding remarks emphasize this second dimension of
rhetorical persuasion, tempering the Stoic notion of a strictly logical enthymeme with a
concern for emotional effect:
I do not want at all that the whole oration consist of or be completely stuffed
with epicheiremes and enthymemes. It will be more similar to dialogues or
even dialectical debates than the pleadings of our art. These are indeed very
different things. For in those dialectical discussions, learned men among
other learned men investigate everything, asking rather detail-oriented and
scrupulous questions, and they arrive at a clear and agreed-upon conclu-
sion.…We have to create a speech for the judgment of others, and often we
must speak among people who are completely inexperienced and certainly
ignorant of those dialectical studies. Unless we delight our listeners with
pleasure and lead them along with our powers and once in a while disturb
them with our feelings, we cannot be victorious even in those cases which are
just and true. Eloquence wishes to be rich, attractive, and powerful. None of
these qualities will come about if it is divided by certain facts, compact, and
⁸⁸nullo differt a syllogismis nisi quod illi et plures habent species et vera colligunt veris, epichire-
matis frequentior circa credibilia est usus, V.14.14. Notice again the appearance of colligunt as a
verb of syllogistic reasoning.
⁸⁹enthymema tantum intellegi contentum est, V.14.24.
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monotonously-patterned arguments; it will bring about scorn from its low-
liness, hatred from its certain slavishness, bloat from its sheer volume, and
boredom from its monotony.⁹⁰
The beginning of this passage suggests that Quintilian conceives of enthymemes as purely
formal structures. Speeches that contain only enthymemes and epichiremes are “more
similar to dialogues and even dialectical debates” (dialogis enim et dialecticis disputation-
ibus erit similior) than rhetorical arguments of “our art.” Such dialectical speech is inef-
fective for rhetoricians, Quintilian warns, because its methods are unfit for the audience,
which will not understand these difficult arguments: even when the rhetorician says what
is “just and true” (iusta et vera), he will lose his case.
To avoid defeat, Quintilian recommends that the rhetorician aim to “delight our lis-
teners with pleasure” (delectatione adlicimus). This attention to “delighting the listeners”
stands in clear contrast with the purely logical understandings of the Stoic enthymeme
seen in Cicero and Sextus Empiricus. It should be noted, however, that Quintilian does not
recommend that the rhetorician use manipulative techniques that take as their sole aim
the emotional state of the audience. In the vein of Aristotle’s connection between infer-
ence and pleasure, Quintilian here connects complex formal logic with negative emotional
states. A speech filled with complex enthymemes, Quintilian warns, will only engender
⁹⁰…constare totam aut certe confertam esse adgressionum et enthymematum stipatione minime
velim. Dialogis enim et dialecticis disputationibus erit similior quam nostri operis actionibus, quae
quidem inter se plurimum differunt. Namque in illis homines docti et inter doctos verum quaerentes
minutius et scrupulosius scrutantur omnia et ad liquidum confessumque perducunt.…Nobis ad alio-
rum iudicia componenda est oratio, et saepius apud omnino imperitos atque illarum certe ignaros
litterarum loquendum est, quos nisi et delectatione adlicimus et viribus trahimus et nonnumquam
turbamus adfectibus ipsa quae iusta ac vera sunt tenere non possumus. Locuples et speciosa <et im-
periosa> vult esse eloquentia: quorum nihil consequetur si conclusionibus certis et crebris et in unam
prope formam cadentibus concisa et contemptum ex humilitate et odium ex quadam servitute et ex
copia satietatem et ex similitudine fastidium tulerit.
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“hatred” (odium) and “boredom” (fastidium). With its dearth of rhetorical variatio and
other stylistic figures, it will be “monotonously-patterned” (in unam prope formam).
Later, Quintilian alludes to the enthymeme’s role in inspiring inferential pleasure,
the hallmark of Aristotelian emotional appeal. Echoing Aristotle’s connection between
audience inference and pleasure, Quintilian recommends that enthymematic arguments
should invite listeners to participate in the reasoning process through the artful use of
elision. Arguments that are too long are liable to produce negative emotional reactions,
and speeches that are “completely stuffed” (confertam…stipatione) with arguments and
that carefully walk through every detail (scrupulosius scrutantur) are more appropriate
for dialectical argument than rhetorical persuasion. Quintilian understands that rhetor-
ical audiences are particularly put off by these lengthy and voluminous arguments: au-
diences experience “bloat” (satietatem) on account of the volume (copia) of the speech.⁹¹
In other words, a reduction in length of one’s enthymemes—accomplished through the
omission of well-known material—would likely effect positive emotional responses in the
audience. Implicit in Quintilian’s remarks here is a recommendation to excise material
that is too meticulous or simply too long, for the unwieldy logical structure of the long-
winded syllogism itself inspires the audience’s distaste. Concision, by contrast, inspires
delight.
Following his advice on how to avoid unpleasant methods of argumentation, more-
over, Quintilian revisits the canonical Aristotelian rhetorical elements of pathos and ethos.
He suggests that argumentation itself and not the orator’s gesticulations or other atech-
nical elements must aim at the orator’s Aristotelian concerns for both pathetic and ethical
⁹¹See also Rhetorica ad Herennium which recommends varietas to combat satietas (IV.4.16).
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components of persuasion:
Now I make the further point that I disagree also with those who believe that
arguments should always be expressed in language which is pure, lucid, and
distinct, but not elevated or ornate. Of course I admit that the arguments must
be distinct and clear, and indeed that in the less important cases the language
and the vocabulary should also be as literal and normal as possible. But if the
subject is a grander one, I do not think that any ornament (so long as it does
not lead to obscurity) should be denied it. . . . And argumentation is less
suspect when well disguised, and the hearer’s enjoyment (voluptas) greatly
helps the credibility (fides) of the speaker.⁹²
Quintilian here claims that unnamed theorists—likely the Stoics who are suggested in
the book’s proem—believe “arguments should always be expressed in language which is
pure, lucid, and distinct.”⁹³ But again, his objection to this pure language is not a matter
of internal form; rather, it is a matter of practical advantage. He reminds readers that
“argumentation is less suspect when well disguised, and the hearer’s enjoyment (volup-
tas) does a lot for the credibility (fides) of the speaker,” a recollection of the emotional
and ethical components theorized by his Peripatetic predecessor.⁹⁴ As Quintilian’s clos-
ing remarks here demonstrate, he does not maintain a Stoic vision of the enthymeme
throughout his discussion of rhetorical proof. He may first ground his understanding of
argumentum in mere ratio and show more concern with the logical formalism of argu-
ing from contraries—that is, the third Stoic indemonstrable—but Quintilian’s enthymeme
⁹²Nunc illud adiiciendum, ne iis quidem consentire me, qui semper argumenta sermone puro et
dilucido et distincto ceterum minime elato ornatoque putant esse dicenda. namque ea distincta qui-
dem ac perspicua debere esse confiteor, in rebus vero minoribus etiam sermone ac verbis quammaxime
propriis et ex usu; at si maior erit materia, nullum iis ornatum, qui modo non obscuret, subtrahen-
dum puto.…et minus suspecta argumentatio dissimulatione, et multum ad fidem adiuvat audientis
voluptas, (V.14.33-35).
⁹³Recall Quintilian’s earlier claim at V.14.1 that the enthymeme is not merely argumentum ip-
sum but also the elocutio argumenti.
⁹⁴For voluptas as a delight or agreeable experience, see OLD, 1a. For fides as the “quality of
being worthy of belief,” see OLD, 9a and 9b.
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ultimately concerns a listener, credibility, and pleasing style. It is rhetorical to its core,
taking into consideration all three Aristotelian elements: logos, ethos, and pathos.
These passages, cautioning against the boredom of the audience and recognizing the
possibility of speaking to “inexperienced and ignorant” people, recall the concerns of Aris-
totle’s Rhetoric. In that text, Aristotle writes that arguments where many syllogisms are
necessary run the risk of being “difficult to follow owing to their length, for the judge is
supposed to be a simple person.”⁹⁵ Aristotle, too, recommends that when some premise
is widely understood, “there is no need to mention it, for the hearer can add it himself,”
and in order to facilitate such elision, Aristotle suggests that enthymemes rely on ma-
terials shared by one’s listeners.⁹⁶ His concern is one that Quintilian shares: they both
aim at the comprehensibility of a rhetorical speech. Perhaps with this very passage of the
Rhetoric in mind, then, Quintilian understands that even the Stoic syllogism, defined as
a dry, logical, and perhaps tediously drawn-out logical form, is insufficient for attending
to the practical needs of speaking to a real audience. Although Quintilian never clarifies
the mechanism of psychological pleasure—he does not say, for example, that inference
is itself a pleasurable activity—he nevertheless explains that concision and omission are
safeguards against boredom.
After uncovering these Aristotelian elements in Quintilian’s theory of argumentation,
one can more easily understand his certa as Aristotelian homolegoumena. Quintilian tells
us that certa, like homolegoumena, are defined by shared opinion (communis opinio), and
⁹⁵τὸ μὲν μὴ εἶναι εὐεπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ μῆκος (ὁ γὰρ κριτὴς ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἁπλοῦς),
1357a10-12.
⁹⁶ἐὰν γὰρ ᾖ τι τούτων γνώριμον, οὐδὲ δεῖ λέγειν, 1357a17-18.
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also include laws which, if not considered reasonable by all people, are at least consid-
ered right by a city or nation or other relevant social group.⁹⁷ And these matters of broad
agreement—these homolegoumena—ground the enthymemes of Quintilian’s rhetoric. Fi-
nally, his manual does not consider enthymemes as mere Stoic indemonstrables; instead, it
highlights their pleasure-producing concision. Through this constellation of Aristotelian
elements, one can sense how Quintilian’s notion of certainty is, at least in part, inspired
by Aristotelian homolegoumena and the Peripatetic enthymemes they support.
Quintilian’s rendering of certainty, however, is not entirely drawn from the rhetor-
ical thinking of his Peripatetic forebear. The first of Quintilian’s categories of certa is
“things perceived by the senses, like the things we see and hear.”⁹⁸ While Aristotle, un-
like many Greek philosophical figures, maintained confidence in the human senses as
reliable instruments for perceiving and understanding the world, neither his Topica nor
his Rhetorica addresses these epistemological questions at great length.⁹⁹ We now turn
to Cicero, whose philosophical writings (which precede Quintilian by about a century),
understand certainty through this sense-based lens. The Roman orator’s conception of
certum is rooted in the debates of Academics and Stoics, for whom certum was an impor-
tant word in determining the validity of perceptual experiences. As we shall see, Cicero
⁹⁷quae persuasione etiam si non omnium hominum, eius tamen ciuitatis aut gentis in qua res
agitur in mores recepta sunt, V.10.13. For the definition of homologēma as nomos in the Rhetorica
ad Alexandrum, see note 34 of this chapter.
⁹⁸quae sensibus percipiuntur, ut quae uidemus audimus, V.10.13.
⁹⁹“Aristotle was confident in the ability of human senses to perfectly grasp all the relevant
aspects of the phenomenal world” (Haskins 2004, p. 3). Aristotle also believed that sense perception
allowed more than just knowledge of particulars. It was instrumental in grounding language:
“for Aristotle, systematic understanding, when expressed in language, would take the form of
generalized propositions about essences and attributes of classes of objects, not about particular
features of an immediate object of perception” (ibid., p. 5). For more on Aristotle’s connection
between language and perception, see Nussbaum (1986, pp. 242-243).
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also positions certainty as a concept central to matters of rhetorical proof, not merely as a
technical matter of sensory epistemology: he views certainty as a part of several intellec-
tual endeavors, a flexibility and complexity which in turn inspires Quintilian’s manifold
rendering of certum.
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Chapter 2
Skepticism and Property in Ciceronian Certainty
In hisDe RerumNatura, Lucretius famously laments that Greek philosophical concepts are
too abstract and complex for the unrefined, impoverished Latin tongue.¹ Latin, indeed,
lacks certain Greek grammatical constructions like present passive participles, and the
absence of a philosophical vocabulary confounds Lucretius when he tries, for example,
to explain homoeomeria.² Cicero, too, has his own difficulties with Latin philosophical
vocabulary, but he nevertheless manages to render important philosophical debates of
Hellenistic philosophical schools into Latin.³ As part of a larger effort near the end of his
life to translate Greek philosophy into his own language, Cicero composes the Lucullus
and theAcademica, works that consider Hellenistic disputes surrounding sense perception
and their understanding of the criterion of truth, the marker of reliable sensory experi-
ence. And by placing what is certum at the center of these discussions, Cicero shows how
certainty in the Latin tradition is concerned with discernment, a rendering that antici-
pates by over a century Quintilian’s first definition of certum as that which is perceived
by the senses. Indeed, we cannot arrive at the schoolroom of Quintilian without first
¹I.136-145.
²I.830.
³For a more general discussion of Cicero’s struggle to render Greek concepts in the Latin
language, see Powell1996.
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passing through the study of Cicero.
But Cicero’s interest in certainty is not limited to these technical philosophical discus-
sions, and his several rhetorical works—both speeches and theoretical treatises—consider
the role of certainty in the courts with the same terminology that appears in his later epis-
temological debates. In one sense, these related rhetorical and philosophical discussions
of Cicero are an ideal backdrop for studying the understanding of certainty that later ap-
pears in Quintilian’s writings, for just as Aristotle and Quintilian conceive of a kinship
between rhetoric and dialectic, Cicero too understands that rhetorical and philosophical
matters are closely connected.⁴ The debates Cicero stages among Hellenistic interlocu-
tors, including Academics and Stoics, thus show a concern with certainty not unrelated
to its role in his rhetorical corpus. As these rhetorical works illustrate, this sense-based
notion of certainty, a central concept in the Lucullus in particular, has links to notions of
property and culpability at the center of several of his forensically oriented writings. In
short, the notion of certainty in Cicero’s corpus anticipates the succinct catalog of certa
in Quintilian’s manual on account of their shared breadth.
Accordingly, this discussion looks both to Cicero’s explicitly philosophical work as
well as to his rhetorical theory to explore his manifold treatment of ancient certainty.
First, Cicero’s arguments for a kind of Academic skepticism hinge on competing under-
standings of perception and the certa et propria nota, the so-called criterion of proof, that
can guarantee the validity of sensory experience. After looking at Cicero’s philosophical
⁴In his Orator, written near the end of his life, Cicero argues that his own oratorical abil-
ities arise “not from the workshops of the rhetoricians, but from the spacious grounds of the
Academy” (non ex rhetorum officinis, sed ex Academiae spatiis, §12). Translations of Cicero’s Or-
ator are adapted from H. M. Hubbell, ed. and trans. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1988).
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texts where these issues are addressed—particularly his Lucullus—this discussion turns to
Cicero’s more explicitly rhetorical texts to see how his notions of certainty bear on the
needs of forensic argumentation.⁵ These oratorical treatises, like his discussions of epis-
temology, illustrate Cicero’s understanding of certainty as a deficient category of knowl-
edge as well as a quality of evidence with limited probative force. Cicero’s discussion
of certum, like that of Quintilian’s text, reveals an ancient modesty about the value of
certainty while positioning it as a nexus of both philosophical and rhetorical interests,
epistemology and oratory, Greek thought and Roman speech.
With the help of post-classical glossaries, one can see that the close association of
“truth” and “certainty” as understood in modern English is (at least among some ancients)
an old pairing. In the case of the seventh-century Harleianus glossary, which lists Greek
words and provides at least one Latin equivalent for each entry, the Greek stem alēth*—
which denotes truth, broadly speaking—exhibits a strong correspondence to both verum
and certum:⁶
⁵I use Academica throughout to refer only to the first book of the collection of these two
works, sometimes called the Academica Posteriora. I refer to the second book by the title Lucullus,
sometimes called the Academica Priora. For a study of the textual history of these works and their
revisions, see Reid (1885, pp. 28–51).
⁶The Greek stem here conveys “truth” as opposed to “mere appearance,” to which ἀλήθεια
does not refer (LSJ I). The Harleianus glossary is part of the manuscript Harleianus 5792 (Goetz and
Gundermann 1965, 2:xx). For a study of Cicero’s epistemological vocabulary and his effort to trans-
late terms from Greek debates surrounding probability, see Glucker (1995). These efforts, it seems,
do not always result in tidy correspondences between the Greek and the Latin. John Glucker re-
ports, for example, that “it is usually assumed that probabile and veri simile are alternative Latin
terms employed by Cicero to translate the Carneadean πιθανόν” (ibid., p. 115). Carneades, so
Glucker explains, advocated the “persuasive” as a “guide to the choice, in practical life, between
various perceptions, without lending them the Stoic adsensio or adprobatio (συγκατάθεσις)” (ibid.,
p. 116). But Glucker shows that while generally Cicero uses probabile to render πιθανόν and veri
simile to render εἰκός, there are exceptions to these correspondences. He points to a bilingual glos-
sary of Philoxenus from late antiquity where “evidence is hardly clear-cut” about probabile and
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• ἀληθές – verum, certum
• ἀληθέστερον – verius, certius
• ἀληθέστατα – verissime
• ἀλήθεια – veritas
• ἀληθής θηλυκόν – vera
• ἀληθής ἀρένικον – verax, certus, verus
• ἀληθινός – manifestus, verax
• ἀληθινός λόγος – veriloquax, veridicus
• ἀληθεύω – verum dico
• ἀληθῶς – vero, certe
• ἀληθῶσταρ – enimvero
The coincidence of these two Latin roots throughout suggests that in this author’s mind
“truth” and “certainty” roughly occupy the same semantic space among the ancient
sources from which he draws his own pairings.⁷
While this seventh-century glossary positions verum and certum as approximate syn-
onyms, however, Cicero’s philosophical writing separates these two Latin terms as a part
of his Roman reworkings of epistemological debates between the Stoic and Academic
schools. As “an Academic, at least of sorts,” Cicero was still an “active [participant] in
veri simile and some of Cicero’s philosophical translations more generally. We turn to Philoxenus’
glossary later in this chapter.
⁷And this alignment is well-documented by modern lexicographers, as well. The Oxford Latin
Dictionary provides fourteen definition groups for certus, the eighth of which reads, “Absolutely
dependable, certain, true.” See also certus 6a, “certain to happen or be realized, inevitable, sure.”
The Thesaurus Linguae Latinae defines certus as probatus, quod putes verum esse vel re vera (III).
The TLL similarly lists ἀληθής as a Greek equivalent for this definition.
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the continuing disputes between the schools” of the Hellenistic philosophers, and ac-
cordingly, he positioned many of his own philosophical writings in the tradition of and
in dialogue with the philosophers who came before him.⁸ And in Cicero’s Lucullus in
particular, he uses certum in his discussions of the “criterion of truth,” a sign of the relia-
bility of sense perception and a concept at the center of debates among these Hellenistic
schools.⁹ According to Stoic epistemological doctrine, “the criterion of truth is what [Sto-
ics] called a cognitive impression,” and such an impression fulfilled three conditions: it
“[1] comes from what is, [2] is imprinted and impressed in accordance with what is, and
[3] is such that an impression of this kind could not come about from what is not.”¹⁰ This
tripartite definition of the Stoic cognitive impression inspires controversy, and as Cicero
makes clear in his dialogues, the possibility of conclusively fulfilling the third condition
in particular—that a cognitive impression “could not come about from what is not”—is
hard to swallow for Academic skeptics.¹¹
Lucullus, who serves as interlocutor in the work that shares his name and who as
⁸Everson (1990, p. 8).
⁹H. Rackham notes that “in Cicero’s encyclopedia of philosophy, Academica [and Lucullus are]
the article on Epistemology” (2000, p. 400). The concept of the criterion of truth “seems to have
been relatively new to the philosophical language around 300 B.C.,” and “we do not know who
introduced it as a technical term, which it is not in its rare occurrences in Plato and Aristotle”
(Striker 1990, p. 144).
¹⁰Striker (ibid., p. 151). J. Hankinson (1997, p. 169) and J. Allen (1997, p. 232) report that the third
condition was added in response to Arcesilaus’ criticism of the original, two-part definition of the
cognitive impression. For a recent discussion of the conditions of the Stoic cognitive impression
as they relate to contemporary epistemological debates concerning internalism and externalism,
see Nawar (2014).
¹¹The most hardline Academics, in fact, “marshall arguments to show that there is no possible
criterion of truth,” even if more moderate skeptics like “Arcesilaus and Carneades also offered
surrogate principles of conduct in place of the criterion, one of which, the ‘convincing,’ was to
win much favour with Carneades’ doctrinaire successors in the Academy” (Long and Sedley 1987,
p. 465).
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“Cicero acknowledged in his letters to Atticus…was no philosopher,” adopts the Stoic po-
sition and argues against the alleged excesses of Academic skepticism.¹² Lucullus’ remedy
for an impractically extreme rejection of claims to knowledge is to assent to information
provided by the senses, on the condition that such information can be shown to be reliable
according to specific qualifications set by the Stoics, the three aforementioned criteria.¹³
As part of his defense of the reliability of sense perception, Lucullus connects veritas with
the certa iudicia of the senses: “Let us begin therefore from the senses, whose iudicia are
so clear and certa, [for] the senses contain the highest truth.”¹⁴ Despite Cicero’s aforemen-
tioned charge that Lucullus is no true philosopher, his statement here employs technical
vocabulary that situates his argument within broader debates concerning the criterion
¹²Reid (1885, p. 46). Reid notes that Cicero “felt a thorough contempt” for the private endeavors
of Lucullus, and often refers to him in letters as a connoisseur of fish ponds: Letters to Att I.18.6,
I.19.6, I.20.3, II.9.1 (ibid., pp. 47-48).
¹³Lucullus’ measured confidence in sense perceptions, as Cicero reports, is derived from his
frequent interactions with the philosopher Antiochus of Ascalon (Lucullus 4). Antiochus is some-
times taken as a cookie-cutter Stoic regarding his theory of epistemology. Gisela Striker, however,
notes that although Antiochus’ own doctrine was inspired by Stoic epistemology, he is ultimately
“wrong…in describing the Stoic criterion as a ‘sign,’ since this suggests, contrary to what the Sto-
ics intended, that one might be aware of a cognitive impression but not of the external object
revealed by it” (Striker 1990, p. 158). This interest in the sign—that is, the nota—of the external
object persists throughout Cicero’s dialogue.
¹⁴ordiamur igitur a sensibus, quorum ita clara iudicia et certa sunt…est maxima in sensibus veri-
tas, II.19. Although certum is an important epistemological term in the Lucullus, the word appears
only twice in the Academica. I count the two appearances of the adjectival/substantive forms. The
related adverb certe appears only once at I.13. On one occasion, Cicero writes that both Academic
and Peripatetic schools “drew plentiful supplies from Plato’s abundance, and both framed a par-
ticular well-defined (certam) rule of doctrine” (utrique Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam
disciplinae formulam composuerunt, I.17). Here, certam merely denotes that the two schools—
Peripatetic and Academic—that arose from Plato’s original teaching each had their own robust
ideas. On another occasion, Cicero remarks that it is Plato’s Old Academy where “all things are
inquired into and no certain statement is made” (de omnibus quaeritur, nihil certi dicitur, I.46). This
use of nihil certi refers to Socrates’ elenchus, which “is an adversarial procedure [whose] object is
always the discovery of the truth,” as opposed to “eristic” which merely seeks to win arguments
(Nehamas 1990, p. 7). The word appears seventeen times, however, in the Lucullus. Translations
of Cicero’s Lucullus are adapted from H. Rackham, ed. and trans. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2000).
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of truth. These iudicia are not mere “judgments”; rather, a iudicium is a technical term
in both the Academica and Lucullus for kritērion, the Greek word for the “mark” that is
associated with accurate and reliable sensory experience.¹⁵
More often, however, Lucullus uses nota, not iudicium, when referring to the criterion,
although in either case he couples his Latin noun with the adjective certum. In a later
passage, for example, Lucullus points to the certa et propria nota as the criterion that
sets claims of sensory knowledge above claims of mere probability, an assurance at the
foundation of his Stoic-influenced epistemology:
[The Academics’] effort is not aimed at proving that it cannot ever happen
that a man may make a positive assertion about a thing without there being
some certa et propria nota attached to the thing that he in particular professes
to accept. What then is the probability that your school talks about?¹⁶
Lucullus’ discussion of the criterion of proof—the certa et propria nota—treats the two
adjectives of this formulation separately, and it will be helpful to look at the concept of
“belonging” before turning our attention to certainty. First, the concern that the criterion
should be the “property” of something true—that is, be exclusively associated with what is
¹⁵For a discussion of the technical meaning of iudicium, see Reid (1885, pp. 135-136, 195). See
another example of such a use at Academica I.30 (ibid., p. 135). Glucker also gives iudicium as the
standard Ciceronian translation for κριτήριον, noting that “where a fairly literal translation seems
satisfactory, Cicero keeps to it” (1995, p. 118).
¹⁶Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec argumentum nec sensus neque perspicuum ullum
relinquitur. Ex hoc illud iis usu venire solet ut quicquid dixerint a quibusdam interrogentur: ‘Ergo
istuc quidem percipis?’ Sed qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur; non enim urguent ut coarguant
neminem ulla de re posse contendere nec adseverare sine aliqua eius rei quam sibi quisque placere
dicit certa et propria nota. Quid est igitur istuc vestrum probabile, II.34–35. While Lucullus earlier
uses iudicium as his Latin translation for the κριτήριον, here he uses nota as his Latin equivalent
for the Greek word σημεῖον, “a term used by all the late Schools for the sign or rule by which
truth might be known,” but in either case the criterion must exhibit certainty (Reid 1885, p. 278).
Although different authors may sometimes prefer one term over another, “there is often little to
distinguish σημεῖον from κριτήριον” (ibid., p. 278).
61
true or proprium to it—is a central point of contention among earlier Hellenistic philoso-
phers.¹⁷ Confident in the viewers’ ability to separate the true from the false, Lucullus
associates the adjective proprium with the sign of a true cognitive impression, insofar as
the nota belongs particularly and unambiguously to the true thing that is perceived:¹⁸
If there is a commonality with a false presentation, it will contain no standard
of judgment, because a special property (proprium) cannot be indicated by a
common mark (commune signum). But if on the contrary there is nothing in
common between them, I have got what I want, for I am looking for a thing
that may appear to me so true that it could not appear to me in the same way
if it were false.¹⁹
Lucullus’ argument here touches on the uniqueness and discernibility of true impressions
from false ones, an important later development in the Stoic theory of the cognitive im-
pression.²⁰ The third condition of such an impression—the requirement that a cognitive
¹⁷Antiochus, a teacher of Cicero who came to adopt a Stoic position after a period of skep-
ticism, “complained that the alleged criterion of [Academic skeptics] was common to truth and
falsehood, since they admitted that even an unimpeded and tested plausible impression might be
false ” (Striker 1990, p. 158).
¹⁸Gisela Striker notes that Lucullus’ account of the nota here implies that “the ‘sign’ can be
observed independently of the thing signified, and this is a point that no Stoic worth his salt should
have admitted” (1997, p. 264). Lucullus’ understanding posits that “what the observer receives
is the impression, which may or may not correctly represent its object” (ibid., p. 265). Striker
hypothesizes that Lucullus’ unorthodox understanding of the Stoic criterion is a consequence of
Antiochus’ blending of Stoic and Carneadean epistemologies (ibid., 265f.).
¹⁹In eo autem, si erit communitas cum falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia proprium communi signo
notari non potest; sin autem commune nihil erit, habeo quod volo, id enim quaero quod ita mihi
videatur verum ut non possit item falsum videri, II.34.
²⁰Debate between the Stoics and the Academics “was indeed centered around the third clause
of the Stoic definition” (Striker 1997, pp. 255-256). Striker compiles three qualities from Diogenes
Laertius (VII.50) and Sextus Empiricus (Adversus Mathematicos VII.248), in addition to Cicero’s
Lucullus (77). The original definition of the cognitive impression, however, only included the first
two of these three conditions. J. Hankinson writes that this third condition was added by Zeno
“in response to Arcesilaus’ objection that the original Stoic characterization [where cognitive im-
pressions are defined merely by arising from what is true and through an impression in exact
accordance with what is true] was inadequate, since if there were false impressions indistinguish-
able from true ones, we could never as a matter of fact know” that these original two conditions
had been fulfilled (Hankinson 1997, p. 169).
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impression arise from what is and not what is not, labelled [3] in the preceding definition—
is precisely the quality denoted by proprium. A second appearance of propria nota makes
this association between the third condition and the adjective proprium clear:
For just as the objects of sight are recognized only by means of the eyes,
so everything else is recognized by means of sense-presentations; but they
are recognized by a mark that belongs exclusively to what is true (propria
veri…nota), and is not common to the true and the false (non communi veri et
falsi).²¹
The appearance of proprium here without its common partner certum helpfully isolates
the issue at stake for Lucullus: if a nota were not propria, it would be communis to both
the true and the false, and therefore it would not meet the third condition of the cognitive
impression. That impression, so he explains, must be property of the verum alone and not
communis with the falsum.
Just as Cicero’s text shows how proprium carries a technical meaning of “ownership”
in the context of Stoic cognitive impressions, his dialogue similarly uses certum to denote
another technical consideration in these epistemological debates. Lucullus’ association
of proprium and the third condition of the Stoic cognitive impression—where the nota
must be propria to the true and not communis with the false—parallels his coupling of
certainty with the second condition, which requires that a cognitive impression be “im-
printed and impressed in accordance with what is.” Immediately after his discussion of
proprium, Cicero’s dialogue similarly treats the controversy relating to the second condi-
tion of the cognitive impression by appealing to another set of novel Latin term. As the
text renders this conflict, Stoics and Academics disagree about whether impressions are
²¹Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed propria veri, non communi veri et
falsi nota, II.33.
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both percepta and perspicua: while the Stoics believe that a sensory perception can convey
the exact qualities of an object to the viewer, the Academics suspect that an impression
might distort or otherwise falsely represent the qualities of the thing perceived.²² In terms
of these two adjectives, a Stoic maintains that what is perspicuous (perspicuum, or clearly
sensed) is necessarily perceived (perceptum), the adjective that denotes the viewer’s truth-
ful, accurate grasp of an impression.²³ Academic skeptics, by contrast, argue that what is
perspicuum is not necessarily perceptum, on account of the fact that the putative clarity
of an impression is no guarantee of its accuracy. And this debate, as Lucullus shows here,
culminates in a claim regarding the certainty of sensory experience:
Skeptics try to prove that there is such a thing as something perspicuous (aliq-
uid perspicui), but that thing, even when it has been impressed (impressum)
in the mind and intellect, it nevertheless is not capable of being perceived
and comprehended. Indeed, how can you say that something is perspicu-
ously white when it can happen that a thing that is black may appear to be
white? Or how shall we say that things are either perspicuous or exactly im-
pressed upon the mind when it is incertum whether the mind is stirred truly
or deceptively?²⁴
At first, it might seem like Lucullus is merely reinforcing the arguments in support of the
propria nota, a reasonable understanding since “the third clause [of the Stoic defintion of
cognitive impressions] makes explicit what is already implied by the second.”²⁵ But the
appearance of impressum—and Lucullus’ move to a separate but similis error—shows that
²²For a discussion of Academic doubts concerning this mechanism of percpetion, see Allen
(1997, pp. 218-219) and Reid (1885, p. 219).
²³For the association of perspicuitas with “vividness” or enargeia, see Reid (ibid., p. 219).
²⁴conantur ostendere esse aliqud perspicui, verum illud quidem impressum in animo atque mente,
neque tamen id percipi atque comprendi posse. Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid,
cum possit accidere ut id, quod nigrum sit, album esse videatur, aut quo modo ista aut perspicua
dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere inaniterne moveatur, II.34.
²⁵Striker (1997, p. 266).
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Lucullus is in fact concentrating on this second clause, namely that what is sensed must
be “impressed in exact accordance” with the object under examination.²⁶ The argument
in this passage, then, centers on the mechanism of impressing and whether such impress-
ing is done reliably: by pointing to the mechanism of impression—“whether the mind
is stirred truly or deceptively”—as the central issue surrounding the second condition,
Lucullus draws attention to the impressing and its effects on the viewer rather than the
truth of the object from which the impression arises. The skeptical position, according to
which accuracy in this mechanism cannot be guaranteed, leads one to uncertainty: when
skeptics cast doubt on this mechanism, the viewer is left with what is incertum.
A second discussion of the clarity of perceptions underscores how certainty is the
quality associated with such clarity rather than with the status of the perceived objects
themselves. In this later passage, Lucullus rebuts the skeptical argument that ordinary
sensory experiences could be inaccurate in exactly the way that dreams and hallucina-
tions are: “Do they not even see that they make everything incerta—a position they deny
(I use incerta to translate the Greek adēla)?”²⁷ The objects of ordinary perceptual experi-
ence (omnia) which are adēla in this passage are “unclear” not in relation to what they are
²⁶After addressing the need for a nota to be propria, Lucullus explains that Academics similarly
err (simili in errore versantur) when they separate the “perspicuous” and the “perceived” (cum
convicio veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt distinguere, II.34. The origin of this dispute is
unclear. James Reid argees with C. F. Hermann that “this distinction was insisted on by Philo” of
Larissa (Reid 1885, p. 219), but Harold Tarrant and John Glucker trace it back to Metrodorus of
Stratonicea (Tarrant 1981, p. 73) where there is an agreement that percepta refers to what is “self-
evident” (ἐναργῆ) and that perspicua refers to what is “grasped” (καταληπτά). Reid notes that
subtiliter is a translation of akribōs, an adverb related to the precision of cognitive impressions
Reid (1885, p. 221).
²⁷Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod nolunt (ea dico incerta quae adēla
Graeci)?, II.54. Lucullus makes a similar point earlier without supplying a Greek translation at
II.32 (si ea quae disputentur vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta).
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but rather in relation to how they appear, and Lucullus expounds upon this difference in
the sentence that immediately follows: “For if objects are so constituted (ita habeant) that
it makes no difference whether they appear (videantur) to anybody as they do to a mad-
man or as they do to a sane person, who can be satisfied with his own sanity?”²⁸ Lucullus
here is not interested in external objects themselves and their existential status; rather,
he worries about how they are perceived (videantur). The skeptical attack on certainty,
then, is an attack on clarity. As a matter of ordinary sensory experience, one’s mind may
be impressed and objects may thus appear in ways that are inseparable from these canon-
ical cases of distortion, and thus the alleged clarity of an impression—its “certainty”—is
similarly subject to the Academic’s doubt.
Lucullus continues to rely on the vocabulary of certainty as he bemoans the inconsis-
tency and impracticality of skeptical approaches to sense impressions. He criticizes the
skeptics as “persons who are confident that the doctrines they are defending are true and
established and certum,” an alignment of the true and the certain that encapsulates his dis-
agreement with his intellectual rivals.²⁹ This attack on skeptical arguments more gener-
ally highlights the importance of accurate impressions in Stoic epistemological doctrine,
where what is certum—that is, what is perspicuum and therefore perceptum—motivates
both sensory knowledge and abstract intellectual activity. Not only does Lucullus argue
²⁸Si enim res ita habeant ut nihil intersit utrum ita cui videantur ut insano an sano, cui possit
exploratum esse de sua sanitate, II.54.
²⁹illa vera et firma et certa esse quae tutentur, II.43. And in an earlier passage, Lucullus shows that
their ignorance stems from an absence of sensory knowledge: “Why, I ask, has the skeptic saddled
himself with such burdensome rules as this when he had no grasp or perception or knowledge or
agreement of any fact that furnished a reason why it was his duty to do so?” (cur has sibi tam
graves leges imposuerit cum quam ob rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi, percepti, cogniti,
constituti, II.23.)
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that sensory impressions are a source of “wisdom herself,” but he also suggests that such
impressions serve as the justification for all action:³⁰
As for wisdom herself, if she does not know whether she is wisdom or not,
how in the first place will she make good her claim to the name of wisdom?
Next, how will she venture with confidence to plan or execute any undertak-
ing when there will be nothing certain (certi nihil) for her to act upon?…There
must be a first principle established for wisdom to follow when she embarks
on any action, and this first principle must be consistent with nature; for oth-
erwise, appetition (our chosen equivalent for the term hormēn), by which we
are impelled to action and seek to get an object presented to our vision, can-
not be set in motion. But the thing that sets it in motion must first of all be
seen, and must be believed in, which cannot take place if an object seen will
be indistinguishable from a false one.³¹
Lucullus here sets up a chain of causality that begins with sensory perception and ends
with deliberate action. There must be “a beginning” (initium) which wisdom can follow
whenever she wishes to embark on a course of action (quod sapientia cum quid agere in-
cipiat sequatur), which manifests itself as an adpetitio.³² But this initium first arises from
³⁰Lucullus’ bundling of sensory impressions with non-sensory forms of knowledge is charac-
teristic of “all Hellenistic theories…[which focus] on how we acquire information through the
senses, assuming optimistically that with this start from the senses the mind can eventually grasp
everything that we recognise to be knowledge” (Annas 1990, p. 185).
³¹Ipsa vero sapientia si se ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo modo suscipere aliquam rem aut agere
fidenter audebit cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur?…constitui necesse esse initium quod sapientia cum
quid agere incipiat sequatur, idque initium esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter adpetitio (eam
enim volumus esse ὁρμήν), qua ad agendum impellimur et id adpetimus quod est visum, moveri non
potest; illud autem quod movet prius oportet videri, eique credi, quod fieri non potest si id quod visum
erit discerni non poterit a falso, II.24–25.
³²adpetitio is “Cicero’s regular rendering of the Stoic expression ὁρμή, impulse. This, according
to the Stoics, is aroused whenever the mind becomes cognisant of any object which is in harmony
with nature” (Reid 1885, p. 211). Lucullus’ argument here was a popular one which affirmed that
“if the sceptics were consistent they would be reduced to inaction in every description,” or as
Reid thinks David Hume might understand the problem, “[the skeptic] must acknowledge, if he
will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and
steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease, and men remain in total
lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence” (ibid.,
p. 56).
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sensory experience: whatever one believes must also be seen (quod est visum, oportet
videri).³³ Like Lucullus’ earlier discussion, this passage underscores the mechanism of
impression: without a certainty (certum) to begin from, the appetition “cannot be set in
motion” (moveri non potest).³⁴ And as a coda to this discussion, Lucullus turns to the third
clause of the cognitive impression: not only must the object be perceived (that is, certum),
but also it must be “believed in” (credi), for assent cannot take place if that which is seen
(quod visum erit) cannot be distinguished from what is false (a falso). The criterion, there-
fore, must be both certum and proprium—it must meet the second and third conditions of
the Stoic cognitive impression, respectively.
Lucullus’ confidence in the Stoic cognitive impression serves as grounds for his cou-
pling of certainty and truth, the coupling we see in the Harleianus glossary. And his
association of certainty with the mechanism of impression in particular approximates
and foreshadows the first notion of certainty in Quintilian’s catalog, where certum is de-
fined as what is perceived by the senses.³⁵ But in the remainder of his enumeration of
the several types of certa, Quintilian does not argue that sense perceptions are reliable
truths, and in fact, his more general understanding of certa as forms of consensus sug-
gests that Quintilian sees these certainties as mere probabilities or even possibilities, not
³³The double appearance of passive forms of video should not merely be read in the regular
sense of “seem” or “appear,” but instead in the more literal sense of “be seen.” Reid notes that
videri here is ‘to be seen’ and that the word at the end of the passage (Quod si aliquid aliquando
acturus est, necesse est id ei verum, quod occurit, videri) uses the more idiomatic sense of ‘to seem’
(1885, p. 205). The importance of sense perception to Lucullus makes the more literal, more sense-
based definition “to be seen” appealing if only as a secondary connotation.
³⁴A similar verb, moveatur, is used to denote mental action when Lucullus defines the certa et
propria nota at 34-35.
³⁵For a brief discussion of Quintilian’s catalog of different types of certa at Institutio V.10.12-14,
see the introduction of this dissertation.
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infallible cognitive impressions. While Lucullus’ discussion of certainty provides a helpful
antecedent to Quintilian’s first definition of certum, his confidence in certainty is largely at
odds with Quintilian’s more modest—or even skeptical—approach to the epistemic value
of what is certum.
By viewing Cicero’s responses to Lucullus later in his dialogue, however, we see how
Cicero’s understanding of certainty foreshadows this epistemic modesty regarding sense
perception in Quintilian’s forensic manual. The latter half of the Lucullus revisits the tech-
nical meanings of certum and proprium, particularly as understood from Cicero’s skeptical
position: he explains that Academics “never said that color, taste, or sound was non-
existent, but their contention was that these presentations do not contain a veri et certi
nota that is peculiar (propria) to themselves and found nowhere else.”³⁶ Like Lucullus’
discussion earlier in the text, Cicero here concentrates on the second and third conditions
of the Stoic cognitive impression: adopting the skeptical position concerning the third
condition, Cicero drives apart the association of certum and proprium on which Lucullus’
confidence hinges. In other words, Cicero will carve out space for impressions that are
certain but not necessarily or reliably true.
Toward the end of the dialogue, Cicero revisits the several technical terms raised in
Lucullus’ defense of Stoic cognitive impressions. In one passage in particular, Cicero
points to the insufficiency of certainty for guaranteeing the accuracy and truthfulness of
such sensory experiences:
³⁶a quibus numquam dictum sit aut colorem aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit disputa-
tum, non inesse in iis propriam quae nusquam alibi esset veri et certi notam, II.103. Cicero also uses
certa illa nota in his mocking description of the philosophical conversion of Dionysius of Heraclea,
who “was a good subject for the sceptics, since he had belonged to two different dogmatic schools”
(Reid 1885, p. 259).
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The only difference is that whereas you [Lucullus], when you have been
deeply affected, acquiesce, assent, approve, and hold that a certum, compre-
hended, perceived, ratified, firm, and fixed thing is a true thing, and cannot
be driven or moved away from it by any reason, I on the contrary am of the
opinion that there is nothing of such a kind that if I assent to it I shall not often
be assenting to a falsehood, since truths are not separated from falsehoods by
any particular distinction.³⁷
Here Cicero rejects Lucullus’ understanding that “a certum, comprehended, perceived,
ratified, firm, and fixed thing” is necessarily a “true thing” (verum). If we recall Lucullus’
understanding of what it means to be certum (namely, that such a thing is clearly and
accurately impressed), Cicero more specifically claims that even if the second clause of
the cognitive impression is fulfilled, the third clause remains unfulfilled and thus pro-
vides enough justification for suspending belief: although an impression may be certum
and even perceptum, Cicero worries that assenting to it would entail often “assenting to a
falsehood, since truths are not separated from falsehoods by any particular distinction.”³⁸
The quality of certainty, standing at the beginning of this asyndetic list of adjectives re-
lated to Stoic cognitive impressions, shows Cicero’s worry that even what is clearly and
accurately impressed is not necessarily true.
³⁷Tantum interest quod tu cum es commotus adquiescis, adsentiris, adprobas, verum illud certum
comprehensum perceptum ratum firmum fixum vis esse, deque eo nulla ratione neque pelli neque
moveri potes, ego nihil eius modi esse arbitror cui si adsensus sim non adsentiar saepe falso, quoniam
vera a falsis nulla discrimine separantur, II.141. It is worth noting that here verum is not adversative
even though verum illud is regularly used with this sense (See, for example, Lucullus II.34 above
and Epistulae ad Familiares. 7.18.4). I thank Keimpe Algra for his help in clarifying the sense of
this passage both in correspondence and in print (1997, p. 137).
³⁸Cicero’s insistence on this point is unsurprising given the importance of this particular dis-
agreement in much of extant debates between Stoics and Academics (Allen 1997, pp. 232-241).
Cicero’s word choice here reflects Stoic technical terminology: adsentiris recalls the Stoic con-
cept of συγκατάθεσις, the assent that the mind gives to an impression that it has received. See
Reid (1885, p. 225) for a fuller account of this term. The adjectives comprehendum and perceptum,
derived from the verbs percipere and comprehendere, are “so closely allied” and “of identical mean-
ing” (ibid., p. 219), and they denote the technical concept of “cognition in the sense of κατάληψσις”
(Algra 1997, p. 132).
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Cicero underscores the deficiency of certainty by his ironic use of comparative and
superlative forms of certum elsewhere in the Lucullus. These two appearances—one of
the comparative and one of the superlative—make light of the double valence of certum:
on the one hand, it has strong associations with what is verum, but on the other, it is
separated from the true as a matter of his own Academic skepticism.³⁹ In his use of the
comparative, he explains his suspicions regarding the third condition of the cognitive
impression:⁴⁰
But all these things are brought forward in order to prove what is the most
certain fact possible (quo certius nihil potest esse), that in respect of the mind’s
assent there is no difference between true presentations and false ones.⁴¹
Cicero offers this defense of skepticism in his final rebuttal of Lucullus’ arguments: the
only doctrine that deserves our assent is the constant doubt of the validity of our sense
perception.⁴² The “most certain fact possible”—that is, what is most true in the first,
stronger sense of certainty above—is that what is certum is not necessarily verum, for
the third condition of the cognitive impression may remain unfulfilled: “there is no dif-
ference between true presentations and false ones.”
Cicero’s one use of the superlative form, certissimum, similarly casts doubt on the
epistemic value of certainty:
³⁹For the association of certum and verum elsewhere in Latin literature, see TLL and OLD.
⁴⁰There is an instance of certius, which could be either an adjective or an adverb: “Also you said
that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with them. Why? Can I speak more certainly about
any others?” (Et ab eis aiebas removendum Socraten et Platonem. Cur? an de ullis certius possum
dicere?, I.74.) (Reid 1885, p. 263) understands certius as an adverb.
⁴¹Omnia autem haec proferuntur ut illud efficiatur quo certius nihil potest esse, inter visa vera et
falsa ad animi adsensum nihil interesse, II.90.
⁴²Reid (ibid., p. 286) writes that adsensum here conveys συγκατάθεσιν.
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Seeing that Panaetius, who in my judgment at all events is almost the chief
of the Stoics, says that he is in doubt as to the matter which all the Stoics
beside him think most certain (certissimam), the truth of the pronouncements
of diviners, of auspices and oracles, of dreams and soothsaying, and that he
restrains himself from assent, which he can do even about things that his
own teachers held to be certain, why should not the wise man be able to do
so about everything else?⁴³
Panaetius, whose reputation for diverging from Stoic orthodoxy was wide-spread, rejects
the belief which “his own teachers felt to be certain,” namely the truth of oracles and
prophets.⁴⁴ Cicero criticizes this confidence in divination in De Divinatione, and by ironi-
cally referring to this Stoic belief as certissimum here, he draws attention to how certainty
does not, at least for him, carry along with it the quality of truthfulness.⁴⁵ His use of the
superlative adjective here reflects a belief that even what is the “most certain” is never-
theless an epistemically deficient category of knowledge, if not outright superstition.
Cicero’s separation of certum from verum underscores a lexical point in one of the
important philosophical disputes between the Stoics and the Academics of his time, and
his discussions in his Lucullus illustrate that the tidy coupling of verum and certum in the
Harleianus glossary is not shared among all ancients, especially in the context of techni-
cal philosophical debates. Another glossary, in fact, corroborates this division of the two
terms. The so-called Philoxenus glossary, found in a ninth-century manuscript, lists Latin
terms and provides Greek equivalents for each, and its entries regarding certainty high-
light the complexity surrounding the Latin root cert*. For even if the earlier Harleianus
⁴³Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem iudicio Stoicorum, ea de re dubitare se dicat quam
omnes praeter eum Stoici certissimam putant, vera esse haruspicum responsa, auspicia, oracula, som-
nia, vaticationes, seque ab adsensu sustineat, quod is potest facere etiam de iis rebus quas illi a quibus
ipse didicit certas habuerunt, cur id sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit?, II.107.
⁴⁴See Reid (1885, p. 303).
⁴⁵Cicero recounts Panaetius’ unique position among Stoics at De Divinatione I.6.
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glossary illustrates a tight correspondence between verum and certum, this later compi-
lation suggests a messier relationship between the certain and the true:⁴⁶
• certum – ἀληθές
• certus – ἀκριβῆς, ἀληθῆς, βέβαιος
On the one hand, the neuter substantive in the Philoxenus glossary preserves the sense
shown in the seventh-century Harleianus glossary: that which is certum is identical with
what is “true” in Greek texts. On the other hand, the entry for certus here includes along-
side alēthēs the adjectives akribēs and bebaios, neither of which is consistently associated
with the Greek root alēth*, a fact attested in the entries of the Harleianus glossary.⁴⁷ In
that earlier compilation, akribēs lists as its equivalents certus, cautus, scrupulosus, and sub-
tilis; and bebaios lists certus, ratus, firmus, and stabilis. Neither akribēs nor bebaios in the
Harleianus glossary includes verus as an equivalent, but both list certus. While this study
makes no effort to provide for certus a clean Greek antecedent or to explain the sepa-
ration of certum and certus in the Philoxenus glossary, the manifold rendering of certus
in the ninth-century manuscript suggests that some post-classical authors observe a mis-
alignment of truth and certainty among their Roman prececessors. And Cicero’s Lucullus,
where this misalignment sits at the root of a crucial epistemological disagreement, serves
⁴⁶For a brief history of the Philoxenus glossary and the manuscript that contains it, Parisinus
lat. 7651, see Goetz and Gundermann (1965, 2:vii–xx). Glucker notes that arguments against the
“ascription of this glossary in its present form to the grammarian Philoxenus, contemporary of
Varro and Cicero, have been reaffirmed by its latest editor; but some of its glosses may well have
been derived from an early source” (1995, p. 121). Glucker defends the general chronological posi-
tion of the author, arguing that the text has “glosses related to Cicero and to two major Augustan
poets…[and] a Greek grammarian living in Rome at the time of those authors and showing an
interest in Latin in any case would naturally be attracted to these three writers.”
⁴⁷The TLL similarly provides βέβαιος as a Greek equivalent for certus (IV).
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as a potent example of this fundamental separation.
Before turning to Quintilian’s rhetorical discussion of certainty in the following chap-
ter, it is important to view Cicero’s other works—particularly those concerning oratory—
for a fuller picture of his capacious understanding of certainty. On the one hand, as we
have seen already, the concept sits at the center of a philosophical debate he composed
near the end of his life; but an effort to define certum as a technical term characterizes
some of Cicero’s forensic writings, too.⁴⁸ In turning to these works, both speeches and
theoretical treatises, readers again find an understanding of certum that is related to but
not synonymous with verum, and Cicero’s discussions of certainty in considerations of
verbal style, lexical specificity, and legal culpability often bear on notions of property and
⁴⁸As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, it is perhaps unwise to draw distinctions be-
tween these two rough categories of Cicero’s works. Even if in Book I of Cicero’s De Oratore,
Antonius argues that an orator has no need for immersing himself in philosophical debate and
in order to avoid appearing to be a “silly Greekling” recommends that the orator should avoid
topics like the supreme good and the roles of virtue and pleasure in seeking it, Cicero shows
an eagerness to combine philosophical discussions in his explicitly oratorical works. For Anto-
nius’ recommendation, see De Oratore I.221-222. Among these recommendations against studying
perennial philosophical questions, Antonius also argues that the orator has no business investigat-
ing “whether (as it has appeared to particular philosophers) nothing can be known to be certum,
and nothing can be grasped and perceived plainly” (an vero, ut quibusdam visum, nihil certum
sciri, nihil plane cognosci et percipi possit, I.222). Wilkins remarks that “certum follows sciri and
does not depend on nihil” (1962, p. 196). Leeman, Pinkster, et al. (1981, 2:145) recommends that
certum be understood as a predicate, noting that this epistemological question “is a matter of the
Academy.” The reappearance here not only of certum but also verbs important to debates about
cognitive impressions (cognosci, percipi) show how the epistemological concerns surrounding cer-
tainty may already be present in Cicero’s earlier rhetorical works. And another instance of certum
in De Oratore reinforces that the term was particularly important to Academics in their rejection
of cognitive impressions: Arcesilaus, Crassus recounts, “selected for adoption from the various
writings of Plato and the Socratic dialogues the dogma that there is nihil certi which can be ap-
prehended either by the senses or the mind” (ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc
maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit, III.67). Leeman, Pinkster,
et al. (ibid., 4:254) notes the connection between this set of vocabulary and the debates between
Academics and Skeptics. Mankin (2011) does not comment on this instance of certum, but Wilkins
(1962, p. 445) notes that counter to the suggestion by editors Bake and Kayser to take nihil esse
certi as a predicate (“that what can be grasped either by the senses or the intellect is no certainty”)
is incorrect since “this possibility of ‘grasping’ was just what the New Academy denied.”
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ownership through a close pairing of certum and proprium, a pairing that resurfaces in his
later philosophical writings. These appearances all suggest that the technical meaning of
certainty found in Cicero’s late epistemological discussions arises from long-developing
considerations of certainty as a matter of the courts and forensic oratory, not merely as a
matter of Cicero’s Academic interests.
Etymologically, certus comes from the past participle of cerno, and cerno itself is re-
lated to the Greek verb krinō, “to separate,” “to pick out,” or “to judge,” and use of certum
throughout the Ciceronian corpus points to this earlier notion of separation and selec-
tion.⁴⁹ In De Oratore, Crassus discusses the verbal styles of various orators, and he con-
trasts his own oratorical style with Antonius’, ultimately recognizing the unique qualities
of each.⁵⁰ Not adopting broad categories such as the grand and plain styles, he concludes
that each orator has a style that is particular to him:
And if such wide differences exist between us who are present and things
of each man are so certa and propria, and if in this variety the superior is
distinguished from the inferior almost more by capacity than by style, and
everything is applauded that is perfect in its own style, what do you not sup-
pose the result will be if we choose to take into consideration all the orators
past and present of all countries? Do you not expect that we shall find almost
as many styles of oratory as orators?⁵¹
⁴⁹See OLD cerno. The OLD also reports that the verb is related to the Welsh word go-grynu (“to
sift”) and the Anglo-Saxon word hrēni (“to clean”).
⁵⁰See III.32-33. For a fuller discussion of Cicero’s terminology relating to oratorical styles, see
Fantham (1979).
⁵¹Quod si in nobis, qui adsumus, tantae dissimilitudines sunt, tam certae res cuiusque propriae et
in ea varietate fere melius a deteriore facultate magis quam genere distinguitur atque omne laudatur,
quod in suo genere perfectum est, quid censetis, si omnis, qui ubique sunt aut fuerunt oratores, amplecti
voluerimus, nonne fore ut, quot oratores, totidem paene reperiantur genera dicendi?, III.34. Mankin
(2011, p. 126) suggests rendering tam…propriae as “so particular [are] the attributes characteristic
of each,” citing OLD certus 3a, proprius 3a. A similar suggestion appears in Leeman, Pinkster, et al.
(1981, 4:171): “so deutliche Besonderheiten.” Translations of De Oratore Book III are adapted from
H. Rackham, ed. and trans. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942).
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It is safe to say that Crassus’ use of certum et proprium here does not point to some fea-
ture of the Stoic cognitive impression as it bears on oratorical style; instead, he positions
this terminology within a discussion of the “ownership” of one’s oratory.⁵² He argues
that each and every orator (quisque) is somehow dissimilar from all others, and that each
has a unique and particular style which in some way belongs to him (propriae).⁵³ But if
Cicero merely means to establish a notion of stylistic ownership or property, why does
he not just call these styles propria and omit certa all together? In what sense are these
two adjectives—not synonyms in their own right—useful for denoting Crassus’ vision of
stylistic particularity?
The kind of ownership that Cicero describes here is a strict one, where each orator
has his one and only style, and while it is perhaps possible for one orator to command
several styles, Crassus intends a near one-to-one correspondence: “we shall find almost as
many styles of oratory as orators.” The adjective proprium, as ancient authors themselves
admit, is insufficient in pointing to this stronger, more exclusive brand of ownership. In
his Institutio, Quintilian points to the ambiguity surrounding proprium when he writes
that the adjective denotes both when something belongs to someone alone and when
⁵²For a discussion of ownership as a notion of personal style in antiquity, see Eden (2012, pp. 11-
48).
⁵³Crassus emphasizes the point by mentioning the variety of oratorical styles (in ea varietate)
and by defining each orator according to his own class (in suo genere, III.34). In the sentences
following this passage, in fact, he understands that the number of styles is so great and the variety
so wide that some might argue the impossibility of studying them with any unifying system at all
(non posse ea quae inter se discrepant eisdem praeceptis atque in una institutione formari, ibid.). Cras-
sus’ argument for ownership of oratorical style thus rests on a system of untangled, one-to-one
correspondence, unlike an Aristotelian tripartite division of forensic, deliberative, and epideic-
tic genres or grand, middle, and plain registers. A similar point about the insufficiency of these
tripartite systems is made at Orator §53, as discussed in Fantham (1979, pp. 455-456).
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something belongs to someone but not exclusively.⁵⁴ The use of proprium by itself does
not, therefore, necessarily denote the kind of exclusive and unique ownership that Crassus
discusses here.
The addition of certum, one might hypothesize, somehow specifies the first, more re-
strictive sense of ownership in Quintilian’s discussion. The owned object, here the stylis-
tic dissimilitudo of each and every orator, has to be “separated” or “sifted” to such a degree
that each speaker possesses one and only one style. Other texts in the Ciceronian corpus
support this hypothesized usage of certum et proprium as an adjective pair for denoting
this stricter version of ownership. These adjectives appear together, for example, in the
forensic setting of Cicero’s Verrine Orations, where in the course of a lengthy praeteritio,
Cicero declines to prosecute Verres for his crimes that occurred during the time of Sulla’s
proscriptions, since in those cases the culpability could be attributed to Sulla instead of or
even in addition to Verres. Cicero claims he will concentrate only on those actions whose
agency is unambiguously and uniquely attributable to the defendant—that is, the crimina
that are certa et propria to Verres alone:
That part of his criminal background which belongs to the time of the Sullan
proscriptions, with its acts of pillage, I shall omit; I will not allow arguments
in his support; I will prosecute him only for his (sua) crimes that are certa
propriaque. I would therefore rule out all charges against him that would
belong to this period of Sulla’s power; let us now examine his splendid record
as assistant governor.⁵⁵
⁵⁴See V.10.58. Quintilian’s own example of the weaker understanding of proprium is a good
one: the production of heat, which belongs to fire, also belongs to the sun. The production of heat,
therefore, is proprium to fire in the second, non-exclusive sense.
⁵⁵in quibus illud tempus Sullanarum proscriptionum ac rapinarum praetermittam; neque ego is-
tum sibi ex communi calamitate defensionem ullam sinam sumere; suis eum certis propriisque cri-
minibus accusabo. quam ob rem hoc omni tempore Sullano ex accusatione circumscripto legationem
eius praeclaram cognoscite, II.1.43. This passage contains the only pairing of proprium and certum
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The inclusion of suum in a syntactically parallel position cements the understanding of
certum propriumque as a concept associated with ownership, and Cicero’s omission of
“all charges against [Verres] that would belong to this period of Sulla’s power” strongly
suggests that the kind of ownership Cicero conveys here is the more exclusive type in
Quintilian’s aforementioned distinction.⁵⁶ As with Crassus’ definition of oratorical style,
Cicero’s certa propriaque crimina are specifically associated with one person and one per-
son only: the crimes are the “property” of Verres and moreover have been sorted, sepa-
rated, and sifted to his unique domain.
In the cases of Verres’ culpability and Crassus’ oratorical style, the adjective pair cer-
tum et proprium denotes a kind of individual association and ownership; however, as
further examples of this pair will show, its use extends beyond the forensic setting of the
courtroom. Elsewhere in De Oratore Book III, Cicero applies this terminology to lexical
specificity, where certum et proprium refers not to ownership of personal style but the
association of a word with its single proper referent:
The words we employ then are either the propria et certa designations of
things as if they were born at the same time as the things themselves; or
terms used metaphorically and transferred in a place not belonging to them;
or new coinages invented by us.⁵⁷
Crassus here contrasts certa et propria words with metaphorical language, where the for-
in the Verrine Orations.
⁵⁶See Eden (2012, p. 26) for a brief discussion of the legal role of suus and proprius in Cicero’s
De Officiis.
⁵⁷Ergo utimur verbis aut eis quae propria sunt et certa quasi vocabula rerum paene una nata cum
rebus ipsis; aut eis quae transferuntur et quasi alieno in loco collocantur; aut eis quae novamus et
facimus ipsi, III.149. Mankin (2011, p. 235) translates propria et certa as “proper and specific” and
suggests that proprius here is a Latin translation of the Greek κύριος or οἰκεῖος. He does not
provide a Greek equivalent for certus.
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mer are strictly literal, each word denoting the object with which it shares an almost
hereditary link.⁵⁸ The language of ownership and property, extending beyond the purely
legal realm, here distinguishes proper and metaphorical vocabulary.⁵⁹ But as with crimes
and their perpetrators as well as styles and their practitioners, certa et propria verba enjoy
an exclusive relationship with the things they signify.⁶⁰
⁵⁸Mankin (2011, p. 235) suggests that Crassus “alludes to without endorsing (paene) an ancient
theory, first elaborated in Plato’s Cratylus and later adopted and modified by the Epicureans, that
words and language in general were in origin a product of ‘nature’ (physis) and not, as in competing
theories, of ‘convention/culture’ (nomos).”
⁵⁹Kathy Eden explains that “in psychological as well as in legal matters, moreover, whatever
is not suum and proprium is alienum” (2012, p. 27). Mankin (2011, p. 235) suggests that the
metaphor of place in alieno in loco “may be derived, directly or indirectly, from Aristotle’s use
of xenos/xenikos (‘foreign’) in connection with metaphor.” See a related use of certa to denote the
accent or dialect proper to a place in the discussion of certa vox Romani generis urbisque propria at
De Oratore III.44. Wilkins merely notes in his commentary that “certa = ‘definite,’ ” (1962, p. 82).
Leeman, Pinkster, et al. (1981, 5:189) rightly suggests that “certa emphasizes that [the words] are
specific and unique to the res.” This same commentary also notes the ambiguity surrounding pro-
prius in lexical discussions since the adjective can point to the “regular, common, familiar term
for a thing [which] excludes old-fashioned and other unusual words as well as coinages” or alter-
natively “the ‘literal’ term [which] excludes metaphors and coinages, but includes old-fashioned
and other unusual words in their literal sense” (ibid., V:188). Innes (1988, p. 308) points to the
two mismatched divisions of words in De Oratore: at III.149 Crassus recommends propria et certa,
metaphors, and neologisms, but at III.152, he recommends unusual words (prisca, or archaisms),
metaphors, and neologisms. Archaic and “proper” do not seem to be interchangeable terms, but
Crassus hints that propria et certa vocabula have meanings that are as old as their referents them-
selves (quasi vocabula rerum paena una nata cum rebus ipsis, III.149). We see another example of
proprium et certum to denote lexical specificity in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, where the author
explains abusio (catechresis): “Abusio is the inexact use of a similar and kindred word in place of
the certo and proprio word, as follows: ‘The power of the man is short,’ or ‘small height,’ or ‘the
long wisdom in the man,’ or ‘a mighty speech,’ or ‘to engage in a slight conversation.’ Here it is
easy to understand that words of kindred, but not identical, meaning have been transferred on the
principle of inexact use” (Abusio est, quae verbo simili et propinquo pro certo et proprio abutitur, hoc
modo: ’Vires hominis breves sunt;’ aut: ’parva statura;’ aut: ’longum in homine consilium;’ aut: ’ora-
tio magna;’ aut: ’uti pauco sermone.’ Nam hic facile est intellectu finitima verba rerum dissimilium
ratione abusionis esse traducta, IV.45).
⁶⁰Cicero is not making a normative claim in favor of the use of language that is certum et
proprium over that which is metaphorical. Quite to the contrary, his forensic argument in Pro
Caecina, combining the lexical and judicial domains covered in the previous examples, claims that
certa et propria vocabula are insufficient for legal discourse. A major point of the case hinges
on the legal interpretation of deiectio, the ejection of Caecina from the land that he allegedly
possessed. Hodge explains that in this case “the facts were mostly admitted by both sides: the
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Throughout these varied examples from Cicero’s rhetorical works, we unearth an un-
derstanding of certum et proprium that seems quite different from the philosophical dis-
cussions in the Lucullus. We have shifted away from the debates of philosophical schools
to applications of linguistic style, judicial culpability, and even lexicography.⁶¹ The ques-
tion thus arises of whether these seemingly unrelated applications share some common
foundation. It is unintuitive that Cicero’s understanding of sense perception would be
rooted in a notion of clear culpability, or that his understanding of lexical specificity is
somehow rooted in sense-based understandings of words.
There is, however, a strong candidate for such a shared foundation in Cicero’s discus-
sions of status theory, the framework of rhetorical invention pioneered by Hermagoras in
the second century. This framework, which “continued to dominate the later Greek and
real issue was a legal one” (1990, p. 88). Cicero explains the need to follow the intent of the
law rather than its letter, and he argues that to understand deiectus—that is, “thrown downward
from above”—in the most literal sense of the word would be to misconstrue the law in question
(III.149). His argument against slavish literalism, as we see here, evinces an understanding of certa
et propria vocabula rooted in unambiguous correspondence between words and their single, proper
meanings. Cicero’s argument rests upon his understanding of an inherent inability of language,
considered as a finite collection of words, to describe the infinite variety of experience. See varietas
in the discussion of personal style at De Oratore III.34. The appearance of certa et propria vocabula
here mirrors that in Crassus’ theory of verbal ornamentation and metaphor at De Oratore III.149,
and as Cicero illustrates through these texts, literal language is too limited in both its stylistic
and judicial dimensions. Cicero’s understanding of “literal” use of language is more radical than
we might originally gather. On the weaker interpretation, Cicero’s understanding of language—
and that of the author of the Ad Herennium, for that matter—merely includes the provision that
words have literal meanings, and that we use them metaphorically to describe (sometimes artfully)
our range of experiences and ideas. The stronger interpretation of “literal” meaning, however,
argues that each word has one and only one literal meaning and accordingly that each meaning
corresponds with one and only one word.
⁶¹See also its application to the visual arts in Valerius Maximus, who in the first century AD
also uses this pairing of adjectives to describe a sculpture of Vulcan crafted by Alcamenes. Va-
lerius’ description concentrates on the “gentle hint of lameness disguised under the drapery,”
which serves as the god’s certa propriaque nota, a characteristic that conclusively identifies him
(dissimulatae claudicationis sub veste leviter vestigium repraesentans, ut non exprobatum tamquam
vitium ita tamquam certam propriamque dei notam decore significans, VIII.11.ext 3).
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Roman doctrines of inventio and hence the entire rhetorical system,” is rendered variously
among different Roman authors, and although the notion of status is discussed briefly in
the introduction of this dissertation, it will be helpful to point to some of Cicero’s own
developments in the terminology and structure of Hermagoras’ original theory.⁶² As he
explains in his Topica, status theory sits around the three issues of “conjecture” (coniec-
tura), “definition” (definitio), and “quality” (qualitas), three labels that correspond to the
questions an sit, quid sit, and quale sit.⁶³ These questions can be used to determine the pre-
cise point of disagreement in a forensic case. For example, if two parties agree that theft
has occurred and thus agree in their answers to the first and second questions of whether
something happened and what happened, they may nevertheless disagree in their answers
to the third question: the prosecutor might call a theft malicious and unfounded, whereas
a defendant may claim he stole in order to afford food, thus mitigating his culpability.
Cicero also relies on status theory in his De Partitione Oratoria, the “most purely
scientific of all Cicero’s writings on rhetoric.”⁶⁴ Under the heading of coniectura, the
first question of the three primary status questions, Cicero considers the question an sit,
whether something happened.⁶⁵ As part of his discussion here, Cicero introduces two
⁶²(Braet 1987, p. 80). Cicero’s familiarity and engagement with status theory is apparent in his
several discussions concerning it. See, for example, De Partitione 33f.
⁶³Cicero does not use the word qualitas to introduce his discussion of the third question at §84,
but he instead refers to this question directly as quale quid sit. For a more thorough treatment
of Cicero’s understanding of status theory within the context of the Topica’s discussion of the
“general question,” see Reinhardt (2003, pp. 346–350). The terms coniectura and definitio reappear
in Cicero’s discussion of status theory in De Oratore, but that text renders the third issue of quality
as consecutio rather than qualitas (III.13).
⁶⁴Rackham (1942, p. 306). For a discussion of the dating and structure of the De Paritione, likely
finished in 46, see Rackham (ibid., pp. 306–309).
⁶⁵The first question of status theory is sometimes rendered sitne, as is the case at Orator 45. Tra-
ditionally, an sit is the first question in expositions on status theory. See, for example, Quintilian
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terms: verisimila and the propriae notae argumenta:
Inference is based entirely on probabilities (verisimilia) and on the essential
characteristics of things (propria rerum nota). But let us for the sake of con-
veying our meaning define the term “probable” as “that which usually oc-
curs in such and such a way”—for example that youth is more prone to self-
indulgence; while an essential characteristic that is never otherwise and that
supplies an indication that is certain (propriae autem notae argumentum quod
numquam aliter fit certumque declarat), as smoke is an indication of fire.⁶⁶
Cicero contrasts these verisimilia—mere probabilities—with the “testament of a propria
nota which never comes about otherwise and which declares a certainty” (propriae notae
argumentum quod numquam aliter fit certumque declarat). But immediately after intro-
ducing these contrasting terms, Cicero moves to a discussion of natural and acquired
characteristics, leaving little clarity in the brief discussion of verisimilia and the propriae
notae argumentum.
Even if Cicero’s original text offers little help in clarifying the significance of cer-
tum and proprium within his understanding of status theory, a commentary by Johannes
Sturm, a prominent sixteenth-century German educator, can help to define these techni-
cal terms. Sturm explains first that verisimilia are like eikota, the Greek term for events
“which usually [come] about in some way.”⁶⁷ In an attempt to provide a robust distinc-
tion between these two Latin categories of evidence, Sturm’s commentary draws from
the Aristotelian distinction between eikota and tekmēria. The propriae notae argumenta,
Sturm explains,
IO III.6.45, III.6.51, V.10.54.
⁶⁶in verisimilibus et in propriis rerum notis posita est tota. sed appellemus docendi gratia verisim-
ile quod plerumque ita fiat, ut adolescentiam procliviorem esse ad libidinem; propriae autem notae
argumentum quod numque aliter fit certumque declarat, ut fumus ignem, §34.
⁶⁷quod plerunque ita fiunt (1565, p. 77).
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are things which never happen otherwise, and which declare a certum. The
number of these things among orators is not great, as both Aristotle wishes
to be the case and also as is the idea itself. They are called tekmēria because
when these things are brought forth, it is the end of the controversy, and all
doubt is carried off.⁶⁸
Sturm argues that propriae notae argumenta are rare in oratorical practice because like
Aristotelian tekmēria, they eliminate the need for any argumentation at all.⁶⁹ In this dis-
cussion, there are resonances of Cicero’s rhetorical use of proprium et certum insofar as
an argumentum points unambiguously to a particular conclusion “and all doubt is carried
off.” A propriae notae argumentum, then, carries the specificity and exclusive correspon-
dence we have seen elsewhere into matters of logic and causation. Instead of words which
are sorted to their referents, styles to their practitioners, and offenses to their criminals,
here Cicero explains that consequents are sorted clearly and uniquely to their causes.
Sturm’s explanation of Cicero’s sole example of such an argumentum—“as smoke de-
clares a fire”—makes the point clearer:
Whatever is truly proprium is also a necessarium argumentum: and this argu-
mentum falls into any one of three kinds. For propriae notae are of this kind,
where they either happen with the events themselves, as smoke and fire. Or
the events come afterwards, as ash follows fire. Or they come beforehand, as
milk comes before birth.⁷⁰
⁶⁸Quae nunquam aliter fiunt, certumque declarat. Horum non magnus numerus est apud oratores,
ut et vult Aristoteles, et ut res ipsa est. τεκμήρια vocantur, propterea quod, cum haec adferuntur, finis
sit controversiae, tolliturque omnis dubitatio, (Sturm 1565, p. 77).
⁶⁹The Aristotelian τεκμήριον shows “an inevitable and necessary relationship between sign and
signate” (Grimaldi 1980, p. 390). Grimaldi notes that the τεκμήριον “will give one a knowledge of
the necessity of the conclusion, will demonstrate the fact of the conclusion, but [it] will not give
a demonstration of the reasoned fact of the conclusion, which is to say a knowledge of why it is a
necessary conclusion” (ibid., p. 388). See also McAdon (2004). Sturm’s use of this terminology is
Aristotelian, not Isocratean, as explained in Noël (2011).
⁷⁰Quodcunque vero proprium est, et necessarium argumentum: id in unum aliquod horum trium
generum cadit. Nam propriae huiusmodi notae, vel simul sunt cum ipsis rebus, ut fumus, atque ignis.
vel res consequuntur, ut cinis ignem: vel praecedunt, ut lac partum antecedit (Sturm 1565, p. 77).
83
In each of these cases, the outcome of an event or condition is required by that event or
condition, and uniquely so: lactation is an outcome caused by pregnancy and its appear-
ance unambiguously arises from this single cause. The defining characteristic of these
argumenta, then, is the reliability of working backwards through a chain of causality.
The appearance of smoke reliably indicates a fire, as leftover ashes show that a fire must
have existed earlier.
This property of the propriae notae argumentum contrasts with the verisimilia of Ci-
cero’s discussion, for unlike such argumenta, verisimilia do not incorporate unambiguous
relationships between cause and effect. Sturm’s commentary includes an instructive dia-
logue between a teacher and student to underscore the variability of these probabilities:
Michael: Therefore how many types of verisimilia are there?
Sturmius: There are two kinds: either it is mostly useful for proving, namely
that which is verisimile, or it is weak.
M: Which are strong?
S: Those which are like certa signs of things: how the defendant, whose hand
was splattered with blood, appeared in the same place where the murder hap-
pened.
M: Which are weak?
S: Those which are not certa signs, but which nevertheless are helpful: how,
even if he is hostile, it is not yet unbelievable: it is nevertheless not necessary
that he killed the victim.
M: Why, then, did he put this first type among the verisimilia?
S: Because things could have happened otherwise: it does not pronounce
something entirely certum. If he had bloodied hands, he still did not com-
mit the murder: perhaps he wished to save and assist the wounded man and
to bring him home while he was still breathing. And so even if these signs
are not propria, they are nevertheless considered like certa and propria when
they are handled correctly.⁷¹
⁷¹ M: Quot sunt ergo verisimilium genera?
S: Duo, aut enim plurimum, id quod est verisimlile, ad probandum valet, aut est infirmum.
M: Quae firma sunt?
S:Quae quasi certa sunt rerum nota. ut respersa sanguine manus et in eodem loco ubi cades facta est,
visus reus.
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The similarity between verisimilia and propriae notae argumenta stems from their abil-
ity to show causal connections: a man’s hand had to be bloodied somehow, probably
through committing the murder at whose location he was found. On account of this like-
lihood, verisimilia are “like certa signs” (quasi certa…nota), but they also allow that “things
could have happened otherwise” (potest evenire aliter). The quasi is crucially important: a
bloody hand may appear to be “sorted” and “particular” to a murderer, but a bloody hand is
not uniquely the property of a killer. (Indeed, it may belong to a medic or another victim.)
The “unsortedness” of verisimilia makes them less convincing as evidence, so an orator
must use them expertly to achieve the probative force normally reserved for tekmēria, a
point Sturm underscores in the concluding lines of the above passage. Only when verisi-
milia are used appropriately (cum sunt recte tractata) can such pieces of evidence take the
place of stronger evidence (pro certis propriisque) where, like Aristotleian tekmēria, causal
relationships can appear unambiguous and necessary, an appearance that depends upon
an expert orator’s efforts.
Sturm’s commentary here is limited to Cicero’s discussion of coniectura, the status of
whether something happened, not what happened. Or as these considerations are ren-
dered in status theory, this discussion is concerned with an sit, not quid sit. In a later
discussion of quid sit (or definitio), Cicero suggests that the concern for what is proprium
M: Quae infirma?
S:Quae non sunt certa signa, sed tamen adiuvant. ut, inimicus etiamsi est, tametsi non sit incredibile:
non tamen est necessarium, occidisse.
M: Cur ergo primum genus, inter verisimilia posuit?
S: Quia potest evenire aliter: neque certum omnino declarat. Non enim, si cruentas manus habuit,
caedem fecit: servare fortasse voluit vulneratum, et adiuvare, et adhuc spirantem, domum ducere.
Itaque etsi propria nota non sunt, tamen cum sunt recte tractata, pro certis, propriisque habentur.,
(Sturm 1565, pp. 82-83).
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is the object of investigation in this second question of definition, not the first question
of conjecture:
It is at all events clear that a definition is an explanation in the form of a state-
ment of the class to which a thing belongs and of some special property that
distinguishes it (proprietate quadam), or else a collection of common proper-
ties among which what its special property (proprium) is comes into view.⁷²
That proprium and proprietas are determined in the second question in status theory, and
not the first, is confirmed in Cicero’s other works: a related discussion in the Topica turns
its attention to proprietas only later in a discussion of the second status question (quid
sit), which attempts to determine “the distinctive feature of definitions (that they must be
coextensive with their definienda).”⁷³
Even if the De Partitione treats the propriae notae argumentum under the heading of
coniectura, this second discussion about definitio suggests that matters of proprietas may
specifically relate to the question of quid sit, leaving matters of certainty to the first ques-
tion of an sit. In his Pro Caelio, Cicero’s use of certum without proprium in matters of
legal culpability supports such a reading. Cicero claims that he can identify the agent
of criminal activity and does so without providing identifying information: “As for the
two charges I have mentioned, I can see that there is someone in the background, I can
see that they have a source, I can see a certum individual as their fountain-head.”⁷⁴ This
sentence attempts to establish “not the identity of the auctor, but the fact that there is an
auctor,” or as understood within the framework of status theory, that the first question
⁷²Non dubium est id quidem quin definitio genere declaretur et proprietate quadam aut etiam
communium frequentia ex quibus proprium quid sit eluceat, §41.
⁷³Reinhardt (2003, p. 353).
⁷⁴horum duorum criminum video auctorem, video fontem, video certum nomen et caput, §31.
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can be answered affirmatively while withholding all information regarding the second.⁷⁵
According to Cicero’s rendering of certum as the aim of investigation under an sit, then,
the existence of a certa (but not propria) nota would be particular and discernible, but not
well-defined in terms of its properties.
As this last example from the Pro Caelio shows, Cicero’s forensic works similarly adopt
these adjectives to qualify the specificity of courtroom accusations and evidence. When
a criminal is merely certum but not proprium regarding the misdeeds at hand, the evi-
dence is perhaps not strong enough for a conviction: one cannot be sure of the criminal’s
identity, even if one is sure that such a criminal—whoever he is—must exist. A propriae
notae argumentum, by contrast, defines the precise agent at work: the name of the crim-
inal, or the smoke corresponding to a fire. In an epistemological context, a nota that is
merely certa also points to the existence of a sensory impression, but what exactly that
impression consists of and whether it is in fact a true impression is left undetermined.
Only when knowledge is both certum and proprium does one have assurance of exactly
who or what is responsible for a crime or impression, respectively. And this common ter-
minology, first used in Cicero’s discussions of status and only at the end of his life fully
theorized as an epistemological framework, should perhaps not surprise his readers. For
in the De Oratore, Cicero himself asserts that status theory extends far beyond the forensic
concerns of the Verrine Orations or the Pro Caelio: “every matter that can be the subject
of inquiry and discussion involves the same kind of issue, whether the discussion falls
⁷⁵Austin (1960, p. 87). Cicero employs definitio in De Oratore to ascertain quid…proprium sit
(III.115), “an aspect of definitio, which Cicero later calls proprietas, [and which] is not part of
traditional status doctrine, and seems to derive from the Peripatetic concept of to idion (‘unique
property’)” (Mankin 2011, p. 204).
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in the class of abstract deliberations or of things within the range of political and legal
debate.”⁷⁶ Whether in the courtroom or in the Academic study, Cicero’s efforts of proof
revolve around these questions of how much one knows: whether knowledge is entirely
grasped and well-defined or merely certain.
In the following chapter, we turn to Quintilian’s text, where epistemological discus-
sions similarly revolve around the notion of the certainty and the limits of knowledge
that is merely certum. Extending the broad applicability of this language in Cicero’s Re-
publican antecedents, Quintilian applies this skeptical approach toward certainty to sev-
eral branches of knowledge, not just to standards of evidence in the courtroom or to the
technical debates of Hellenistic philosophical schools. While an important predecessor
of Quintilian’s first rendering of certainty as “things perceived by the senses, for exam-
ple what we see or hear,” Cicero’s texts more crucially anticipate the skeptical position
adopted in Quintilian’s educational program. Even if Cicero suggests that the certum and
the verum may be sometimes misaligned, Quintilian underscores the epistemic deficiency
of certainty and the corresponding centrality of persuasion to all kinds of argumentation.
⁷⁶Omnis igitur res eamdem habet naturam ambigendi de qua quaeri et disceptari potest, sive in
infinitis consultationibus disceptatur sive in eis causis quae in civitate et in forensi disceptatione ver-
santur, III.111.
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Chapter 3
The Status of Skepticism in Quintilian’s Theory of Certainty
In his Orator, Cicero calls for philosophical instruction in the education of the rhetorician,
for without this training, the orator will not be able to “separate truth from falsehood.”¹
And as he explains in the first book of his Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian agrees that the
perfect orator should be “not only perfect in morals…but also in knowledge.”² Like Cicero,
he aims “to unite in one person the knowledge of moral philosophy and the commitment
to morality, currently cloistered in the philosopher’s study, with the eloquence of the
orator, who is active in the courts and the assemblies.”³ Quintilian tries to bridge the
reclusive and the social, philosophy and rhetoric, knowledge and action.⁴
This educational goal of achieving perfect knowledge through rhetorical training,
however, is a matter of idealism for both theorists, for just as Cicero remarks in his Orator
that the perfect rhetorician has never lived, Quintilian too writes that his educational pro-
gram strives toward a potentially impossible aim: “such a person [who possesses perfect
knowledge] has perhaps never yet existed, but that is no reason for relaxing our efforts to
¹nec iudicare quae vera quae falsa sint, §16.
²nec moribus modo perfectus…sed etiam scientia, I.pr.18.
³Walzer (2003, p. 38).
⁴For a more general discussion of the influence of Cicero’s philosophy on Quintilian, see Pardo
(1998).
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attain the ideal.”⁵ This admission of the difficulty of attaining perfect knowledge adum-
brates Quintilian’s skeptical attitude toward rhetorical practice throughout the Institutio
more broadly: even if Quintilian sets out as his educational aim an idealized orator, his dis-
cussion of the inaccessibility of knowledge in Book II illustrates how his idealized orator
will have imperfect and unfixed beliefs. And his skeptical attitude toward the rhetori-
cian’s access to knowledge, not unprecedented in ancient discussions of oratory, extends
well beyond the walls of the courtroom and its concerns for rhetorical persuasion. By
arguing that knowledge is similarly inaccessible in the fields of natural philosophy, ge-
ometry, and a range of apodeictic intellectual endeavors, Quintilian’s rhetorical treatise
blurs the Aristotelian distinction between scientific demonstration on the one hand and
the endoxic arguments of rhetoric and dialectic on the other, most markedly through the
claim that both brands of argument take as their basis not unassailable truths but rather
certa or “certainties.”
This skeptical thread runs through Quintilian’s discussions of the nature of argumen-
tation and rhetoric, primarily in the second and fifth books of his rhetorical manual, the
latter of which also incorporates a range of Aristotelian rhetorical elements, including
enthymemes, an interest in audience psychology, and particularly a reliance on homole-
goumena. While these concepts show Quintilan’s debt to his Peripatetic predecessors
even in light of competing Stoic understandings of similar terms, a debt demonstrated in
the first chapter of this dissertation, the present discussion shows that Quintilian’s un-
derstanding of certainty also adopts skeptical elements, likely related to those seen in Ci-
⁵qualis fortasse nemo adhuc fuerit, sed non ideo minus nobis ad summa tendendum est, I.pr.19.
For Cicero’s doubt of the perfect orator’s existence, see Orator §7.
90
ceronian discussions in the second chapter. And Quintilian’s discussions of certa—largely
defined as matters of customary agreement or consensus—illustrate how Quintilian’s no-
tion of argumentation, rhetorical and otherwise, also takes inspiration not just from a
broadly skeptical approach to several kinds of knowledge but also from the theory of sta-
tus, the post-Aristotelian framework used to structure a speech around the agreements
and disagreements of forensic adversaries. The Institutio, then, like the Ciceronian trea-
tises that precede it, admits of the difficulties of grasping firm knowledge, and in light
of these epistemological limitations, it proposes a novel recasting of argumentation in
the language of certainty—a concept rooted in the crafting of consensus rather than the
demonstration of truth.
Before turning to the topic of certainty, it will be helpful first to see how Quintil-
ian’s skeptical understanding of rhetoric and other intellectual endeavors motivates his
unwillingness to conceive of these practices as a search for truth. During Quintilian’s
defense of rhetoric’s position as an art in the second book of the Institutio, a hypothetical
interlocutor objects that rhetoric lends credence to falsehoods: “no art assents to false
propositions because it cannot exist without a cognitive presentation which is invariably
true, whereas rhetoric does assent to falsehoods and therefore is not an art.”⁶ Rather than
argue that rhetoric does not assent to falsehoods, Quintilian admits its deceitfulness but
adds the provision that rhetoric itself is not “in false opinion” and that “there is a great
⁶Altera est calumnia nullam artem falsis adsentiri opinionibus, quia constitui sine perceptione
non possit, quae semper vera sit: rhetoricen adsentiri falsis: non esse igitur artem, II.17.18. Although
perceptio here may recall the Stoic doctrine of cataleptic impressions, Reinhardt and Winterbottom
write that “the argument which [Quintilian] seeks to refute is clearly meant as a general attack on
rhetoric as opposed to one on a specifically Stoic position” (2006, p. 327).
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difference between holding an opinion oneself and making someone else adopt it.”⁷ He
adds that “an orator, when he substitutes a falsehood for the truth, knows it is false and
that he is substituting it for the truth; he does not therefore have a false opinion him-
self, but he deceives the other person.”⁸ While Quintilian accommodates deceitfulness in
rhetorical practice, he here shows that the rhetorician himself does not assent to outright
falsehoods and that rhetoric still qualifies as an art according to the criteria set forth by
his objector.
As a later discussion in Book XII illustrates, participating in this deception in no way
undermines the perfection of the “Wise Man” (ipse sapiens), the speaker who embodies
the idealistic aim of the Institutio’s educational program. Indeed, even if an allowance
for rhetorical deceitfulness is not unprecedented among earlier theorists, Quintilian sets
out an even “cruder utilitarianism [in deception] than the Stoic would probably sanction”
since he allows the ideal orator to lie for “trivial reasons” (leviores causae):⁹
First of all, everyone must grant me what even the sternest of the Stoics ad-
⁷Ego rhetoricen nonnumquam dicere falsa pro veris confitebor, sed non ideo in falsa quoque esse
opinione concedam, quia longe diversum est ipsi quid videri et ut alii videatur efficere, II.17.19. Here
Quintilian “uses the noun opinio…[because] he needs a term for ‘item of knowledge’ which (unlike
a perceptio) does not have built into it the notion of truth” (Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006,
p. 328). One can contrast this willingness to use falsehoods with Socrates who “was never willing
to use arguments which he knew to be fallacious…[and] to refute anything that is said regardless
of whether it is true or false” (Nehamas 1990, p. 8). For the charge that rhetoricians use both true
and false arguments, see also Plato’s Euthydemus 272B.
⁸Item orator, cum falso utitur pro vero, scit esse falsum eoque se pro vero uti: non ergo falsam
habet ipse opinionem, sed fallit alium II.17.20.
⁹For the claim that Quintilian accommodates a “cruder utilitarianism” than that allowed in
Stoicism, see Walzer (2003, p. 33). That the orator may tell outright lies under particular circum-
stances is not Quintilian’s invention: it is debated in texts as early as Plato’s Hippias Minor and
also in early Stoic texts. See Reinhardt and Winterbottom (2006, p. 339) for a brief survey of these
discussions. That the Stoic Wise Man was allowed to lie as long as he recognized the falsehood of
his statement finds attestation in early Stoic works (Walzer 2003, pp. 32–33).
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mit, namely that the good man will go so far as to tell a lie on occasion, and
sometimes even for quite trivial reasons: with sick children, for example, we
pretend many things for their good and promise to do many things which
we are not going to do; even more justifiably, we lie to stop an assassin from
killing a man, and deceive an enemy to save the country. Thus lying, which in
some circumstances is blameworthy even in slaves, in others is praiseworthy
in the Wise Man himself.¹⁰
For Quintilian, deceit is not just a useful tactic in rhetorical practice: the statesman, the
military commander, and even everyday parents find it justifiable in their various duties.¹¹
Throughout the Institutio, then, we see that deception—as long as it is done knowingly and
with an eye to some beneficial practical outcome—is permitted in matters large and small,
rhetorical and otherwise.¹²
¹⁰Ac primum concedant mihi omnes oportet, quod Stoicorum quoque asperrimi confitentur, fac-
turum aliquando bonum virum ut mendacium dicat, et quidem nonnumquam levioribus causis, ut in
pueris aegrotantibus utilitatis eorum gratia multa fingimus, multa non facturi promittimus, nedum
si ab homine occidendo grassator avertendus sit aut hostis pro salute patriae fallendus: ut hoc quod
alias in servis quoque reprendendum est, sit alias in ipso sapiente laudandum, XII.1.38.
¹¹Austin points to a similar comparison of deception by military commanders and lying by
parents in Xenophon’s Memorabilia IV.2.17 (1965, p. 69).
¹²An earlier discussion in Book II highlights the role of deception in other artes, particularly
painting: “And when the painter makes us believe by his art that some objects are in the foreground
and others in the background, he himself is not ignorant of the fact that they are all on the same
plane” (Et pictor, cum vi artis suae efficit ut quaedam eminere in opere, quaedam recessisse credamus,
ipse ea plana esse non nescit, II.17.21). The curious litotes, non nescit, used in the description of
the painter’s art highlights how Quintilian allows that the painter may knowingly deceive his
audience while accommodating a broader skeptical attitude toward the art of painting. While the
painter is not unaware (non nescit) of how his figures both occupy a two-dimensional plane and
represent three-dimensional space, the double nature of visual illusion eludes his firm knowledge
of its spatial qualities. Epistemological problems related to painting are also present in Greek
philosophy, especially concerning perspective and distance. Wesley Trimpi explains that Plato,
Aristotle, and Vitruvius all expressed some degree of doubt regarding the ability to comprehend
figures painted with the viewer’s perspective in mind. Plato remarks that a skenographic painting,
“setting aside the question of reality, seeks to secure the viewer’s psychological ‘participation’ by
establishing his precise spatial relation to the object within the geometrically quantitative planes
of Euclidean optics” (Trimpi 1978, p. 412). See especially Plato’s distinction between “eikastic” and
“fantastic” images at Sophist 235B-236E. Plato uses distance “to emphasize the distortion already
present in any verbal or pictorial representative image” (Trimpi 1973, p. 30). Trimpi also comments
on Aristotle’s use of deceptive painting (skiagraphia) as an example of an image that is “really
something, but not that of which [it creates] the impression” (1978, p. 407). Vitruvius comments
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Quintilian’s understanding that deception is an acceptable element of the Wise Man’s
rhetorical practice sits within a larger discussion of the nature of such an ideal orator, and
while Quintilian opens his manual with the aim of producing a student who is “not only
perfect in morals…but also in knowledge,” his final book tempers this perfect knowledge
by looking to Academic skepticism as a model for oratorical study. Earlier in Book XII,
Quintilian treats another hypothetical objection to his treatment of rhetorical education,
an objection that argues “a good man only pleads good causes, and truth itself is defense
enough for them without the help of learning.”¹³ Quintilian refutes this requirement not
only on the grounds that the orator may need to use strategic falsehods but also that—in
the spirit of Carneades, the well-known Academic—he may not have firm knowledge of
the “truth itself” in the first place:
In answering these people in the first instance in relation to my own work,
I shall be satisfying them also as regards the duty of a good man, who may
sometimes have reason to undertake the defense of the guilty. It is not useless
to consider how one may on occasion speak for a falsehood or even for an in-
justice, if only because this enables us to detect and refute such things more
easily, just as the person who knows what things are harmful will be better
at applying remedies for them. After all, the Academics argue both sides of a
question, but live according to one side only, and the great Carneades, who
that in “painted stages, there appear to be projecting columns, projecting shelves, and extensions of
the shapes of statues, even though the panel, without a doubt, is flat along a straight edge” (in scenis
pictis videntur columnarum proiecturae, mutulorum ecphorae, signorum figurae prominentes, cum sit
tabula sine dubio ad regulam plana, VI.2.2). As Trimpi explains, Vitruvius then “cites the example of
oars’ appearing bent under water,” which Plato uses to illustrate the “natural incomprehensibility
of appearances” (1978, p. 409). Vitruvius points to a “psychological application to the illusionistic
effects of optical perspective” (ibid., p. 409) whereby “things that are real appear to be false, and
some things are approved by the eyes in a way that is inconsistent with their reality” (quae sunt
vera, falsa videantur et nonnulla aliter quam sunt oculis probentur, VI.2.4). Similarly, Quintilian’s
painter allows two different pictorial compositions to exist simultaneously: he sees both the flat
plane and the figures in perspective.
¹³Bonus enim vir non agit nisi bonas causas, eas porro etiam sine doctrina satis per se tuetur veritas
ipsa, XII.1.33.
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is said to have spoken at Rome in the presence of the censor Cato just as vig-
orously against justice as he had spoken in defense of justice the day before,
was a perfectly just man. What virtue is, in fact, is revealed by its opposite,
vice; equity is better understood by looking at its opposite; and in general
most things are shown to be good by comparison with their contraries.¹⁴
The central figure of this passage is “the great Carneades” (Carneades ille), head of the New
Academy, who engages in the practice of arguing on both sides of an issue (in utramque
disserunt partem).¹⁵ As Quintilian reports, Carneades famously used this rhetorical tactic
as a member of an embassy from Greece, arguing in Rome in 155 B.C. first in favor of
justice and then as persuasively for injustice.¹⁶ By positioning Carneades as a model for
the “good man,” for Carneades himself is “a perfectly just man” (nec…iniustus ipse vir fuit),
Quintilian suggests that his ideal orator is not one with full, confident grasp of the truth
but rather one willing to entertain differing if not opposite arguments.¹⁷ And in fact,
¹⁴Quibus ego, cum de meo primum opere respondero, etiam pro boni uiri officio, si quando eum ad
defensionem nocentium ratio duxerit, satisfaciam. Pertractare enim quo modo aut pro falsis aut etiam
pro iniustis aliquando dicatur non est inutile, uel propter hoc solum, ut ea facilius et deprendamus
et refellamus, quem ad modum remedia melius adhibebit cui nota quae nocent fuerint. Neque enim
Academici, cum in utramque disserunt partem, non secundum alteram uiuunt, nec Carneades ille,
qui Romae audiente Censorio Catone non minoribus uiribus contra iustitiam dicitur disseruisse quam
pridie pro iustitia dixerat, iniustus ipse uir fuit. Verum et uirtus quid sit aduersa ei malitia detegit, et
aequitas fit ex iniqui contemplatione manifestior, et plurima contrariis probantur, XII.1.34–35.
¹⁵K.E. Wilkerson notes that it was also a Stoic practice to argue on both sides of an issue (1988,
p. 136), but he cites as justification a passage from the Academica (II.75) that itself doubts the
existence of this practice among the Stoics. Quintilian surely intends to associate the practice—
although perhaps not exclusively—with the New Academy. The Stoic Wise Man, with his un-
shakeable grasp of catalectic impressions, is not limited to purely theoretical and methodological
knowledge like the science of rhetoric. See Atherton (1988, p. 398) for an explanation of how Stoic
dialectic, “as a body of scientific knowledge, of which the sage alone, of course, is in full posses-
sion,” encompasses “epistemology, linguistic, grammar and semantics, and the study of linguistic
ambiguity, as well as stylistics.”
¹⁶Carneades cautions that “we accept [appearances] because of their persuasive presentation
not because we know they are true” (Wilkerson 1988, p. 142) He merely allows that “reasonable
decisions can be made on the basis of probable rather than certain knowledge” (Mendelson 2001,
p. 280).
¹⁷In his commentary on Book XII, Austin points to another passage in the Academica (II.7)
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Quintilian envisages that Academic skepticism can allow the orator to make the soundest
judgments in the courtroom on account of the fact that “the Academy is the most useful
[in the opinion of some men] because its habit of arguing both sides of the question is
closest to the practice of forensic cases.”¹⁸ Quintilian’s admiration for Carneades in his
discussion of the ideal orator thus suggests that his conception of the ideal orator, while
never explicitly aligned with the Academic school outright, shares in Carneades’ modest
epistemological doctrines.¹⁹
After viewing Quintilian’s admiration for Carneades and the methods of Academic
skepticism in the last book of the Institutio, we turn back to Quintilian’s defense of
rhetoric’s use of deception in Book II, where we find greater evidence of the epistemic
modesty of the New Academy. As part of his broad defense of the use of falsehoods, in
fact, Quintilian suggests that the rhetorician need not fully and accurately grasp the truth
where the method of inquiry among Academics is summarized as follows: “our disputations do
nothing except (through speaking on each side of an issue) draw out and shape something which
is either true or approaches the truth as closely as possible” (neque nostrae disputationes quidquam
aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid quod aut
verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat).
¹⁸Academiam quidem utilissimam credunt, quod mos in utramque partem disserendi ad exercita-
tionem forensium causarum proxime accedat, XII.2.25. It is worth noting that the subjunctive verb
accedat shows that this view is not Quintilian’s own original view. But as D.A. Russell writes in
his commentary, the source he has in mind is perhaps Cicero who espouses a similar view in De
oratore, 3.67-68, 80 (2001, 5:233). Quintilian, however, does caution against following one philo-
sophical school blindly at XII.2.27. Quintilian’s conception of the ideal orator, one might assume,
aligns with the model of the Stoic sage on account of his attribution of the idea of the vir bonus di-
cendi peritus to Cato in the first pages of the Institutio’s final book, but this account of Carneadean
skepticism resists a close coupling of Quintilian’s ideal and the Stoic sage. For further discussion
of the alignment of Quintilian’s vir bonus dicendi peritus and the concept of the Stoic Wise Man,
see Walzer (2003, p. 26). For Cicero’s conception of Cato as the perfectus…Stoicus in his capacity
as an oratorical model, see Paradoxa Stoicorum, §2–3.
¹⁹In Quintilian’s eyes, “ethical training was the most important part of the development of the
orator,” not a complete knowledge of all subjects. (Willbanks 1996, p. 807). Willbanks even goes
on to claim that Quintilan “was absolutely convinced that the ideal was achievable and practical”
(ibid., p. 807).
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that is absent from his speech; instead, he must merely know that he speaks falsely.²⁰
While this claim appears to require an excessively subtle reading of Quintilian’s earlier
discussion of rhetorical deceitfulness in Book II, where the rhetorician “substitutes a false-
hood for the truth [and] knows it is false and that he is substituting it for the truth,” a sec-
ond discussion nearby emphasizes that the rhetorician does not know—and in fact cannot
know—whether the content of his speeches is true. Quintilian again uses an argument
from his hypothetical interlocutor to introduce his point:
Rhetoric is the art of speaking well, and the orator knows how (scit) to speak
well. “But he does not know (nescit) whether what he says is true.” Well,
neither do the people who tell us that the origin of all things lies in fire or
water or the four elements or indivisible bodies, or indeed those who calculate
the distances between the stars or the size of the sun and the earth; yet they
call their study an art. And if reason (ratio) enables them to appear not just
to have an opinion of these things but to appear to know them because of the
cogency of their proofs, the same reason (eadem ratio) may very well do as
much for the orator.²¹
Forms of the verb scire are used in two different senses in this passage: the rhetorician
“knows how” (scit) to speak well (bene dicere), but he “does not know” (nescit) whether
what he says is itself true.²² Rhetoric, at least as Quintilian has portrayed it here, has
²⁰scit esse falsum eoque se pro vero uti, II.17.20.
²¹Rhetorice ars est bene dicendi, bene autem dicere scit orator. ‘Sed nescit an verum sit quod dicit.’
Ne ii quidem qui ignem aut aquam aut quattuor elementa aut corpora insecabilia esse ex quibus
res omnes initium duxerint tradunt, nec qui intervalla siderum et mensuras solis ac terrae colligunt:
disciplinam tamen suam artem vocant. Quodsi ratio efficit ut haec non opinari sed propter vim pro-
bationem scire videantur, eadem ratio idem praestare oratori potest, II.17.37–38.
²²Compare OLD scio 1d, “to have certain knowledge of (opp. mere belief or suspicion),” and 8a,
“to know (an art, language, etc.), be versed in.” Reinhardt and Winterbottom make a similar point
about the separation of knowledge of subject-matter and knowledge of method, but they leave
their summary of this passage unclear as it relates to these two definitions: “rhetoric says what
it knows” (2006, p.347). I would emend that conclusion to point to the second type of knowing
outlined here: “rhetoric says what it knows how to say.” They are correct to note that “bene dicere
is not rhetoric’s subject-matter in Quintilian” (ibid., p. 346-347). Reinhardt and Winterbottom
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knowledge of its own practices and principles (that is, its ars), but it does not claim knowl-
edge of the material about which it speaks. Quintilian summarizes this nuanced under-
standing of scire shortly after the above passage: “in the end, the orator knows (scit) that
the things he says are similar to the truth (veri similia).”²³ Book II of the Institutio thus ad-
vances a skeptical outlook for the rhetorician’s practice: at best, he knows that his claims
are verisimilar, but his knowledge never amounts to a firm grasp of the truth of these
claims.
In addition to suggesting the rhetorician’s inability to access perfect knowledge, this
passage boldly advances a skeptical position that applies more broadly to a range of in-
tellectual activities, for as part of this defense of rhetoric, Quintilian claims that the epis-
temological difficulties for the rhetorician also hold true for individuals working in fields
of apodeictic reasoning. Natural philosophers, astronomers, and geometers also merely
appear to know (scire videantur) that their subject-matter is true when in fact they only
suppose (opinari) that it is so.²⁴ In the terms of Quintilian’s conception of rhetoric, these
experts merely know how to reason and do not know the content of their claims. No
explain this distinction between knowledge of an art and knowledge of subject-matter itself with
a helpful example from Plato. They point to a passage from the Theaetetus (200D–201C) where
“Socrates proves the non-identity of knowledge and true judgment with reference to a courtroom
situation” (2006, p. 346). Socrates there argues that what has happened at the scene of a crime can
be known only by an eyewitness. The orator’s speeches, no matter how persuasive and evocative,
cannot give the jury access to the knowledge of the eyewitness who himself saw the crime happen
(Theaetetus, 201B–C).
²³scit autem esse veri similia quae dicit, II.17.39. Reinhardt and Winterbottom align this state-
ment with a kind of Platonic skepticism: “like Socrates, rhetoric knows that it does not know”
(ibid., p. 348). A study of Quintilian’s understanding of the law concludes that in the Institutio
“truth is no more and no less than a high degree of plausibility” (Witteveen 2003, p. 309).
²⁴Reinhardt and Winterbottom more precisely identify these natural philosophers as Heraclitus,
Thales, Empedocles, and the Atomists (2006, p. 347). A discussion of these other fields is not out
of character for an ancient rhetorical training manual, for rhetoricians were trained in astrology,
dialectic, geometry, and many other disciplines even among the early sophists (Greer 1925, p. 27).
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longer interested in rhetoric alone, Quintilian’s discussion of geometry and natural phi-
losophy here claims that other disciplines also suffer from an inaccessibility to knowledge.
He moreover unifies rhetoric and these other intellectual activities by arguing that they
all partake in one and the same limited brand of ratio, for the rational process used among
philosophers and mathematicians is the same process (eadem ratio) which an orator uses
in his own speeches. And on account of this shared method, all such intellectual activities
suffer from the same epistemological limitations.
Book I of the Institutio, a discussion of the orator’s early childhood education, pro-
vides further evidence of Quintilian’s efforts to couple rhetoric and geometry in particular
through their shared use of the same ratio:
Geometry proves subsequent propositions from preceding ones, the uncertain
from the certain: do we not do the same in speaking? Again: does not the
solution of problems rest almost wholly in syllogisms? This is why you find
the majority of people thinking that geometry is closer to dialectic than to
rhetoric. But even the orator will sometimes, if rarely, prove his point by
dialectic, seeing that if the subject demands it, he will use syllogisms, and
certainly the enthymeme, which is a rhetorical syllogism.²⁵
Like mathematicians, orators make use of syllogistic reasoning, and both kinds of practi-
tioners root their proofs in priora and certa.²⁶ The verb probare in this passage recalls the
vis probationum in Quintilian’s discussion of geometry and natural philosophy in Book
²⁵Ex prioribus geometria probat insequentia et certis incerta: nonne id in dicendo facimus? Quid?
Illa propositarum quaestionum conclusio non fere tota constat syllogismis? Propter quod pluris inve-
nias qui dialectice similem quam qui rhetoricae fateantur hanc artem. Verum et orator, etiamsi raro,
non tamen numquam probabit dialectice. Nam et syllogismis si res poscet utetur, et certe enthyme-
mate, qui rhetoricus est syllogismus, I.10.37.
²⁶In a basic template of syllogistic reasoning, premises—that is, priora—give rise to conclusions.
See OLD prior 8. The similarity between rhetoric and geometry may extend beyond their shared
use of syllogisms, for Colson suggests that here “Quintilian is especially thinking of the resem-
blance between [Euclidean parts of a proof] and the regular divisions of a speech” (1924, p. 135).
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II, where proof results not in knowledge but in the mere belief (opiniari) that one’s con-
clusions are true.²⁷ The geometer’s method of proof in Book I, as is the case in Book II,
does not bring about knowledge of vera; instead, it grounds consequents (insequentia)
and uncertainties (incerta) by means of antecedent certainties.²⁸ Quintilian’s discussions
in Book I and Book II, therefore, suggest that rhetoric, mathematics, and natural philos-
ophy all operate through participation in the same method of imperfect reasoning, and
by collapsing these various disciplines through their shared reliance on ratio, Quintilian
implicitly rejects the long-standing division of apodeictic demonstration on the one hand
and rhetorical and dialectical reasoning on the other.²⁹
By appealing to the role of certa in this comparison of geometry and rhetoric in the
first book of the Institutio, Quintilian anticipates the fuller discussion in Book V of ar-
gumentation and its reliance on certainty. There he sets out to explain how oratory’s
“particular and principal task is to confirm its own goals and to refute those which are
expounded by one’s adversary,” but rather than limit his discussion to rhetorical proof
alone, he expands the scope of his claims to include all forms of rational argument.³⁰ In
²⁷Colson writes that “it is…fairly probable that Quintilian has in mind the treatise of Euclid
called ψευδάρια, which Proclus couples with the Elements” (1924, p. 136). Now lost, the Pseudaria
warned readers of fallacies brought about through geometrical reasoning.
²⁸This skeptical attitude toward mathematics is not unique to Quintilian even in his own era.
Seneca expresses a similar skepticism regarding the ability of mathematics to arrive at truths in
Epistle 88.28.
²⁹See Chapter 1 of this dissertation for a discussion of the division between apodeictic rea-
soning and endoxic dialectic and rhetoric in the works of Aristotle, particularly as this division is
discussed at Topica 100b21-23 and Rhetoric 1356b33-35. See also Nicomachean Ethics where Aristo-
tle argues that “it appears to be the same [level of foolishness] to accept probable statements from
the mathematician and to demand strict proofs from the rhetorician” (παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται
μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν, I.3.4). Since
“ethics [unlike mathematics] is essentially practical,” he argues, “the roughness [of ethical judg-
ments] is an immediate consequence of the practicality” (Broadie 2002, p. 265).
³⁰hoc tamen proprium atque paecipuum crederent opus, sua confirmare et quae ex adverso pro-
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that later discussion, Quintilian makes explicit his conflation of rhetoric and other disci-
plines by explaining how it is the “nature of all arguments”—including not just rhetorical
proofs but also apodeictic demonstrations—to use certainties to prove what is doubtful.³¹
And by defining certainty as a matter of agreement, as we shall see, Quintilian illustrates
how consensus grounds the premises of all kinds of argumenta.
After reminding his readers that there are three kinds of argumenta, including the
enthymeme, the epicheireme, and the apodeixis, and surveying their several definitions
from earlier rhetorical theorists, Quintilian turns his attention to their shared basis:³²
All authorities, whatever their differences, agree in defining [apodeixis and
epicheirema] in the same way, namely as a reasoning (ratio) which lends cre-
dence to what is doubtful (dubia) by means of what is certain (certa). This
indeed is the nature of all arguments: certainties cannot be proven by uncer-
tainties.³³
Mirroring his discussion in Book II where Quintilian argues that the same type of rea-
soning (eadem ratio) grounds rhetoric, natural philosophy, and mathematics, Quintil-
ian’s definition of argumenta in Book V similarly blurs the distinctions among different
kinds of proof: they all reason “in the same way” and share the same natura. Even if “in
Greek usage there is some difference between [the enthymeme, the epicheireme, and the
ponerentur refutare, V.pr.2.
³¹natura…omnium argumentorum, V.10.8.
³²Nunc de argumentis: hoc enim nomine complectimur omnia quae Graeci enthymemata, epichire-
mata, apodeixis uocant, V.10.1. For a discussion of Quintilian’s debt to Aristotle in his understand-
ing of the enthymeme in particular, see Chapter 1 of this dissertation. For a discussion of the
enthymeme as understood in the Aristotelian and Stoic texts that ground Quintilian’s text, see
Burnyeat (1994).
³³Utrumque autem quamquam diversi auctores eodem modo finiunt, ut sit ratio per ea quae
certa sunt fidem dubiis adferens: quae natura est omnium argumentorum, neque enim certa incertis
declarantur, V.10.8.
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apodeixis],” so Quintilian explains in the first sentence of his discussion of argumenta,
“the general sense is much the same.”³⁴
As part of this radical combination of these three categories of arguments, Quintil-
ian turns his attention to the notion of certainty, a notion that he positions both as the
beginning of rational arguments and as their aim. In the aforementioned discussion of
apodeictic reasoning and epicheiremes in Book V, Quintilian remarks that it is the “na-
ture of all arguments” to “lend credence to what is doubtful by means of what is certain,”
a notion he reiterates in the final chapter of Book V when he explains that “when reason
(ratio) itself comes into question, we have to establish the certainty (certum) of the propo-
sition we are going to use to prove what is uncertain (incertum).”³⁵ Whenever ratio serves
as the probative strategy of an argument, then, such an argument uses certainties as its
foundation.
The foundational importance of certainty for Quintilian’s theory of argument is espe-
cially clear given his careful attention to its definition. As part of his refashioning of all
argumentation as a method of using what is certum to prove what is incertum, Quintilian
provides the following series of definitions for this crucially important term, a collection
of definitions first mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation but to which we now
turn with a more careful eye:
Now we regard as certain things perceived by the senses, for example what
we see or hear (Signs come under this head); things about which common
opinion is unanimous: the existence of the gods, the duty of respecting par-
³⁴quamquam apud illos est aliqua horum nominum differentia, etiam si uis eodem fere tendit,
V.10.1.
³⁵cum ipsa ratio in quaestionem venit, efficiendum est certum id quo probaturi sumus quod incer-
tum est, V.14.16.
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ents; provisions of laws; what has been accepted as moral custom, if not the
belief of all mankind, at least in that of the city or nation where the case is be-
ing pleaded—many matters of right, for example, involve custom rather than
laws; whatever is agreed between both parties; whatever has been proved;
lastly, whatever is not contradicted by our opponent.³⁶
Quintilian structures his catalog of certa around three broad categories: previously proven
statements, sense perceptions, and matters of consensus. The most important of these
categories is that relating to consensus, but before turning to this primary meaning of
certainty, it will be helpful first to show why Quintilian includes these other two cate-
gories.
First and most straightforwardly, Quintilian notes toward the end of his catalog that
whatever has been proven beforehand (quid probatum sit) constitutes certainty. Alongside
his aforementioned discussion of certainty as the foundation of arguments, where one
uses certainties as the premises of proof, Quintilian here clarifies that certainty constitutes
not only the beginning of arguments but their ends as well. Quintilian also remarks in
the last book of the Institutio that “some things which we adduce to prove something
else need to be proven themselves…[and] when this [proven conclusion] begins to be
certain (certum), it can become the argument for an uncertain fact.”³⁷ Certainties, then,
can amount even to intermediate conclusions in more complex arguments.
But not all statements used in proofs need to be proven themselves, for Book V reminds
³⁶Pro certis autem habemus primum quae sensibus percipiuntur, ut quae videmus audimus, qualia
sunt signa, deinde ea in quae communi opinione consensum est: ‘deos esse,’ ‘praestandum pietatem
parentibus,’ praeterea quae legibus cauta sunt, quae persuasione etiam si non omnium hominum, eius
tamen civitatis aut gentis in qua res agitur in mores recepta sunt, ut pleraque in iure non legibus sed
moribus constant: si quid inter utramque partem convenit, si quid probatum est, denique cuicumque
adversarius non contradicit, V.10.12-13.
³⁷quaedam tamen quae in alterius rei probationem ducimus ipsa probanda sunt…cum id coeperit
esse pro certo, fiat incerti argumentum, V.12.2.
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readers how there must be “something in the cause which does not need proof…[and]
which either is true or seems to be true and from which assurance may be given to what
is doubtful.”³⁸ While the conclusions of arguments are considered certain, Quintilian ac-
knowledges the need for argumentative starting points that at least “seem to be true” on
their own. Perhaps as an example of what may constitute such material which itself “does
not need proof,” Quintilian includes matters of sense perception (quae sensibus percipiun-
tur) as a second category in his catalog.
Even though Quintilian makes only this brief mention of sense perception against the
several items relating to consensus, he nevertheless places this definition first in his cat-
alog, likely on account of the etymological link between certum and cerno.³⁹ As discussed
in the second chapter of this dissertation, Republican Latin texts and especially the philo-
sophical works of Cicero take an interest in this link between certainty and sense percep-
tion, but as part of this etymlogical understanding, Cicero’s skeptical position makes clear
the separation of certum and verum. In the Academica, where Lucullus attempts to iden-
tify certum with verum on account of his confidence in the reliability of sense perceptions,
Cicero drives these terms apart:
The only difference is that whereas you [Lucullus], when you have been
deeply affected, acquiesce, assent, approve, hold that a certain (certum), com-
prehended, perceived, ratified, firm, fixed thing is a true thing, and cannot be
driven or moved away from it by any reason, I on the contrary am of the opin-
ion that there is nothing of such a kind that if I assent to it I shall not often
³⁸necesse est esse aliquid in causa quod probatione non egeat. Alioqui nihil erit quo probemus, nisi
fuerit quod aut sit verum aut videatur, ex quo dubiis fides fiat, V.10.11–12.
³⁹For certum as a derivative of cerno, see OLD certus. At Leviathan II.27, too, Thomas Hobbes
also appeals to cerno as an etymlogical root for the manifest or conspicuous nature of a crimen, an
action that includes an “outward act” and “not mere intentions” (2008, p. 193).
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be assenting to a falsehood, since truths are not separated from falsehoods by
any particular distinction.⁴⁰
Cicero begins his criticism of Lucullus’ pairing of certainty and truth with a series of
characterizations of these putatively reliable sense perceptions—certain, comprehended,
fixed—and concludes that even in the face of such strong perceptions, there is no dis-
cernable difference between true and false impressions. Most important for our study is
Cicero’s use of certum: he remarks that while Lucullus understands that what is certain
amounts to a “true thing” (verum), he himself rejects that equivalence. Within this frame-
work of Ciceronian skepticism, a framework that perhaps underlies Quintilian’s own un-
derstanding of the certainty of sense perceptions, certainty can be understood as a feature
of perceptions that appear reliable but nevertheless amount to an imperfect category of
knowledge.⁴¹ For even if Quintilian himself does not advocate for an explicitly skeptical
approach to philosophy here in Book V, a skeptical attitude toward sensory perception
persists in his writings.⁴² In Book XII of the Institutio, for instance, Quintilian similarly
⁴⁰Tantum interest quod tu cum es commotus adquiescis, adsentiris, adprobas, verum illud certum
comprehensum perceptum ratum firmum fixum vis esse, deque eo nulla ratione neque pelli neque
moveri potes, ego nihil eius modi esse arbitror cui si adsensus sim non adsentiar saepe falso, quoniam
vera a falsis nulla discrimine separantur, II.141.
⁴¹For a discussion of the link between certum and enargeia and the importance of “certainty”
in epistemological debates between Stoics and Academics in Ciceronian philosophy, see Chapter
2 of this dissertation.
⁴²Quintilian explains that rhetoricians should “pick the most eloquent [model] for imitation”
and that one “has no need to swear allegiance to the laws [of any philosophical school]” (oratori
uero nihil est necesse in cuiusquam iurare leges. Maius enim opus atque praestantius ad quod ipse
tendit et cuius est uelut candidatus, si quidem est futurus cum uitae tum etiam eloquentiae laude
perfectus. Quare in exemplum bene dicendi facundissimum quemque proponet sibi ad imitandum,
XII.2.26–27). This allegiance to no school of philosophy should not be understood as a matter
of philosophical ignorance, for Austin notes that the word “orator here is used, as so often in
Quintilian, of the orator in the highest possible sense” (1965, p. 88). Despite the call to avoid
allegiance to one philosophical school in paticular, Quintilian does express admiration for the
philosophy of Carneades at XII.1.35.
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contrasts mere sense perception with firmer theoretical understanding, the latter form-
ing the roots of the ideal orator’s knowledge of virtue: such an orator “has embraced the
virtues themselves with his mind” and “has not simply heard them with his ears in order
to repeat them with his tongue.”⁴³ While not uniquely or even explicitly skeptical in its
philosophical recommendations in this final book, the Institutio nevertheless espouses a
measured confidence in sensory perception.⁴⁴
Quintilian’s awareness of the etymological link between certainty and sense per-
ception appears to motivate not only this second category of certa—the sensus of the
individual—but also the third and most important category, the consensus of a group.
As shown in the first chapter of this dissertation, the reliance on shared beliefs and con-
ventions, understood as homolegoumena, underlies much of Aristotelian rhetorical the-
ory, for on account of the widespread adoption of such beliefs, the orator can omit them
from otherwise lengthy and burdensome proofs. This catalog of certa, too, stresses the
importance of such shared beliefs if by nothing other than the several categories Quin-
tilian provides here. The Institutio defines such matters broadly, from the unanimous
beliefs of all mankind (ea in quae communi opinione consensum est) to the agreements be-
tween parties in a forensic dispute (quid inter utramque partem convenit) to even what is
“not contradicted by one’s opponent” in such a dispute (cuicumque adversarius non con-
⁴³Sed ille vir bonus, qui haec non vocibus tantum sibi nota atque nominibus aurium tenus in usum
linguae perceperit, sed qui virtutes ipsas mente complexus ita sentiet, nec in cogitando laborabit sed
quod sciet vere dicet, XII.2.17. Austin remarks that “Quintilian seems to mean that the good man, in
whom virtues are innate, will not only speak of them with ease when they are needed in panegyric,
but will base his thoughts on them also and reflect his personal knowledge in his words” (1965,
p. 83).
⁴⁴For a discussion of Quintilian’s understanding of vision, hallucination, and influencing the
imagination of one’s audience, see Adams (1996).
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tradicit).⁴⁵ Aside from the first item of consensus denoting unanimous and perhaps even
cross-cultural beliefs, Quintilian’s list is largely rooted in agreements pertinent to the law:
forms of lex and ius appear three times in his catalog. And as we shall now see, discussions
of legal foundations elsewhere in the Institutio illustrate the strong association between
consensus and Quintilian’s notion of certainty.
In Book XII, Quintilian writes that “every law, which is a certain thing (quod certum
est), depends either on a written text (scriptum) or on custom (mores),” adding that when
the text of the law has to be interpreted, the ability to do so is rooted in the shared un-
derstanding of educated rhetoricians: “To understand the meaning of each word is either
common ground to sensible men or peculiar to the orator; equity is perfectly familiar to
all good men.”⁴⁶ The consensual nature of mores, one of the foundations of law cited here,
is clear from Quintilian’s catalog of certainties in Book V, where he explains how cer-
tainties can be derived from “moral customs (mores), if not in the belief of all mankind, at
⁴⁵The range of meaning of communis is broad, at times denoting an agreement of two parties
(OLD 1) and at others denoting something “belonging to, or affecting, everyone or everything”
(OLD 2), but the catalog’s structure from broadest agreements to most particular strongly suggests
that “unanimous” is an appropriate translation of communis here. His example of “the duty of
respecting parents” (praestandam pietatem parentibus) appeals to widespread notions of Roman
pietas, and Quintilian’s subsequently reports how a similar familial duty, “that children are loved
by their parents” (liberos a parentibus amari), is “the strongest kind of credible statement, because it
is nearly always true” (unum firmissimum, quia fere accidit, V.10.16). To begin his list of the various
forms of consensus, Quintilian refers to opinio, an important term that he uses throughout Book
II to denote beliefs that are not necessarily true but are perhaps verisimilar. For a discussion of
opinio as a deficient category of knowledge, see Reinhardt and Winterbottom (2006, p. 328). The
appearance of opinio here underscores that beliefs that are certa for Quintilian do not achieve
the status of unassailable truth. For a discussion of Hellenistic debates regarding the status of
unanimous opinions, see Obbink (1992).
⁴⁶namque omne ius, quod certum est, aut scripto aut moribus constat…vim cuiusque vocis intel-
legere aut commune prudentium est aut proprium oratoris, aequitas optimo cuique notissima, XII.3.6–
7.
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least in that of the city or nation where the case is being pleaded.”⁴⁷ Quintilian’s appeal
to language (scriptum) as one basis of legal certainty, too, should be understood as a con-
ceptualization of the law rooted in shared beliefs. Since only those who are “sensible” or
orators themselves share the “common ground” of understanding the law’s words, the law
is thus a “certain thing” insofar as rhetoricians agree on its meaning, whether a matter of
mores or verba.⁴⁸
Quintilian’s notion of the certainty of the law and its deep connections with the shared
ability to “understand the meaning of each word,” in fact, serves as an example of Quintil-
ian’s broader conceptualization of language itself as a kind of certainty rooted in consen-
sus, a helpful case for showing the strong association of agreement and certainty. As part
of a discussion of the role of language in early childhood education, Quintilian elaborates
a theory of language in Book I that calls consuetudo the “most certain teacher of speak-
ing” (certissima loquendi magistra), and Quintilian clarifies his definition of consuetudo by
drawing a parallel between language and money: “indeed one must use language as one
uses a coin, for which there is a ‘public die.’ ”⁴⁹ Of central importance in this passage is
⁴⁷quae persuasione etiam si non omnium hominum, eius tamen civitatis aut gentis in qua res agitur
in mores recepta sunt, V.10.13.
⁴⁸Vincenzo Scarano Ussani argues that legal interpretation in Republican Rome was more of an
oracular practice than a matter of consensus. He writes that “according to ancient custom, [the
orator’s] house would be visited by promising young men who would ask him, as an oracle, what is
the path to true eloquence” and would ask “to interpret the law” (2003, p. 294). This understanding
of the jurist as an oracular interpreter of the law is rooted in Cicero’s image of the orator as an
oracle in De oratore (I.200) (ibid., p. 294). Quintilian also portrays the orator as an oracle in his
retirement, from whom young men (iuvenes) will seek out the “path to speaking well” (dicendi
viam, XII.11.5), but the notion that legal interpretation happens in this oracular context is absent
from Quintilian’s manual.
⁴⁹consuetudo vero certissima loquendi magistra, utendumque plane sermone, ut nummo, cui pub-
lica forma est, I.6.3. Colson does not comment on the meaning of consuetudo in this passage. Con-
sultus Chirius Fortunatianus’sArs Rhetorica from the fourth or fifth century shows that the analogy
between language use and coinage was long-lasting: Verbis utendum est ut nummis publica mon-
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the notion of what is “public,” for it demonstrates again how Quintilian’s understanding
of certainty is founded in consensus, whether that of the broader public or of a more selec-
tive group of educated authorities. On the one hand, the analogy between language and
money roots language in the public valuation of even popular assessment of words, and
Quintilian himself elsewhere recommends that a rhetorician should use language that is
familiar to common people: “And yet Cicero had laid down quite clearly that the greatest
fault in public speaking was to distance oneself from ordinary language and our normal
instinctive usage (consuetudine communis sensus).”⁵⁰ By associating language with the sen-
sus communis, a term that recalls the communis opinio of the broadest certainties in Book
V, Quintilian suggests that the certainty of language is tied to its wide, public adoption.⁵¹
But Quintilian’s understanding of language, like his catalog of certainties, looks not
only to the broadest types of consensus but also to the narrower agreements of learned
experts, whether forensic rhetoricians or, as is the case here, authorities on language.
The publica forma used for minting authorized currency is perhaps best understood as
a die that is not “public” but “official.”⁵² A later discussion of the role of consuetudo in
Quintilian’s text justifies this second, more restrictive interpretation: at the conclusion
eta signatis, III.3. For a brief discussion of Fortunatianus’ appropriation of Quintilian’s metaphor,
see Montefusco (1979, p. 430). For an early modern example of further interest in Quintilian’s
comparison of language and money, see Camporeale (2002, pp. 8-9) on Lorenzo Valla’s theories of
language. Colson points to similar analogies in Ovid and Sextus Empiricus (1924, p. 74).
⁵⁰Atqui satis aperte Cicero praeceperat in dicendo vitium vel maximum esse a vulgari genere ora-
tionis atque a consuetudine communis sensus abhorrere, VIII.pr.25.
⁵¹Recall that Quintilian includes unanimous or near-unanimous beliefs in his catalog of certa:
ea in quae communi opinione consensum est, V.10.12.
⁵²The adjective publicus extends over both meanings. See OLD publicus, which includes among
definitions “authorized, provided, maintained, etc., by the state, official” (1a), “available to, shared
or enjoyed by, all members of the community, public” (4), and “common to all, universal” (5a).
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of his discussion of orthography and grammar, Quintilian argues that the customs of
speech (consuetudo sermonis) should not be determined by the errors common among
everyday Romans; rather, such customs should be governed by the “consensus of the
educated” (consensus eruditorum) just as the “customary practices of living” (consuetudo
vivendi) should be governed by the “consensus of good people” (consensus bonorum).⁵³
Thus, when the Institutio compares language to coinage insofar as each is stamped with
the “public die,” one need not read publica as an appeal to descriptivist approaches to ordi-
nary language. For Quintilian, the more limited consensus eruditorum as well as the public
determine how to mint the currency of speech.⁵⁴ In either case, whether one grounds lan-
guage in the consensus eruditorum or the sensus communis, Quintilian’s conceptualization
of language shows how its certainty is deeply tied to the consensus of a group, not the
sensus of the individual.
This reorientation of certainty through the lens of agreement, as we shall now see,
stems not from a wholly original notion of the Roman schoolmaster but instead points
to Quintilian’s deep familiarity with and debt to so-called status theory, an immensely
influential rhetorical framework devised by the Hellenistic rhetorical theorist Hermago-
⁵³sic in loquendo non si quid vitiose multis insederit pro regula sermonis accipiendum erit. Nam
ut transeam quem ad modum circi turbam exclamasse barbare scimus. Ergo consuetudinem sermo-
nis vocabo consensum eruditorum, sicut vivendi consensum bonorum, I.6.44-45. Colson does not
comment on the appearance of consensus in this passage.
⁵⁴The tension between language guidelines set by learned authorities and those observed within
“ordinary language” is a central concern for Lorenzo Valla, one of Quintilian’s most avid readers
in the fifteenth century. For scholarly debate surrounding Valla’s views on ordinary language,
particularly as they are rooted in Quintilian’s discussion here, see Waswo (1987) and Monfasani
(1989). For a more recent treatment of this debate concerning language within the context of
Valla’s broader concern with logic and rhetoric, see Nauta (2009). For Valla’s interest in consensus
as it is understood in the Institutio, see Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
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ras.⁵⁵ Although we have already encountered status theory in the rhetorical treatises of
Cicero, it will be helpful first to review Quintilian’s account of Hermagoras’ theory since,
as Quintilian himself shows, there are several competing formulations by the time of the
Institutio’s composition in the first century.⁵⁶ In the most general terms, status theory is
a rhetorical framework where parties in a forensic dispute come to “a standing still” (that
is, a status) at the point of contention between them, and in order to refine this stopping
point in the most precise terms, status theory recommends that rhetoricians turn to the
triad of questions at the heart of this framework: whether something happened, what
happened, and what kind of thing it was.⁵⁷ After noting that “every cause rests on some
issue (status),” Quintilian explains how these questions sit at the center of the disagree-
ments between courtroom adversaries:⁵⁸
The issue (status) is not the first conflict—“You did it,” “I didn’t”—but what
arises out of the first conflict. In other words, the type of question. With
“You did it,” “I didn’t,” the question is whether he did it. With “That is what
you did,” “I didn’t do that,” the question is what he did. Since it is obvious from
⁵⁵For a survey of ancient references to Hermagoras as well as a survey of modern scholarship
on his theory of status, see Bennett (2005). Bennett notes that “despite this scholarly attention [in
the twentieth century], Hermagorean doctrine remains somewhat uncertain in its details” (ibid.,
p. 188).
⁵⁶For a comprehensive discussion of Quintilian’s views of status theory within its historical
development, see Holtsmark (1968).
⁵⁷For a helpful summary of the major components of status theory (also called stasis theory),
see Dieter (1950). For a history of the development of status theory, see Nadeau (1959). The status
or “issue” remains an important rhetorical framework for centuries and also appears in rhetor-
ical handbooks in sixteenth-century England (Skinner 2014, pp. 44–45). For a discussion of the
Aristotelian influence on status theory, particularly regarding the forensic framework of circum-
stantiae, see Sloan (2010). For Hermagoras’ original formulation of four status questions including
the final question of “objection,” see Nadeau (1959, pp. 53–54). Nadeau writes that later Latin au-
thors, including Cicero and Quintilian, consider the three questions listed here to be sufficient
(ibid., p. 54). For a detailed summary of Book III of the Institutio and an account of the place of
status theory within the broader treatment of rhetorical inventio in Book III, see Snieżewski (2013).
⁵⁸omnis causa contineatur aliquo statu, III.6.1.
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this that the first point has to be considered by conjecture and the second by
definition, and both parties rest their case on this, the question will be either
of a conjectural or a definitional issue.⁵⁹
This passage highlights the first two questions of status theory—conjecture and
definition—to demonstrate the “type of question” at the center of forensic disputes. If
the two parties disagree regarding whether one has committed a crime, the first issue
of conjecture produces the question. If the two parties agree that a crime was commit-
ted but do not agree on what precisely the crime was, however, the case rests on the
question of definition, not conjecture. While Quintilian reports that there are competing
notions of status theory among rhetorical writers, where some theorists differ in termi-
nology and offer up to eight issues rather than Quintilian’s three, all such theorizations
nevertheless take as their method of refining the case at hand a series of questions that
identify disagreements. After laying out these various formulations, Quintilian himself
acknowledges his debt to previous thinkers in subscribing to what he portrays as a canon-
ical understanding of Hermagoras’ framework: “Following most authorities, I kept three
logical issues (status)—conjecture, quality, and definition—and one legal issue.”⁶⁰ The In-
stitutio thus presents an elaborate history of status theory not merely as a narrative of the
development of rhetoric but also to provide a backdrop for Quintilian’s own rhetorical
view that “every cause rests on some status.”
As part of Quintilian’s account of the historical development of status theory and
⁵⁹Non enim est status prima conflictio: ‘fecisti’, ‘non feci’, sed quod ex prima conflictione nascitur,
id est genus quaestionis: ‘fecisti’, ‘non feci’, ‘an fecerit’: ‘hoc fecisti’, ‘non hoc feci’, ‘quid fecerit’.
Quia ex his apparet illud coniectura, hoc finitione quaerendum atque in eo pars utraque insistit, erit
quaestio coniecturalis uel finitiui status, III.6.5.
⁶⁰Secundum plurimos auctores, servabam tris rationales status, coniecturam qualitatem fini-
tionem, unum legalem, III.6.66.
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its influence on his own methods of rhetorical invention, he explains how it adopts the
language of certainty in its treatment of the agreements and disagreements at the center
of rhetorical arguments. In a discussion of the first question of conjecture, for example,
Quintilian uses certum to describe an agreement within the courtroom:
Many later writers, simply changing the names, spoke of “things that are
not agreed” and “things that are agreed.” For it is true—and it cannot be
otherwise—that a fact must be either agreed (certum) or not. If it is not agreed
(si non est certum), we have conjecture. If it is agreed (si certum est), we have
other types of issue.⁶¹
Against the tradition seen in Ciceronian texts that associates certum with sense percep-
tion according to its etymological roots, Quintilian’s discussion of certainty in his account
of the development of status theory points to later developments (deinceps) that connect
the notion of certainty with consensus, not sensus. Quintilian underscores this later under-
standing of certainty by linking the verb consto and the adjective certum, such that when
disputing parties come to an agreement (in rem de qua constet) and arrive at a certainty
(certum), there remain other issues (reliqui status) through which they can still articulate
other disagreements.⁶² As part of his adoption of the framework of status, then, Quintil-
ian departs from the notion of certum rooted in matters of sense perception and instead
understands certainty through the lens of the agreements and disagreements at the heart
of forensic rhetoric.⁶³
⁶¹Plurimi deinceps, mutatis tantum nominibus, in rem de qua non constet et in rem de qua constet.
Nam est uerum nec aliter fieri potest quam ut aut certum sit factum esse quid aut non sit; si non est
certum, coniectura sit, si certum est, reliqui status, III.6.34.
⁶²Quintilian’s discussion here centers on two-issue theories of status, so the suggestion that
several issues (reliqui status) remain after the first has been settled is peculiar. This plural form
perhaps points to Quintilian’s own conception of the three rational issues at III.6.66: the reliqui
status, then, would include both quality and definition, qualitas and finitio.
⁶³The contrast between certainty and doubt that appears in Quintilian’s treatment of Book V
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Developed over the course of Book III, Quintilian’s notion of status theory expands
to domains outside forensic disputes, an expansion that facilitates his application of cer-
tainty, understood as consensus, to other methods of inquiry. Paralleling his assertion in
Book V that it is the “nature of all arguments” to use certainties to prove what is doubtful,
Book III of the Institutio similarly argues that even if “some have held that [the issues
of status theory] are relevant only to forensic subjects, these people’s ignorance will be
revealed by the facts.”⁶⁴ While Quintilian does not discuss the applicability of this foren-
sic framework to apodeictic reasoning specifically, he nevertheless extends the language
of certainty from Hermagoras’ forensic framework to other branches of oratory. In the
case of deliberative oratory, for example, Quintilian devises three issues in parallel to the
traditional triad of questions at the heart of status theory; moreover, he uses the language
of certainty to locate the precise question (quaestio) at the center of such deliberative
matters:
Whether the object is to persuade or to dissuade, there are therefore three
considerations to take into account first: what the proposal is, who are the
people discussing it, and who is the adviser. As for the proposal, its practi-
cability is either certain (certum) or doubtful (incertum). If it is doubtful, this
becomes the only or at least the most vital question (quaestio). We shall often
find outselves saying first that a thing ought not to be done even if it could,
and secondly that it cannot be done. When the question turns on this, we
reappears in Book III’s treatment of status theory, suggesting moreover that the Institutio not only
understands certainty as agreement but also doubt as disagreement. As part of a discussion on
the status of quality, Quintilian appeals to this contrast in describing “a clearly named fact, where
it is certain that the deed was done, and there is no doubt about what it is that has been done”
(succidentium autem aliae de communi appellatione, ut ‘sitne sacrilegus qui pecuniam privatam ex
templo futurus est,’ aut de re denominata, ubi et factum esse certum est nec dubitatur quid sit quod
factum est, III.6.41).
⁶⁴Quamquam id nonnulli ad iudiciales tantum pertinere materias putaverunt, quorum inscitiam,
cum omnia tria genera fuero executus, res ipsa deprendet, III.6.1.
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have conjecture.⁶⁵
Rather than root deliberation in the three traditional status questions of forensic rhetoric—
an sit, quid sit, quale sit—Quintilian here recommends that deliberation consider what
proposal is at hand, who is deliberating, and who advocates for each side. Quintilian’s
framing of deliberative oratory around a question (quaestio) further recasts this second
branch of oratory through the lens of status, for “what we call issue (status) is called
by some ‘constitution’ (constitutio), by others ‘question’ (quaestio), by others ‘that which
the question reveals.’ ”⁶⁶ By theorizing deliberative oratory through the vocabulary of
status theory, which is first and most emphatically a strategy useful for forensic rhetoric,
Quintilian illustrates how he expands the applicability of status theory and the language
of certainty beyond the courtroom, an expansion that foregrounds his refashioning of the
full range of argumenta through the lens of certa in Book V.
The expansion of certainty’s relevance to matters outside the conjectural issue of
status theory, perhaps most clearly seen in Quintilian’s appeal to certum in his dis-
cussion of deliberative oratory, further supports the view of argumentation in Book V,
where all arguments and not just conjectural disagreements hinge on matters of cer-
tainty. As his discussion of status theory illustrates, Quintilian understands agreements
⁶⁵Quare in suadendo ac dissuadendo tria primum spectanda erunt: quid sit de quo deliberetur, qui
sint qui deliberent, qui sit qui suadeat. Rem de qua deliberatur aut certum est posse fieri aut incertum.
Si incertum, haec erit quaestio sola aut potentissima; saepe enim accidet ut prius dicamus ne si possit
quidem fieri esse faciendum, deinde fieri non posse. Cum autem de hoc quaeritur, coniectura est,
III.8.16.
⁶⁶Quod nos statum, id quidam constitutionem vocant, alii quaestionem, alii quod ex quaestione
appareat, III.6.2. For a discussion of constititio and its place within different formulations of status
theory, especially those in the works of Cicero, see Chapter IV where I treat Valla’s rendering of
certum as that which is constitutum.
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and disagreements—articulated in the issues of conjecture, definition, and quality—as a
central strategy of rhetorical invention. Rooted in the language of certainty, the version
of status theory elaborated in the Institutio conceives of rhetorical argumentation more
generally (and not just forensic oratory) through the notion of consensus, an extension
that parallels Quintilian’s assertion that geometry, natural philosophy, and rhetoric all
operate through “the same reasoning” (eadem ratio). By coupling his skeptical outlook,
through which no intellectual practitioners have reliable access to vera, with his under-
standing that it is the “nature of all arguments” both to use and to aim at certa, Quintilian
positions certainty outside its originally limited position within Ciceronian understand-
ings of status. If all argumenta begin with what is certa (that is, what is agreed upon) in
the service of making incerta certain, one can see how Quintilian understands certainty
not as mere matter of sense perception or specific type of forensic agreement; rather, its
expansive definition in the Institutio extends into all matters, not just the issue of coniec-
tura.
The earlier works of Cicero show a relatively limited function of certum in status the-
ory, for it is most tightly coupled with the first status question of conjecture. In Quintilian,
too, one sees that certainty is brought up most often in the context of this first question of
forensic disputes, and even in his discussion of deliberative oratory, Quintilian positions
certum within his discussion of the first question of “what the proposal is.” Quintilian’s
final gloss of status here as some kind of constitutio or quaestio, however, suggests that his
understanding of status and certainty is more flexibile than in the Ciceronian accounts.
Any status, then, might be construed as an “act of deciding, determination, or settling,”
and in his first discussion of coniectura, too, Quintilian suggests that certum can stand
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for a res de qua constet more generally.⁶⁷ One might see, then, that certum is not bound
exclusively to the issue of coniectura but instead is tied more broadly to agreements of
any sort. Indeed, this is the breadth of certum one sees in Book V, where matters of con-
vention, consensus, and law all fall under this single term.
Quintilian’s efforts to conflate several methods of inquiry and his suggestion of
broader understandings of certainty within status theory, in fact, capture the attention of
his later readers. As we shall see in the following chapter, Lorenzo Valla, one of Quintil-
ian’s most devoted early modern admirers, would consider this novel expansion of status
theory to be one of the Institutio’s most important contributions to his own thinking on
matters of logic and rhetoric. Indeed, through a reference to the three questions of sta-
tus theory, Valla explains in his Dialecticae Disputationes that “in each kind of inquiry—
rational, moral, natural, and many others—our practice is to ask whether it is, what it is,
and what it is like, which is almost explicit in the words of Quintilian.”⁶⁸
⁶⁷For constitutio as “an act of deciding, determination, or settling,” see OLD constitutio 4.
⁶⁸praeterea in singulis—rationali, morali, naturali, et sique sint alia—quaerere solemus an sit, quid
sit, quale sit, ut propemodum ex Quintiliani verbis palam est, II.19.25.
117
Chapter 4
Certum atque Confessum: Valla on the Forensics of Certainty
The fifteenth-century Italian humanist Lorenzo Valla is perhaps most famous for demon-
strating on philological grounds that the Donation of Constantine was a forgery.¹ But
Valla’s activity as an expert of the Latin language was not limited to this important revi-
sion of ecclesiastical and political history. Valla also employed his philological expertise
to compile his influential De Linguae Latinae Elegantia (or Elegantiae), a 1441 work on the
proper use of Latin.² As an admirer of the prose of Cicero and especially Quintilian, Valla
wrote six volumes of learned stylistic recommendations to mitigate what he viewed as a
decline and corruption of the purity of the Latin tongue.³ Valla aimed to return to those
exemplary authors of antiquity who were the “most devoted to speaking well.”⁴
As part of this project to revitalize and restore the Latin language, Valla treats a variety
¹The Donation of Constantine granted temporal authority over Rome and the Western empire
to the papacy. For a survey of the document’s history and Valla’s philological methods in proving
its illegitimacy, see Camporeale (1996).
²For studies of the novelty and influence of Valla’s Elegantiae, see Percival (2004, p. 75) and
Perreiah (2014, pp. 36-37).
³For Valla, the decrepitude of the Latin language mirrors the decrepitude of the city of Rome
itself: “Everything has been overthrown, everything has been burned down, everthing has been
ruined, so that hardly the Capitoline hill remains. And accordingly, for many centuries, not only
has no one spoken Latin, but no one has even understood how to read it” (Omnia everta, incensa,
diruta, ut vix Capitolina supersit arx. Siquidem multi iam saeculis non modo Latine nemo locutus
est, sed ne Latina quidem legens intellexit), Proem to Book I (Moreda 1999, 1:60). Translations of
Valla’s Elegantiae are my own.
⁴Valla includes under the heading of bene loquendi studiosissimi not only orators and jurists
but also philosophers and writers. See Moreda (ibid., 1:60).
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of words and phrases in the Elegantiae, where he prescribes correct sense and syntax,
usually by referencing model sentences. In the fifth book, Valla directs his readers to the
phrase certum est with an example from Quintilian’s Institutio:
certum est is not just understood as “it is obvious” (manifestum est), as Quin-
tilian does here: Truly, it is certus that there is a law [that one may kill an
adulterer]. But it is also understood as “it is carefully considered” (delibera-
tum est) or “it is settled” (constitutum est). In the second case, a dative with
an infinitive is usually attached to the phrase, as in “it is certum to me to go
into Spain.” Sometimes the dative is merely implied, as is the case in Vergil:
it is certum that it is preferable to suffer in the forest, among the dens of
beasts…that is, it is certum to me.⁵
Here Valla first links what is certain to what is “obvious” or “manifest,” and while mani-
festum is a term familiar to the law courts, it also suggests an interest in sense perception
more broadly, an interest that relates to the etymological origins of certum as a word re-
lated to perception.⁶ This relationship between certum and sense perception, in fact, does
not escape Quintilian’s notice. His first rendering of certum in the Institutio points to
⁵certum est non modo accipitur pro manifestum est, ut Quintilianus: Nempe legem esse certum
est; sed etiam pro deliberatum et constitutum est. In quo secundo plerumque adiungitur dativus
cum infinitivo; ut, certum est mihi ire in Hispaniam. Nonnumquam dativus subintelligitur, ut apud
Vergilium: Certum est in sylvis, inter pelaea ferarum malle pati…Id est mihi, V.27 (Moreda 1999,
2:582).
⁶For certum as a derivative of cerno, see OLD certus. Several Latin authors use manifestum in
this sense of “visible” or “conspicuous”: see OLD manifestus 4, 5, 6. Manifestum was originally
relevant to evidence in criminal cases, and early appearances of manifestum in Plautus describe
those who are caught red-handed. Only later authors make use of the term in more abstract senses
of being “obvious” or “in plain sight.” For manifestum as “obvious,” see OLD 3a. The etymology
of manifestum is unclear. The first component of the word derives from manus, likely related
to a criminal whose hands are at work in the crime. The OLD hypothezies that manifestus and
infestus use the same second component, festus, but the meaning has an “obscure origin.” See OLD
infestus. For early examples of manifestum relating to catching criminals as noted in OLD 1 and 2,
see Plautus Menaechmi 594 or Asinaria 569. See also OLD manifestus 3b for the later construction
manifestum est, “it is plain (that).” For a discussion of the importance of forensic oratory to New
Comedy more generally, see Scafuro (1997, pp. 25-67).
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this kinship: there the Roman schoolmaster writes that what is certum is that which is
“perceived by the senses, for example what we see or hear.”⁷
The passage in the Institutio that Valla references in his Elegantiae, however, calls
attention not to evident sensory experience but rather to the strategies of the law court.
Even though Valla had at his fingertips Book V of the Institutio, with its explicit definitions
of certum, he instead takes as a model for his language study an earlier reference to certum
in Book III that centers on the role of status theory in forensic rhetoric.⁸ Rhetoricians, so
Quintilian recommends, should refine the issue of a dispute by turning to the triad of
questions at the heart of this rhetorical framework: whether something happened, what
happened, and what kind of thing it was.⁹ In this preliminary discussion in Book III
cited in Valla’s Elegantiae, Quintilian notes that the man accused of murder may defend
himself by arguing that the victim was an adulterer, for as Quintilian reminds his readers,
it is certum that the law permits one to kill such a criminal:
Let us suppose the charge made by the accuser is “You killed the man.” If the
defendant denies it, it is he who produces the issue. But suppose he admits
(confitetur) the fact, but says the adulterer was justifiably killed by him. (It
is of course certum that there is a law permitting this.) Unless the accuser
makes some reply, there is no case.¹⁰
⁷Pro certis autem habetus primum quae sensibus percipiuntur, ut quae videmus audimus, V.10.12.
For a more thorough treatment of the relationship between sense perception and certainty in
ancient epistemological discussions, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
⁸As we have discussed in previous chapters, status theory is a rhetorical framework where
parties in a forensic dispute come to “a standing still” (that is, a status) in their arguments. See
note 57 in Chapter 3.
⁹For Hermagoras’ original formulation of four status questions including the final question of
“objection,” see Nadeau (1959, pp. 53-54). Nadeau writes that later Latin authors, including Cicero
and Quintilian, consider the three questions listed here to be sufficient (ibid., p. 54).
¹⁰Sit enim accusatoris intentio: ‘hominem occidisti’; si negat reus, faciet statum qui negat. Quid si
confitetur, sed iure a se adulterum dicit occisum (nempe legem esse certum est quae permittat)? Nisi
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While the accused admits what he has done—he agrees that he killed another man—he
denies the action was unjustified. In other words, while the two parties of this case pro-
vide the same answers to the first two status questions of whether and what happened,
they disagree on the answer to the third: what one calls a cold-blooded murder, the de-
fendant calls a justifiable homicide. The application of status theory, as this example
demonstrates, articulates the agreements of two parties in order to target their precise
point of contention. Quintilian posits that since it is certum that a law exists allowing one
to kill adulterers, there can be no disagreement about whether the defendant acted within
his legal rights if his claim regarding the victim’s adultery is true. But “if the prosecutor
says, ‘He [who was killed] was not an adulterer,’ then the rebuttal of the charge is now the
prosecutor’s business, and he will produce the status,” the point at which the two parties
“stand still” in disagreement regarding the kind of homicide committed.¹¹
The Elegantiae’s rendering of certum as manifestum and its invocation of status theory
orient Valla’s understanding of this adjective as a matter of legal dispute rather than mere
sense perception. More broadly, Valla understands certainty through the lens of forensic
rhetoric, as reflected not only in his citation of Quintilian’s discussion of status theory but
also in his second definition of certum in the Elegantiae as what is “settled” or constitu-
tum, a word whose legal valence Valla explores extensively. This exploration, as we shall
aliquid accusator respondet, nulla lis est, III.6.17. Valla omits the relative clause quae permittit that
follows Quintilian’s acknowledgment of the law.
¹¹‘Non fuit’ inquit ‘adulter’: ergo depulsio incipit esse actoris, ille statum faciet, III.6.17. The valid-
ity of the prosecutor’s case would then depend on proving that the victim was not, in fact, an adul-
terer. This application of certum to the agreed-upon legal standard within the framework of status
theory suggests again Quintilian’s effort to extend certainty beyond the concerns of conjecture,
an alteration of Ciceronian renderings of status. For a discussion of Quintilian’s understanding of
certainty within status theory, see Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
121
see, complements Valla’s rendering of certum as agreement, which serves, in turn, as the
foundation for his understanding of the law as a matter of broader public consensus and
not as the dictates of nature. And this notion of certainty as forensic agreement serves
more generally as the foundation for his reevaluation of both dialectic and jurisprudence
as matters of rhetorical consensus rather than reason alone.
Valla’s understanding of certum is central not only to his theory of the origins of law
but also, as we shall investigate first, his reformation of Aristotelian dialectic in the Di-
alecticae Disputationes. In this work, the first edition of which was completed in 1439,
Valla recommends that philosophy and dialectic look to his preferred model from antiq-
uity, Quintilian, to replace Aristotle and the methods proposed by his scholastic followers.
Even in the work’s first chapter, which brims with Aristotelian predicables and transcen-
dentals, Valla asks himself “in translating these terms, whom should I follow but Quin-
tilian?”¹² The Disputationes, as Valla makes clear here, aims to reform the philosophical
core of scholastic dialectic by importing the lessons of the rhetorical schoolmaster.
Valla’s insertion of Quintilian’s thought into the Aristotelian system of logical argu-
mentation was, in one sense, a literal one. In the second book of the Disputationes, Valla
merely extracts much of the second half of Book V of the Institutio word for word and
includes it as the second half of his own book (II.21-23) in lieu of a discussion or even
paraphrase of Quintilian’s work. He justifies this transplanting by appealing to Quin-
tilian’s unparalleled genius: “no one—unless God were ‘someone,’ so to speak—can say
anything that has the mighty genius and eloquence of Quintilian’s language.”¹³ Like a du-
¹²In quorum translatione quem potius quam Quintilianum sequar?, I.I.6.
¹³neminem neque ea ingenii vi neque ea eloquentia posse quicquam dicere—nisi Deus aliquis, ut
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tiful but over-zealous modern scholar, Valla provides this reference for his source before
inserting Institutio V.8.1–V.10.125 as the remainder of Book II of his Disputationes, a full
thirty-one pages of Latin in the most recent I Tatti edition.¹⁴ This selection of Quintilian’s
“mighty genius and eloquence” includes his discussions of technical proof (De probatione
artificiali, V.8), signs (De signis, V.9), and arguments (De argumentis, V.10), all of which
encompass some of the most important materials from our discussion in earlier chapters
of Quintilian’s approach to forensic arguments through the certa at their foundations.¹⁵
Valla’s interest in certum and its role in forensic argument extends even beyond these
sic dicam, foret—qua Quintilianus dixit, II.20.1-2.
¹⁴Valla may have been providing Quintilian’s text not only on account of his admiration of
the style of the Institutio but also on account of its novelty. That is, readers of the Disputationes
may not have been familiar with Quintilian’s text, discovered only a two decades before the first
edition of Valla’s own work here. While the earliest editions of Valla’s Disputationes were written
before Valla’s acquisition of Quintilian’s text in 1443, this large selection of the Institutio illustrates
Valla’s eagerness to include Quintilian’s theory in later versions of his work. The version of the
Disputationes which Valla was still writing at the time of his death in 1457 serves as the basis of
the latest edition from the I Tatti Renaissance Library (Copenhaver and Nauta 2012, 2:498-499).
¹⁵These chapters, evidently indispensable for Valla, also include Quintilian’s claim that argu-
ments “confirm (confirmat) what is doubtful through what is not doubtful” and that an argumen-
tum must begin with a statement which does not need to be proven itself. Quintilian writes, “Since
argument is reasoning that provides proof, by which one thing is inferred through another, and
which confirms what is doubtful through what is not doubtful, there must be something in the
case that needs no proof” (Ergo, cum sit argumentum ratio probationem praestans, que colligitur
aliud per aliud, et quae quod est dubium per id quod dubium non est confirmat, necesse est aliquid
esse in causa quod probatione non egeat. Alioquin nihil erit quo probemus, nisi fuerit quod aut sit
verum aut videatur, ex quo dubiis fides fiat, II.23.7, originally Institutio V.10.11-12). Even the original
portions of Book II of the Disputationes appropriate Quintilian’s rhetorical vocabulary. As a par-
allel to Quintilian’s aforementioned claim that an argument must begin from what is not doubtful,
for example, Valla writes that “one thing proves another, and one and the same thing does not
prove itself; there is one thing that confirms (confirmat), another that is confirmed (confirmatur),
and nothing is its own cause” (Alia res alia probat; non una eademque seipsam. Et aliud est quod
confirmat, aliud quod confirmatur, nec quicquam sibi ipsi causa est, II.19.19). The reappearance of
confirmare in Valla’s formulation here recalls Quintilian’s own focus on this crucially important
dimension of forensic practice. As Quintilian explains, confirmatio is one of the essential parts of
a forensic speech (IV.3.1). For this rhetorical valence of confirmo, see OLD 7a. For that of confir-
matio, see OLD 4. Rhetorical theorists in the early modern period also see confirmatio as one of
the principal tasks of forensic rhetoric. For a discussion of Thomas Wilson’s appeal to confirmatio
in his sixteenth-century Arte of Rhetorique, see Skinner (2014, p. 43).
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passages of the Institutio. In his original sections of the Disputationes, Valla explains that
the nature of proof is to make certum what was previously incertum and writes that “ev-
ery proof is produced through truths that are certum, and through them, that very truth
(veritas) causes some other truth (verum), which was incertum, to be seen as certum.”¹⁶
Valla’s discussion here, however, is not a mere restatement of Quintilian’s theory. While
similar to Quintilian’s claim that incerta are proved through certa, Valla’s formulation di-
verges from that of his Roman predecessor when it states that an argument should arrive
at a conclusion that is not merely certum but also verum. Whereas Quintilian writes that
it “is the nature of all arguments that nothing is shown to be certain by what is uncer-
tain,” Valla here includes additional concerns for “the very truth” of arguments.¹⁷ That is,
while Quintilian merely proposes to use premises that are certain to prove a conclusion
that is uncertain, Valla shows that the rhetorical concern of demonstrating what is cer-
tum is also relevant to discussions of philosophical veritas. He understands that at stake
in argumentation is not just certainty but also truth.¹⁸
Underlying Valla’s preoccupation with the truth is his dismantling of the tradition of
¹⁶probatio omnis fit per vera quae certa sunt, facitque per haec ipsa veritas aliud quoddam verum
videri certum quod erat incertum, II.19.22. Alan Perreiah’s recent study of Valla’s approach to
language asserts that “Valla conflates truth with certainty” (2014, p. 70). While these two terms
are closely related, Valla does not fuse them into one concept. As he shows here, what is verum
can nevertheless remain incertum.
¹⁷As discussed in the third chapter of this dissertation, Quintilian understands argument as the
use of certa to make certum what was previously incertum: quae natura est omnium argumentorum,
neque enim certa incertis declarantur, V.10.8.
¹⁸Valla’s understanding of truth continues to inspire scholarly debate. Charles Trinkaus argues
that for Valla “truth and knowledge are…what an individual thinks they are” (1983, p. 151). Peter
Mack, taking an opposite view, argues that Valla understands that “language adequately describes
what is in the world [and that] truth depends on accurate knowledge of the world and correct
representation of such knowledge” (1993, p. 57).
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Aristotelian modal propositions.¹⁹ Valla’s critique of modality is two-fold: first he criti-
cizes the redundant and confusing terminology of the six traditional modal adjectives—
possible, impossible, necessary, contingent, true, false; and second he challenges the cat-
egory of modal propositions at its root by arguing that all sentences, and not only those
of the six original varieties, are modal insofar as they are true.²⁰ As Lodi Nauta explains,
Valla “starts with criticizing the traditional six modal terms…[but] soon changes tactics
and extends the range of ‘modal’ terms to include all kinds of qualifications of verbs such
as ‘easy/difficult,’ ‘certain/uncertain,’ and ‘useful/not useful.’ ”²¹ After Valla first restricts
the traditional range of modal statements from six to one, he then expands the reach of
true statements well beyond their original role as merely one of a few available types
of propositions and introduces “a whole new concept of modality, which comes to an
adverbial qualification.”²² Valla places all Aristotelian modes under the category of true
statements and explains that a claim of what is possible or necessary or contingent nev-
ertheless makes a truth claim about such possibility, necessity, or contingency.
Valla’s emphasis on the truth of all kinds of modal propositions leads him to propose
the radically true nature of all arguments more generally. He explains that a proof (pro-
batio), which is the aim of argument (argumentum), “ought to be true without qualifica-
¹⁹For a discussion of Valla’s rejection of modal logic and this rejection’s incompatibility with
his frequent use of the reductio ad absurdum, see Perreiah (2014, pp. 67-70).
²⁰See Nauta (2009, pp. 230-238) for a helpful discussion of Valla’s rejection of the six modal
categories.
²¹Nauta (ibid., p. 230).
²²Nauta (ibid., p. 232). Valla summarizes his new conception of modal logic in a defense against
charges of heresy in his Defensio Quaestionum in Philosophia Laurentii Vallensis, Viri Doctissimi
atque Eloquentissimi: Male dici propositiones ‘modales’ easque sex, cum sint proprie infinite, §7. See
Zippel (1970, p. 86).
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tion.”²³ He ultimately concludes that every argument, and not just individual propositions,
must employ true statements in all its parts:
In fact, all parts of an argument must be true, whether you say it is ‘necessary’
or ‘possible’ or ‘easy’ or ‘honorable’ or anything else. Suppose I say ‘it is
honorable that a citizen should fight for his country’: will this sentence really
come under any of those modes? Not at all. Because the case is very clear,
let this one example suffice for many. Accordingly, I think that a ‘modal’
sentence means nothing, and that whatever weight those six modes have, the
nouns or verbs that I have mentioned have just as much; but I think that
necessity and possibility is in the conclusion, just as there is truth in all the
parts of the structure of an argument.²⁴
Valla cannot be clearer when he asserts that a modal statement “means nothing.” Rather
than hinge his understanding of arguments on careful analysis of possibility, contingency,
or necessity, Valla instead considers only the truth of proof. As he explains earlier in his
text, “proof does not come from the false,” and here he reiterates that “there is truth in all
parts of the structure of an argument.”²⁵
After reducing the number of modal categories and subordinating all propositions to
what is “true,” Valla then introduces certum as an additional qualifier of the statements of
an argumentum:
In this context, however, ‘true’ is the same as certum because it matters not at
all that something is true unless it is certum atque confessum. But in the first
two parts of a syllogism or structure of argument, a truth is posited as certum
²³quasi falsitas ad probationem faciat, quae vera utique debet esse, II.19.4.
²⁴Omnia enim sint vera oportet, sive dicas necesse est sive possibile sive facile sive honestum sive
cetera omnia. Quid enim si dicam honestum est civem pugnare pro patria: nunquid sub aliquo illorum
modorum haec erit enuntiatio? Minime. Unum pro multis in re apertissima suffecerit exemplum.
Quapropter ita sentio nihil esse enuntiationem modalem, tantundemque momenti quantum illa sex
habent, habere cetera quae dixi nomina seu verba; sed necessitatem ac possibilitatem in conclusione
esse, sicut veritatem in omnibus partibus argumentationis, II.19.7.
²⁵For Valla’s claim that proof does not arise from what is false (e falso non fit probatio), see
Disputationes II.19.4.
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atque confessum as such. In the last part, however—in the conclusion—the
truth is extracted by force (extorquetur), and thus it has necessity, or a sort of
necessity.²⁶
This addition of certum to Valla’s conception of modal statements underscores an impor-
tant epistemological dimension of the nature and purpose of argument. To be clear, Valla
here does not recommend adding certum as a second modal qualifier. Indeed, as he ex-
plains earlier, modal statements “mean nothing,” and propositions should be considered
“true” and nothing more. His use of certum points to his interest in the recognition of a
true statement as such: it denotes not the character of the statement itself but our recog-
nition and even admission of that statement’s truth.²⁷ “It matters not at all that something
is true,” Valla insists, “unless it is certum atque confessum.”²⁸ The goal of proof, so Valla
believes, is not merely to demonstrate that a conclusion is true but also to compel another
to confess that truth.²⁹
²⁶Idem autem est hoc loco verum quod certum, quia nihil attinet esse quid verum nisi fuerit certum
atque confessum. Sed veritas duarum priorum syllogismi argumentationisque partium, pro certa
atque confessa ponitur. In ultima autem–idest in conclusione–extorquetur, ideoque necessitas inest
sive tanquam necessitas, II.19.8.
²⁷An example can help illustrate this important relationship between verum and certum. The
statement “There are 361 votes against Socrates” is true even before the votes are counted. But this
true statement remains incertum as long as the tally is not counted and “confessed.” By counting
the votes, one does not change the truth of the original statement, but the counting allows one
to recognize its truth. For a discussion of several conceptions of truth in Valla’s writings that
relate to mental recognition, see Perreiah (2014, pp. 67-70). As Perreiah explains, Valla often sees
truth “primarily as the expression of an affective or a cognitive act” or as “spoken and written
expressions of mental acts” (ibid., pp. 68-69).
²⁸The most recent I Tatti translation renders nihil attinet esse quid verum as “nothing gets to be
true.” I choose to render attinet as an impersonal verb with an accusative and infinitive verb, as
recommended at OLD attineo 7c. The I Tatti translation suggests a logical relationship (that certum
is a necessary condition of verum) that Valla’s Latin does not contain.
²⁹Valla’s reorientation of argument around the process of turning disagreement into
agreement—incertum into certum—reorients the whole project of philosophical syllogism from
a question of ontology to a question of epistemology and rhetoric. In other words, Valla is not
interested in the discovery of truths but in others’ recognition and understanding of them. Com-
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In this careful explanation of logical premises and their conclusions, Valla uses le-
gal language to reformulate dialectical reasoning as a concern of the lawyer’s courtroom
rather than the philosopher’s study. The first two parts of an argument—that is, its two
premises—are confessa, and Valla’s use of confiteor, a verb closely associated with the
world of criminal action, imbues his description of the syllogism with the air of forensic
strategy.³⁰ Valla’s legally tinged terminology here extends also to the third part of the
argument—the conclusion—where the truth must be “extracted” (extorquetur), recalling
the gathering of evidence “by forcible argument” or even by dislocating joints and tortur-
ing on the rack.³¹ Valla’s use of extorqueo also recalls methods of gathering of evidence
that Quintilian himself considers in his discussions of inartificial proofs: as Valla’s model
for his work, Quintilian describes how an expert interrogator can “extort (extorquere) from
a witness what he did not want to say.”³² Valla thus reinforces that rational arguments
are dependent on the language of legal procedure, even in the context of philosophical
pare Aristotle’s separation of scientific demonstration and dialectic. Aristotle explains that only
the former uses premises that are “primary and true” whereas dialectical argument uses endoxa,
premises that are “reputable” and in many cases “agreed upon.” See Topica 100a25-30 and 100b21-
23. For a recent discussion of the role of endoxa in argument, see Frede (2012) and Chapter 1 of
this dissertation. Valla’s suggestion that truth exists independent of its recognition runs counter
to modern scholarship that argues for Valla’s rejection of truth: “On the one hand Valla denies
that there is an ontological truth, [but] on the other hand he affirms that there is solely and ex-
clusively a logical truth” (Camporeale 1986, p. 233). Valla never doubts the existence of veritas in
this discussion, and in fact he suggests that the existence of veritas is prior to its recognition in
argument. At least here, the truth is not merely a product or creation of logical syllogism; rather,
syllogism provides access to it.
³⁰For the legal dimension of confiteor, see wide-ranging examples from Plautus and Terence
through Statius and Tacitus, OLD 1a, 1c.
³¹See OLD extorqueo 2, 3.
³²At in eo qui verum invitus dicturus est, prima felicitas interrogantis extorquere quod is
noluerit.…Respondebit enim quae nocere causae non arbitrabitur, ex pluribus deinde quae confessus
erit eo perducetur ut quod dicere non vult negare non possit, V.7.17. See Quintilian’s similar point
about an expert defense attorney where extorqueo also appears (V.7.27). Note, too, the appearance
of confessus in Quintilian’s discussion of the interrogator at V.7.17.
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dialectic.³³
Valla’s concern with extracting a confessed conclusion through dialectical argument,
in fact, complements the two renderings of certum est in the Elegantiae, where certainty
points on the one hand to given premises and on the other to claims that require consid-
eration and ultimately a kind of agreement. As explained earlier, Valla’s first definition
of certum in the Elegantiae, that which is manifestum, recalls the language of evidence
and witness testimony. Valla’s second definition there, which equates certum and consti-
tutum, similarly points to the close ties between certainty and status theory, which takes
as its concern the point of disagreement in a legal dispute.³⁴ For while Quintilian him-
self generally uses the Latin term status to denote the issue of a forensic dispute, Cicero
and the author of the Rhetorica Ad Herennium both prefer constitutio.³⁵ The Rhetorica ad
Herennium uses constitutio to denote a “synthesis, a conjunction, co-stasis, or ‘standing
³³Nauta frames the difference between dialectic and philosophy underlying Valla’s project here
according to the rough division proposed by Quintilian: “The orator may use syllogism, but since
his task is to plead rather than to seek the truth, he must employ the full range of his verbal skills
to attract and convince the jury and the audience, who often are ignorant of the fine points of
dialectic” (2009, p. 235).
³⁴Valla also suggests deliberatum as an alternative for constitutum in this second sense. The
verb delibero always denotes active thinking, never passive awareness. Some definitions in OLD
include, for example, “to engage in careful thought (usually in consultation with others), weigh the
pros and cons, deliberate” (1a), “to consider (a matter) carefully, ponder, think over” (2a), and “to
have resolved on (after consideration); to have decided” (3a). Valla’s brief discussion here of the
use of the dative case with certum est helps to illustrate the difference between his two examples of
certum. He notes that in the second meaning of the phrase—that is, when certum has the meaning
of deliberatum or constitutum rather than manifestum—the word appears with a personal pronoun
in the dative case, or one is at least understood (subintelligitur). The second sense of certum—that
is, what has been deliberated or settled—requires one’s thought and assent.
³⁵In his discussion of status, Quintilian explicitly notes his preference for status over constitutio
in discussions of locating the issue of a forensic dispute: Quod nos statum, id quidam constitu-
tionem uocant, alii quaestionem, alii quod ex quaestione appareat, Theodorus caput [id est κεφάλαιον
γενικώτατον] ad quod referantur omnia, quorum diuersa appellatio, uis eadem est, nec interest discen-
tium quibus quidque nominibus appelletur dum res ipsa manifesta sit (III.6.2.2). The word constitutio
appears only 4 times in all of the Institutio.
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together’ of specific statements, or declarations, between which there is an interval of
conflict, or disagreement.”³⁶ Cicero, too, notes in his De Inventione that the constitutio is
the “original clash, or primary conflict of causes.”³⁷ In Valla’s eyes, then, certainty points
not just to the “manifest” premises of a forensic dispute but also to the “standing together”
at a point of dispute.
Valla’s close coupling of constitutum and certum adumbrates his broader interest in
what is “settled” both in matters of legal argumentation and even, as we shall now see, in
the origins of the law itself. Valla’s most thorough discussion of the roots of the law, where
he corroborates the forensic link between certum and constitutum, appears in the elaborate
marginal notes of his edition of Quintilian’s Institutio. These notes—which themselves are
largely drawn from legal sources—illustrate Valla’s close association of certum, constitu-
tum, and consensus.³⁸ Alongside Quintilian’s own enumeration of the categories of certa
³⁶See Dieter (1950, p. 359).
³⁷See I.10 and Dieter (ibid., pp. 364-365). For further references to constitutio as the “formulation
of the point at issue in a case,” see OLD 7a.
³⁸Although it was the famous papal secretary-cum-book hunter Poggio Bracciolini who dis-
covered a complete manuscript of the Institutio at the monastery of St. Gall in 1416, Valla took up
the task of editing the damaged text. Poggio expresses in his letters an admiration for Quintilian,
from whom “we could learn the perfect method of public speaking, even if we did not have Ci-
cero, the father of Roman oratory.” He explains in a letter to Guarinus Veronensis the benefit to
the study of language he expects from his discovery of this manuscript: “there was one outstand-
ing and extraordinary man, M. Fabius Quintilian, who so cleverly, so thoroughly, and attentively
worked out everything which had to do with training even the very best orator that he seems
in my judgment to be perfect in both the highest theory and the most distinguished practice of
oratory. From this man alone we could learn the perfect method of public speaking, even if we
did not have Cicero, the father of Roman oratory. But among us Italians, he so far has been so
fragmentary, so cut down, by the action of time, I think, that the shape and style of the man has
become unrecognizable” (Gordon 1991, pp. 193-194). The complete manuscript of the Institutio,
Poggio also notes in his letter to Guarinus Veronensis, was “still safe and sound, though filthy
with mold and dust. For these books were not in the library, as befitted their worth, but in a sort
of foul and gloomy dungeon at the bottom of one of the towers, where not even men convicted of
a capital offence would have been stuck away” (ibid., p. 195). Valla likely received the complete
manuscript of Quintilian’s Institutio in 1443, and completed editing the text in December of 1444.
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in Book V, for instance, Valla includes a passage from the jurist Salvius Julianus:³⁹
Long-standing custom (consuetudo) is observed in the place of law with good
reason, and this is the law which is said to be settled by customs (moribus
constitutum). For as these laws in particular restrain us for no other reason
than because they are accepted by the judgment of the public, those things
which the populace approved without any written law likewise justly restrain
all men: for what difference is there whether the populace declares its will
by vote or by its very deeds and actions? It is understood most correctly,
therefore, that laws may be abolished not only by the vote of the proposer
of a law but also by the silent agreement of all people through disuse (tacito
consensu omnium per desuetudinem).⁴⁰
In a letter from the winter of 1443, Giovanni Aurispa complains that Valla has not yet told him
whether he received the manuscript of Quintilian that Aurispa had sent earlier. In a letter dated
December 31, 1443, Valla replies that he “wrote long ago that I had received the copy of Quintilian”
(Cook 2013, pp. 151, 157).
Valla, even from a young age, admired Quintilian not merely as a superior rhetorical theorist
or expert of Roman forensic practices but as an expert stylist of the Latin language. One of Valla’s
earlier works is De comparatione Ciceronis et Quintiliani, now lost, which many scholars assume
to have included a scandalous statement of his preference for Quintilian over Cicero as a stylist
and rhetorical thinker. Recent work has suggested that this work may have been a comparison of
a declamation by Pseudo-Quintilian and Cicero’s Pro Ligario (Pagliaroli 2006). For a discussion of
Valla’s estimation of Quintilian’s writing, see Cesarini Martinelli (1986). In his letters, Valla writes
that he is “the man who composed a Commentary on Cicero and Quintilian in which I exalted
Quintilian above Cicero, Demosthenes, and Homer himself” (Cook 2013, p. 110).
The manuscript of the Institutio was well regarded not merely for its textual emendations but
also for Valla’s marginal notes. Winterbottom explains that “the name and fame of Lorenzo Valla
gave his manuscript a large and swift progeny” and lists a selection of later editions that emerged
from Valla’s editorial work (1967, pp. 361-363). In fact, Valla’s notes on the first two books of the In-
stitutio were included in a Venice edition of Quintilian’s work in 1494, almost 50 years after Valla’s
death (Sandys 1908, 2:67). Valla’s editing of the Institutio was a critical success: one correspon-
dent, eager to borrow Valla’s manuscript of Quintilian, writes that it was “the only correct copy
on earth” (Cook 2013, pp. 306-307). Valla’s manuscript is now held at the Bibliothèque nationale
de France, cataloged as MS Par. Lat. 7723. In their edition of Valla’s marginal notes, Martinelli
and Perosa write that “the discipline most persistently investigated in the marginal comments of
Quintilian in each case is the law: Valla has stripped the Corpus iuris (and the Sententiae of Paulus)
looking for evidence pertaining to the legal situations described by the orator” (1996, p. lxxxi).
³⁹Lucius Octavius Cornelius Publius Salvius Julianus Aemilianus served in the consilium prin-
cipis under Hadrian and wrote the Digesta, 90 books of case law.
⁴⁰Inveterata consuetudo pro lege non immerito custoditur, et hoc est ius quod dicitur moribus con-
stitutum. Nam cum ipse leges nulla alia ex causa [nos teneant,] quam quod iudicio populi recepte
sunt, merito et ea, que sine ullo scripto populus [probavit], tenebunt omnes: nam quid interest utrum
suffragio populus voluntatem suam declaret an rebus ipsis et factis? Quare rectissime et illud recep-
tum est, ut leges non solum suffragio legis latoris, sed etiam tacito consensu omnium per desuetudinem
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As he explains in the Elegantiae and as we see in his citation of Julianus here, Valla draws
a close connection between what is certum and what is constitutum. Rather than focus
on Quintilian’s first rendering of certum in Book V—namely, what is perceived by the
senses—Valla instead concentrates on the varieties of certa rooted in what is established
or settled or agreed upon.⁴¹ Through his reference to Julianus, Valla draws attention to
the derivation of laws not from the deliberation of a group of expert legislators but rather
from the “judgment of the public.” Similarly, such laws can be overturned “by the silent
agreement (tacito consensu) of all through disuse,” where the appearance of desuetudo,
the lack of consuetudo, emerges through the unnoticed consensus of many.⁴² By focusing
on popular use as the foundation for law, this citation of Julianus underscores the close
relationship in Valla’s eyes between what is certum and what is agreed upon.
And just as Quintilian appeals to consensus in his discussion of certum, so too does
abrogentur. Valla’s marginal note does not include nos teneant after causa, but modern editions of
the Digest include these two words. I have changed probabit to the perfect tense verb that appears
in Julianus’ text since he intends to quote the Digest here. Martinelli and Perosa do not note these
textual differences in their edited volume of Valla’s marginal notes (Martinelli and Perosa 1996,
p. 105).
⁴¹Quintilian lists several categories of certa at V.10.12-14: “Now we regard as certa things per-
ceived by the senses, for example what we see or hear (signs come under this head); things about
which common opinion is unanimous: the existence of gods, the duty of respecting parents; pro-
visions of laws; what has been accepted as moral custom, if not in the belief of all mankind, at least
in that of a city or nation where the case is being pleaded—many matters of right, for example, in-
volve custom rather than laws; whatever is agreed upon between both parties; whatever has been
proved; lastly, whatever is not contradicted by our opponent” (Pro certis autem habemus primum
quae sensibus percipiuntur, ut quae videmus audimus, qualia sunt signa, deinde ea in quae communi
opinione consensum est: “deos esse,” “praestandum pietatem parentibus,” praeterea quae legibus cauta
sunt, quae persuasione etiam si non omnium hominum, eius tamen civitatis aut gentis in qua res agi-
tur in mores recepta sunt, ut pleraque in iure non legibus sed moribus constant: si quid inter utramque
partem convenit, si quid probatum est, denique cuicumque adversarius non contradicit). Quintilian’s
use of consto in his enumeration of the types of certa foreshadows Valla’s efforts to align certum
and constitutum.
⁴²For Valla’s link between utor and consuetudo, see his discussion in the Elegantiae V.5 (Moreda
1999, 2:558). For Valla’s debt to Quintilian for his understanding of consuetudo, see Pareja (1998).
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Valla in his reference to Julianus’ discussion of laws stemming from public agreement.⁴³
These consensual foundations of law are similarly evident in Valla’s discussion of the
origins of leges in the Elegantiae, a discussion that—like his section on certum est—
concentrates less on purely stylistic concerns and more on Valla’s jurisprudence:
Laws come from either a prince or a free people. Those which are established
by a king do not require the consensus of one other person. There are those
which are brought upon the people and those which are not really ratified
without the people’s decree, because the public is accustomed to being asked,
or rather interrogated, about them, and so these laws are called rogationes.⁴⁴
Valla’s capacious understanding of leges here includes not only laws that are imposed
upon the population by a monarch (a rege), but also those which are validated by the
people’s agreement, a contrasting pair of sources also referenced in Valla’s citation of
Julianus’ discussion of laws that come about either through a “proposer” or through the
“agreement of all people.” At one extreme, a law enacted by an autocrat requires no
consensus, not even of “one other person.” At the other extreme, laws that are enacted
through a rogatio “are not really ratified without the people’s decree.” In contrast to laws
enacted by the king, they require the consensus of many.⁴⁵
Valla’s understanding of the law as a matter of consensus is so strong that it leads him
to reject natural law—ius naturale—in favor of empirical approaches to jurisprudence, a
⁴³For Quintilian’s link between certum and consensus, see his second definition of certum in
note 41.
⁴⁴Sunt igitur leges aut principis, aut liberi populi. Quae a rege conduntur, alterius consensum non
requirunt; quae ad populum feruntur, quaeque sine eius iussu fere ratae non sunt, quia rogari, id est,
interrogari de his populus solet, rogationes etiam dicuntur, XLVIII (Moreda 1999, 1:474).
⁴⁵The final clause of Valla’s explanation references the rogatio, a legislative procedure dating
to the Roman Republic that involved a Roman magistrate proposing legislation as a question to
a Roman assembly. After the requisite period of three days reserved for debate (trinundium), the
assembly would reconvene to answer the question with a ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ either passing or rejecting
the law. See OCD lex.
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position he also explores in his commentary on Quintilian’s rhetorical manual. In the sec-
ond book of the Institutio, Quintilian suggests that there are three categories of law: the
sacred, the public, and the private.⁴⁶ Valla first comments on the superiority of Quintil-
ian’s formulation to that found in the Digest—Melior hec divisio quam est illa in Digestis—
and then includes as an example of the inferior theorization contained within the Digest a
long citation from the jurist Ulpian, who defends the existence of ius naturale.⁴⁷ Of great
interest to Valla is Ulpian’s distinction between natural law (ius naturale) and the law of
nations (ius gentium), a separation that Ulpian explains as follows:
Natural law (ius naturale) is what nature has taught to all animals. For that
kind of law is not only the property of the human race, but of all animals,
including those born both on land and in the sea. And it is shared with birds,
too. The joining of male and female derives from this law, which we ourselves
call matrimony. And the procreation of children comes from this law. Indeed,
we see that other animals, even wild animals, have experience with this kind
of law. The law of nations (ius gentium) is that which human nations use.
And one is allowed to understand that the law of nations is separate from
natural law since the latter pertains to all animals, whereas the law of nations
is common only among men.⁴⁸
⁴⁶nam et genera sunt tria sacri, publici, privati iuris, II.4.33. Martinelli and Perosa (1996, p. lxxxii)
calls Valla’s notes on this passage the “pearl” of the entire manuscript.
⁴⁷Ulpian writes that there are only two kinds of law, the public and the private, where public
law is further divided into laws pertaining to sacred rites (in sacris), those pertaining to priests
(in sacerdotibus), and those pertaining to civil officers (in magistratibus). Ulpian similarly divides
private laws into three categories: natural laws (ex naturalibus praeceptis), laws of different na-
tions (ex praeceptis gentium), and civil laws (ex praeceptis civilibus): Huius studii due sunt positiones,
publica et privata. Publicum ius est quod statum rei publice Romane spectat, privatum quod ad sin-
gulorum utilitatem: sunt enim quedam publice utilia, quedam privatim. Publicum ius in sacris, in
sacerdotibus, in magistratibus consistit. Privatum ius tripartitum est: collectum enim est ex natural-
ibus preceptis aut gentium aut civilibus, Institutio II.4.33 (ibid., pp. 56-57).
⁴⁸Ius naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Nam ius istud non solum humani generis
proprium est, sed omnium animalium, que in terra, que in mari nascuntur; aviumquoque commune
est. Hinc descendit maris et femine coniugatio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus; hinc liberorum
procreatio; videmus enim cetera animalia, feras etiam, istius iurus [peritia] censeri. Ius gentium
est quo gentes humane utuntur. Quod a naturali recedere facile intellegere licet, quia illud omnibus
animalibus, hoc solis hominibus inter se commune sit, Institutio I.4.33 (ibid., p. 57). Valla’s manuscript
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In a pointed critique of Ulpian’s separation of ius naturale and ius gentium, Valla rejects
the notion that law can ever be natural, arguing that the existence of any law among
“beasts” is even more absurd than Ulpian’s claim that the law of nations is a kind of
private law.⁴⁹ In contrast to Ulpian’s description of ius naturale as a law that pertains
to all living creatures and their mating and procreation, Valla defines law as a uniquely
human institution: “nature is one thing, and the law is another, and whatever animals do,
they without a doubt do through nature.”⁵⁰
But Valla’s strongest criticism of Ulpian’s ius naturale focuses on the fundamental
difference between the former’s insistence that laws always arise from human agreements
and the latter’s view of a natural law that exists independent of human activity. In his
commentary on Quintilian’s Institutio, Valla illustrates his interest in such agreements by
uses the noun peritia (practical knowledge or skill) instead of the adjective perita (skilled or expert),
but I have emended the text to use the predicate adjective after censeri in agreement with animalia.
The noun peritiawould effect the sense of animals being considered a skill itself rather than skillful.
⁴⁹Nam quod bestias etiam complexus est, ut dicat “ius naturale,” hoc absurdius est quam id quod
modo peccavit, Institutio II.4.33 (Martinelli and Perosa 1996, pp. 57-58).
⁵⁰Aliud est enim natura, aliud ius, et quicquid animalia faciunt, haud dubie natura faciunt, Insti-
tutio II.4.33, (ibid., p. 58). Martinelli postulates that this difference hinges on Valla’s understanding
of choice as a uniquely human capability. She writes, “The concept of justice, which involves the
freedom of choice, is proper only to mankind. And animals defend themselves from violence, but
‘whatever happens justly or unjustly pertains only to men’ ” (ibid., p. lxxxiii). Valla emphasizes
his distaste for the term ius naturale in the Elegantiae, too, by drawing contrasts between the be-
havior of men and the behavior of animals. In a chapter titled Aliud leges esse, aliud iura (“That
leges are one thing, and iura another”), he explains that “it is ridiculous to speak of ius naturale,
which nature teaches to all animals. An instinctive desire to mate and even for harming, plunder-
ing, and killing a weaker animal—who says this is ius? And so Cicero in his books on duties was
silent about the natural law, illustrating that there is ius only among humans, and that is the ius
gentium or the ius civilium” (Nam ius naturale dicere, quod natura omnia animalia docuit, ridicu-
lum est. Appetitum coeundi atque adeo nocendi imbecilliori animali, spoliandi, occidendi, quis ius
esse dixerit? Ideoque M. Tullius in libris officiorum de iure naturali silentium egit inter solos homines
ius esse significans, idque Gentium esse vel Civilium, IV.XLVIII) (Moreda 1999, 1:474). Here Valla
refers to Cicero’s late work, De Officiis. As he does in his commentary on the Institutio, Valla here
separates the events of the natural world from the affairs of man, and his examples of inhumane
activity, so to speak, of capturing and killing prey underscore this difference.
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appealing to a requirement of consistency among all iura. A nation should not be able to
enact a ius gentium, he argues, that contradicts the putative ius naturale, but by adopting
Ulpian’s notion of natural law, such contradictions could appear:
That which all nations consider just—since nature is their guide—and [about
which] one nation does not differ from another, let us call that one kind of
law. And that which nations or peoples individually have deemed to be just
on their own, let us call that another kind, at least regarding its appearance.
For if it were the case, as Ulpian says, that all men are born free by natural
law but become slaves by the law of nations, it would not be called the law of
nations but rather injustice (iniuria). And this would likewise be the case if
some nation wished to have a law for taking a cow as a wife: because if this
[law of marrying a cow] is the ius, then that first notion [of a ius naturale]
is not the ius. Indeed, it is not possible for the law to be contrary to the law,
although the natural law in particular, if it differs from the law of nations, can
be called a divine law or sacred law.⁵¹
Valla views ius as a single set of rules that must be internally consistent—“it is not pos-
sible for the law to be contrary to the law”—but he then illustrates the contradictions in
contemporary thought concerning slavery: men are born free according to natural law,
but through the law of nations, they are made slaves.⁵² To strengthen his case, Valla
then invokes a derisive hypothetical scenario: that a nation might allow men to marry
cows. If a nation were to enact a law whereby one could marry a cow, however unlikely
the case may be, an inconsistency among iura would arise: as Ulpian explains, ius nat-
⁵¹Quod enim omnes gentes iustum sentiunt natura duce, nec alia ab alia differunt, id unum genus
iuris existimememus, alterum, huius nimirum speciem, quod singule gentes populive privatim iustum
esse decreverunt. Nam quod ait Ulpianus, omnes nasci liberos naturali iure, sed iure gentium servos
fieri, si ita esset, non ius gentium, sed iniuria appellabitur, perinde ac si vellet aliqua gens ius esse
vaccam ducendi uxorem; quod si hoc ius est, illud ius non erit: neque enim potest ius iuri esse con-
trarium, cum presertim ius naturale, si quid a gentium differt, possit appellari ius divinum aut ius
sacrum, Institutio II.4.33 (Martinelli and Perosa 1996, p. 58).
⁵²Valla calls this contradiction between the two laws iniuria, often translated as “injustice” as I
have done here. One might also think of the term as what simply contradicts ius, or “unlawfulness.”
See OLD, iniuria 1a.
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urale includes “the joining of male and female” and the procreation of children, goals
that human-animal matrimony would impede.⁵³ Valla’s examples illustrate his interest
in not merely what “all nations consider just” but also what “nations or peoples (gentes
populive) individually have deemed just on their own,” and however outrageous these in-
dividual judgments may seem, they nevertheless stand as a kind of ius. Rather than define
law according to what nature has imposed upon man, Valla instead insists on the agree-
ments of people as the source of legal authority, and since the notion of ius naturale runs
counter to this authority, Valla rejects it.
Valla’s detailed critique of natural law serves as a prelude to his central claim, taken
from another book of the Institutio, that “all justice rests either on nature (natura) or on
convention (constitutio),” a claim that recalls Valla’s forensic understanding of certainty
as what is constitutum.⁵⁴ Quintilian’s unambigious appeal to natura as a foundation for
⁵³Valla hedges his proclamation that natural law and civil law can never contradict each other
by appealing to Quintilian’s third category of laws, sacred law (ius sacrum). He writes here that
“natural law, if it differs from the law of nations, can be called the divine law or the law of nations.”
His discussion of sacred law is unclear, and Martinelli and Perosa note that Valla may simply use ius
divinum as another phrase for ius naturale, as he seems to do in his commentary on Institutio II.4.33
(1996, p. lxxxiv). There is a similar kinship between ius divinum and ius naturale in the Elegantiae.
In his discussion concerning leges and ius, Valla writes that Cicero “nevertheless referred to the
ius naturale in his rhetorical works, but that which pertains only to mankind; he meant that there
were six kinds of this law: religio, pietas, gratia, vindicatio, observantia, veritas” (In rhetoricis tamen
ius naturale statuit, sed quod in homines tantummodo cadat; cuius species sex esse voluit, religionem,
pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, observantiam, veritatem, IV.XLVIII) (Moreda 1999, 1:474). These
six examples of natural laws do not constitute the same kind of instinctual or animal behavior that
Ulpian cites as examples of ius naturale. For a more thorough discussion of the inconsistencies in
Valla’s use of ius divinum, see Martinelli and Perosa (1996, pp. lxxxiii-lxxxvi).
⁵⁴iustum omne continetur natura vel constitutione, VII.4.5. Valla cites this passage from the Insti-
tutio as part of his commentary of the Institutio at II.4.33 (ibid., p. 58), but he does not comment on
this passage of the Institutio where it appears in Book VII. Valla explains the conventional nature
of justice and the law more generally here through two references to the Digest. His first reference
to the Digest here, taken from Paulus, argues “that which is always fair and good is said to be the
law, as it is natural law” (id quod semper equum et bonum est ius dicitur, ut est ius naturale). Valla
takes this citation fromDigest I.I.II. Julius Paulus Prudentissimus served as a jurist under Septimius
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justice, however, seems to run counter to Valla’s earlier account of the inadequacy of
theories of a ius naturale. But in a discussion of leges in the Elegantiae, Valla explains
how natura is not separate from human agreements but instead serves as the underlying
motivation for them:
That which was established through the custom of ancestors was thus es-
tablished through laws, and was thus settled through laws (legibus ita con-
stitutum est), and was thus established through nature, and was thus settled
through nature (ita natura constitutum est), and was thus ordered by nature.
This thing nature herself ordered to us, and it was given to us through nature,
just as we give aid to those who are in danger. Reason herself (ratio ipsa)
commands this to us, and it thus seems that reason dictates it.⁵⁵
Valla clarifies that customs and laws can themselves be “settled through nature” (natura
constitutum est). This thorough intertwining of natura and constitutio for Valla stands in
contrast to Ulpian’s formulation of a law that derives exclusively from natura without
reference to the agreements of men themselves. In fact, underlying Valla’s rendering of
natura is ratio, the rational faculty that guides nature as well as mankind’s formation of its
own laws and customs. In other words, what is constitutum is a manifestation of natura’s
effects, not a legal apparatus counter to or even independent of nature’s dictates.
Severus, Caracalla, and finally Alexander Severus, who appointed him the praetorian prefect. He
was a contemporary of Ulpian. Valla takes his second reference from Gaius and inserts it shortly
after the first: “All people, who are ruled by customs and laws, make use of a law that is in part
particular to themselves, and in part common to all men” (omnes populi, qui moribus et legibus
reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utuntur). Gaius worked as a
Roman jurist from 130-180 AD. His citation of Paulus argues that ius naturale consists of what is
“always fair and good,” a universalizing sentiment that continues with his second citation, where
Gaius distinguishes between laws that are particular to one community or another (partim suo
proprio) and laws that are shared among all humans (partim communi omnium hominum).
⁵⁵More maiorum comparatum est, legibus ita comparatum est, legibus ita constitutum est, ita
natura comparatum est, ita natura constitutum est, ita natura praescriptum, hoc nobis ipsa natura
praescribit, nobis natura datum est, ut periclitantes allevemus. hoc ratio ipsa praescribit, ita videtur
ratio dictare, III.LXXVIII (Moreda 1999, 1:396). See an additional discussion of ius and leges at
Elegantiae IV.XLVIII (ibid., 1:474).
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Valla reiterates his understanding of the rational basis of law and its close ties with
human legal agreements in his commentary on the Institutio, where he writes that a nat-
ural law is only natural in that it arises from the natural reason common to all men: “But
what natural reason (naturalis ratio) has established (constituit) among all men is rightly
preserved and called the ius gentium among all nations, since it is the law which all na-
tions use.”⁵⁶ By drawing attention to the subset of ius gentium that all nations use on
account of their shared natural reason (gentes omnes utuntur), Valla blurs the distinction
between ius naturale and ius gentium. Thus, nature does not impose a set of regulations
on humanity; instead, there exists a class of constructed laws which are natural by virtue
of their rational basis and omnipresence among all nations. Natural laws, at least as Valla
understands them, do not descend from heaven but rather arise from humanity.
By emphasizing the role of what is constitutum in the origins of both ius gentium and
ius naturale, Valla again shows the decisive importance of agreements in his understand-
ing of forensic matters more generally. And Valla’s conflation of natural reason and set-
tled agreement in his theory of the origin of law parallels his efforts in the Disputationes
to understand dialectical reasoning and rhetorical argument through the shared lens of
forensic procedures, particularly in the aim of forging consensus. As Valla explains at the
end of his study of modal propositions, the dialectical syllogism should draw a conclusion
that resolves one of the three questions central to status theory:
Every proof is produced through truths that are certum, and, through them,
that very truth causes some other truth, which was incertum, to be seen as
⁵⁶Quod autem naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes gentes pereque cus-
toditur vocaturque ius gentium, cum quo iure gentes omnes utuntur (Martinelli and Perosa 1996,
p. 59).
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certum, and this happens either necessarily or plausibly. There are, however,
three ways for a truth to be incertum since, according to some of the greatest
authorities, our doubts are of three kinds: whether something is; what that
something or anything is; and what it is like.⁵⁷
Valla’s integration of the syllogism and status theory reformulates dialectic in terms of
the agreements and disagreements of forensic rhetoric, and his understanding of what is
incertum as what is unsettled shows how disputes, both dialectical and rhetorical, can be
categorized according to the three “doubts” in traditional renderings of status theory: an
sit, quid sit, and quale sit.⁵⁸ The goal of argumentation, so Valla explains here, is to resolve
disagreements about what is doubtful: by using what is already certum atque confessum,
an argumentum tries to make certum a true but controversial conclusion. What is incertum
only becomes certum after an agreement emerges about what was at first doubtful—that
is, after the conclusion itself becomes constitutum. Certainty, therefore, occupies a central
role in both the beginning and the end of logical arguments: in the collection of premises
that are agreed upon and finally in the resolution of disagreements in the argument’s
conclusion, a conclusion that eventually becomes constitutum, confessum, and certum.
As Valla closes his discussion of syllogism, he notes that the three questions at the
heart of status theory can and should be applied not merely to forensic disputes and
philosophical proofs but also to matters from a wide variety of intellectual disciplines. He
⁵⁷Probatio omnis fit per vera quae certa sunt, facitque per haec ipsa veritas aliud quoddam verum
videri certum quod erat incertum, idque vel necessario vel verisimiliter. Est autem verum intercum
triplici via quia, ut maximis quibusdam auctoribus placuit, tripliciter dubitamus: aut an quippiam
sit; aut quid illud quippiam sive aliquid sit; aut quale sit ipsum aliquid, II.19.22. Compare Institutio
V.10.8 where Quintilian argues that it is the nature of arguments to “give credence to what is
doubtful by means of what is certain.”
⁵⁸For status theory considered as a “doctrine of inquiry” around these three questions, see
Carter (1988, p. 100).
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argues that “every problem—whether within the law or outside the law, whether within
philosophy or outside philosophy—derives from these questions.”⁵⁹ Valla defends this uni-
fied approach to both logic and rhetoric that takes as its tools both ratio and consensus by
appealing to the lessons of his favorite Roman schoolmaster. He concludes that “in each
kind of inquiry—rational, moral, natural, and many others—our practice is to ask whether
it is, what it is, and what it is like, which is almost explicit in the words of Quintilian.”⁶⁰
For Valla, Quintilian is the prime inspiration for turning philosophy and legal theory (and
in fact any branch of intellectual activity) into a forensic investigation centered around
status theory, a framework that takes certainty both as its material and as its aim. By
theorizing law and logic through the shared foundation of what is certum, Valla clears the
way for the application of status theory and for the search for certainty in all kinds of
investigations, not just those of the courtroom.
Quintilian’s influence on Valla is clear both from the humanist’s explicit copying from
his Roman predecessor and also from the material history of Quintilian’s manuscript. By
dealing with the newly discovered text in the first half of the fifteenth century, Valla is
naturally influenced by this ancient rhetorical manual: his humanist rendering of Quin-
⁵⁹ex quibus omnis quaestio—sive in iure sive extra ius, sive in philosophia sive extra philosophiam—
pendet, II.19.24.
⁶⁰praeterea in singulis—rationali, morali, naturali, et sique sint alia—quaerere solemus an sit, quid
sit, quale sit, ut propemodum ex Quintiliani verbis palam est, II.19.25. In support of this expansive
understanding of status theory, Valla cites Boethius on the divisons of moral and natural questions.
For Valla’s citation of Boethius De Topicis Diferentiis at II.19.24, see Patrologia Latina 64:1180A-B.
Valla’s expansive view of status theory is perhaps influenced by Quintilian, who takes inspiration
from Cicero: “Most writers offer us three general issues. Cicero adopts these in the Orator, and
thinks they embrace everything which comes into dispute or contention. They are: Does it exist?
What is it? What sort of thing is it?” (a plurimis tres sunt facti generales status, quibus et Cicero in
Oratore utitur et omni quae aut in controversiam aut in contentionem veniant contineri putat: sitne,
quid sit, quale sit, III.6.44). Quintilian, like Cicero, enumerates the three status questions at V.10.53.
See also Valla’s brief mention of the three status questions at Disputationes I.17.5.
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tilian’s notion of certainty is perhaps most facilitated by the physical presence of the
Institutio on his desk. But as we shall see in this dissertation’s final chapter, Quintilian’s
influence extends to later centuries and their thinkers as well. For Giambattista Vico, an
eighteenth-century professor of rhetoric and law, Quintilian’s theory of certainty still ex-
erts a powerful influence even though the novelty of Poggio Bracciolini’s discovery has
long passed. Indeed, as we shall see, Quintilian’s lasting legacy does not even require
his later readers to acknowledge the Roman educator as the source of their thinking, for
Vico’s works incorporate Quintilian’s notion of certum often without even acknowledging
its source.
142
Chapter 5
A Vichian Coda: The End of Humanist Certainty
The works of Giambattista Vico, a Neapolitan professor of rhetoric whose writings span
the end of the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries, could perhaps
be summarized best as a defense of philology.¹ Although Vico’s works are contemporary
enough with Cartesian epistemology and English empiricism to engage with them, his
writings nevertheless often look backward as part of a larger effort to recover the mean-
ings of ancient words, meanings that Vico believes can elucidate human history. Against
the rise of Cartesian attitudes toward scientific knowledge, Vico follows the methods of
early humanist writers like Valla (who precedes Vico by about three centuries) in their
shared confidence in the instructive power of language itself.²
As part of his interest in words and their origins, Vico points his readers not only to
early examples of Latin literature but also to humanist experts on the Latin tongue. In his
Institutiones Oratoriae, a collection of university lessons on rhetoric, Vico recommends
to his readers that they look to a variety of Renaissance texts in order to understand
the “native meanings of words” (nativa significatio verborum).³ More specifically, Vico
¹For a study of Vico’s understanding of language as the foundational science, see Mooney
(1976) and Manson (1969, pp. 44–63).
²For a broader discussion of the shared rhetorical and epistemological theories of Vico and
Valla, see Struever (1976).
³The dating of the Institutiones Oratoriae is a matter of scholarly debate. The Latin edition
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suggests as part of his lesson on verbal elegance that readers turn to Valla’s Elegantiae,
for through the study of such sources, one might learn about the primeval, rustic character
of words.⁴ And among the words in which Vico takes an interest in his Institutiones, one
finds cerno, signifiying both “to sift” and “to distinguish,” as well as decerno, signifying “to
select the right reason” or “to decide, judge, decree.”⁵ Vico’s gloss of cerno—whose past
participle is the etymological foundation of certum—is just one small sign of a much larger
interest in the study of certainty: like Valla, Vico positions the notion of what is certum
at the center of much of his epistemological and rhetorical writings.
In some significant part, Vico’s understanding of certainty throughout his works re-
flects the lasting influence of Quintilian and his devoted follower Lorenzo Valla. As part
of his rejection of Cartesian epistemology, Vico appeals to a brand of certainty rooted
in vulgaris cognitio and conscientia, the common knowledge of a people. This notion of
conventional certainty, moreover, is tied to an understanding of language determined by
usage, a relationship that appears in Quintilian’s Institutio as we have seen in Chapter 3
and also in Valla’s discussion of the Roman educator as we have seen in Chapter 4. By
presenting certainty as a kind of widespread knowledge as well as an attribute of language
derived from the consuetudo of a broader public and of learned experts, Vico’s discussions
referenced here “consists of material from the extant manuscripts which are either transcriptions
of Vico’s lectures made by students at the University of Naples between 1699 to 1741 or copies of
them” (Pinton and Shippee 1996, p. xviii).
⁴Ad eas igitu addiscendas verborum significationes nativas conferunt plurimum Laurentii Vallae
Elegantiarum libri, §35.290–292.
⁵As is the case with many words in Vico’s discussion here, he looks to uncover a physical
antecedent to verbs of intellectual activity: multa sunt ruris vocabula quae ad mentis humanae
operas significandas translata sunt, ut lego, intelligo, puto, dissero, cerno, decerno, et alia eius generis,
§35.281–284.
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of epistemology and language reveal the influence of Quintilian’s rendering of certainty
as a matter of consensus. Indeed, the constellation of words Vico uses in his discussions of
certainty—consuetudo, consensus, conscientia—all point to his fundamental association of
what is certum and what is agreed upon, an associaiton that reveals his debt to Quintilian
and even Valla.
But even if Vico turns away from the Cartesian interest in demonstrative knowledge
and instead turns to the legal and rhetorical foundations of certainty that have developed
in the centuries that precede him, his discussions of rhetorical premises in the Institutiones
avoid positioning certa as the basis of argumentation. In fact, several passages of Vico’s
works suggest that while he is aware of and often eager to employ the conception of
certainty theorized in Quintilian’s Institutio, he nevertheless uses certum in ways that are
at odds with the Roman schoolmaster’s rhetorical formulation. By sometimes shifting his
vocabulary of common beliefs to effata and sententiae and by occasionally defining certum
as a close relative of rational, even scientific verum, Vico can be seen as a transitional
figure: on the one hand acknowledging Quintilian’s enormous influence in the history of
humanist certainty, but on the other hand, moving away from this ancient terminology
toward a more “modern,” less rhetorical understanding of the meaning of certum.
In this chapter, I trace this allegiance to and departure from Quintilian’s notion of
certainty in two sections. I first look at Vico’s confrontation with the Cartesian rever-
ence for scientia, where Vico illustrates his close association of the certain and common
consensus by defining the value of conscientia as a kind of ordinary knowledge that pro-
duces certitudo. Turning then to a range of Vico’s writings on the law, I show that what
Vico calls certain law or certa lex is tied to his understanding of the language of the law
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as a custom or consuetudo as well as the consensus of experts. After drawing attention
to these several appeals to various forms of consensus in Vico’s discussions of certainty,
I show in the chapter’s second half how Vico’s rhetorical works in particular suggest a
departure from Quintilian’s notion of certainty. I conclude with some examples of certum
in Vico’s epistemological and rhetorical discussions that show the decline of Quintilian’s
understanding of certainty as consensus.
Vico’s writing is often understood, at least in part, as a critical response to the rise of
Cartesian philosophy on the European continent. Vico himself makes this stance against
Cartesianism clear in one of his early works, the 1710 De Antiquissima Italorum Sapi-
entia, whose first chapter details Vico’s critique of Descartes’ well-known cogito proof.⁶
By highlighting the division between classical strains of skepticism and (as Vico under-
stands) the more extreme rejection of knowledge claims in Cartesian methodology, the
De Antiquissima attempts to show how Descartes’ project discards the valuable epistemic
category of probable but unassured belief, a category Vico renders in the language of cer-
tainty: “no [classical] skeptic doubts his own thinking: indeed, he professes that what
he seems to see is so certain (certum), and professes it with such steadfastness, that he
defends it even in the face of ridicule and calumny.”⁷ The classical skeptic, Vico contends
⁶For a discussion of the opposition between Vico’s efforts to “reunite philosophy and rhetoric”
and the sharp “contrast between the sterile geometric method of the Cartesians and [Vico’s] cre-
ative power of the imagination that grasps truth as metaphor rather than as clear and distinct
ideas,” see Carr (2009, pp. 1–5). For a discussion of probability within Vichian and Cartesian sys-
tems of rhetoric, see Schaeffer (1981). The De Antiquissima was intended to be a trilogy consisting
of three books—one on metaphysics, one on physics, and one on ethics—but only the first on
metaphysics survives (Taylor 2010, p. vii).
⁷Sed Scepticus non dubiat se cogitare; quin profitetur ita certum esse, quod sibi videre videatur, et
tam obfirmate, ut id vel cavillis, kaluniisque propugnet, I.2. Translations of Vico’s De Antiquissima
are adapted from Jason Taylor, ed. and trans. On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians Drawn
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here, does not wholly reject his confidence in sense perceptions since such a skeptic be-
lieves that his sensory experience is certum, even if it falls short of unassailable knowledge
of the truth. The Cartesian dogmatist, by contrast, takes the classical position to its ex-
treme and refrains from granting even this provisional or partial assent.⁸
Vico’s description of sense perception (quod sibi videre videatur) as a kind of belief that
is “certain” already recalls some of the epistemological discussions in the texts of Cicero
and Quintilian, discussions treated in the second and third chapters of this dissertation.
But Vico’s transmission of these ancient thinkers is not limited to a notion of certainty as
sense perception; on the contrary, he extends his definition of certainty to beliefs rooted in
common knowledge by highlighting the epistemic value of conscientia or “consciousness”:
What [the classical skeptic] contends is that the certitude (certitudo) that he
is thinking is mere consciousness (conscientia), not science (scientia), and is
ordinary knowledge (vulgaris cognitio) available to even a person without any
learning…not some rare and exquisite truth (verum) which requires the med-
itation of a great philosopher to invent.⁹
At the core of Vico’s argument against Cartesian dogmatism is the absence of conscientia
in its epistemological terminology, for even if Descartes allows one to experience scientia
of what is verum—true, unimpeachable knowledge—he provides no intermediate epis-
temic category for what is merely probable, verisimilar, or a matter of “consciousness.”¹⁰
out from the Origins of the Latin Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).
⁸While there is no mention of the Academica here in the De Antiquissima, Cicero’s work argues
that sensory experience can be certum but still fall short of the status of verum. This intermediate
reliability of what is certum perhaps inspires Vico’s understanding of the adjective here. See the
second chapter of this dissertation.
⁹Sed certitudinem, quod cogitet, conscientiam contendit esse, non scientiam, et vulgarem cogni-
tionem, quae in indoctum quemvis cadat; ut Sosiam; non rarum verum, et exquisitum, quod tanta
maximi Philosophi meditatione egeat ut inveniatur, I.2.
¹⁰Vico’s own definition of verum is a subject of great scholarly controversy. This chapter does
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If the Cartesian dogmatist’s cognitive experience does not fulfill the qualifications of sci-
entia, in other words, he grants such experience not even the status of conscientia. Within
his defense of this intermediate category of knowledge, Vico equates conscientia with cer-
titudo, and this appeal to certitudo is tightly bundled with widely held beliefs: certitudo
is “ordinary knowledge” (vulgaris cognitio) rather than the learned inquiry of a Cartesian
philosopher.¹¹ This vulgaris cognitio merely happens upon (cadat) everyday people and
not just careful meditators. As Vico explains here with perhaps a dash of irony, the Carte-
sian proof of existence is a “rare and exquisite truth,” understood only by the single “great
philosopher.”¹²
Vico’s criticism of Cartesian epistemology in the De Antiquissima thus relies on a con-
ception of certainty that parallels Quintilian’s notion of certum in two dimensions. Quin-
tilian’s first category of the many types of certa in the Institutio includes “what we perceive
not treat in great detail the well-known Vichian axiom that identifies the verum and the factum, a
puzzling statement that is explicitly stated in the De Antiquissima but is absent from later works
like the Scienza Nuova. For a discussion of this axiom and its place in the development of Vichian
thought and its bearing on his rejection of Cartesianism, see Morrison (1978b).
¹¹For Vico’s understanding of rhetoric more broadly as “a kind of reasoning that went on among
nonspecialists,” see Mooney (1976, p. 588). The Latin phrase vulgaris cognitio is a helpful and ac-
curate translation of conscientia (rather than the English “consciousness”). The first definition
of conscientia in the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae is communis complurium scientia, or the common
knowledge of many people. While the author of this TLL entry finds several examples of con-
scientia in this sentence from early rhetorical texts like the Rhetorica ad Herennium to Apuleius
and even early Christian texts, the word never appears in Quintilian with this sense. The term
conscientia appears only eleven times in the Institutio, for example at V.6.2 with the sense of what
is intus hominis (TLL III) or at V.11.41 with the sense of what is proverbial (TLL III.B). Vico thus
does not seem to have borrowed this term from Quintilian’s text, at least as he understands it here
in the De Antiquissima.
¹²As James Morrison explains Vico’s thinking, “Descartes was wrong to claim to know (scire)
that he is a thinking being (res cogitans): that he exists is certain, not what he is” Morrison (1978b,
p. 586). His proof, Vico imagines, “gives only certitude and not truth, consciousness and not
knowledge” Morrison (ibid., p. 591). Additionally, one might see conscientia as a collective brand
of knowledge through its prefix (con-) of Vico’s Latin term.
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through the senses,” and Vico here too links certitudo with sensory experience.¹³ Second,
by drawing attention to the common availability of conscientia and certitudo, Vico’s ar-
gument parallels the Institutio in its rendering of certainty as broad agreements rooted
in consensus and custom. Indeed, the common prefix of conscientia and consensus affirms
Vico’s parallel understanding of certainty as a kind of knowledge found in shared belief,
not in individual discovery, and against the Cartesian backdrop of careful, deliberate, and
individual meditation, Vico rehabilitates the value of vulgaris cognitio, a kind of collective
or common knowledge that constitutes a separate but still valid epistemological category.
In sum, Vico’s attack on Cartesian epistemology in the De Antiquissima relies on a notion
of certainty that, while never explicitly tied to the writings of Quintilian, nevertheless
appears to have adopted the Roman schoolmaster’s manifold understanding of certum.
Even if the De Antiquissima suggests that Vico adopts this ancient terminology un-
problematically, the full corpus of Vico’s writings jumbles this tidy alignment between
the certain and consensus. In his 1725 Scienza Nuova, the last major work of his career,
for example, Vico appeals to the terminology of certainty not to define objections to Carte-
sianism but as a categorization of two types of law: certain law (certa lex) and true law
(vera lex). Even though the work is written almost entirely in Italian, Vico nevertheless
includes a recommendation of the correct sense of certum in Latin in the course of elab-
orating this fundamental legal division: “In good Latin, certum means particularized, or,
¹³I depart here from Donald Verene’s assessment that Vico’s understanding of “certum, that
of the indubitable, corresponds to Descartes’ sense of certainty [which is] established by rational
thought” Verene (2003, p. 128). Drawing some affinity between Descartes and Vico is not wholly
unjustified, however, since Vico “posited mathematics as the highest, indeed the only, kind of
knowledge (scientia) which man possesses” (Morrison 1978b, p. 585). More scientific if not outright
Cartesian notions of certainty that appear in Vico’s own thought are treated later in this chapter.
As his first definition of certum, Quintilian includes quae sensibus percipiuntur (V.10.12).
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as the schools say, individuated; so that, in overelengant Latin, certum and commune, the
certain and the common, are opposed to each other.”¹⁴ Vico’s opposition between certum
and commune here appears to contradict his close association of certum and the conscien-
tia of “ordinary knowledge” in the De Antiquissima: in that text, certitudo is the quality of
widely available and widely held belief, not the quality of refined scientia of the uniquely
wise philosopher. Vico’s works, thus, leave readers with a paradox. How can certainty be
vulgaris but not commune? Does this paradox signify a radical shift in Vico’s thinking be-
tween the De Antiquissima and the Scienza Nuova, or does it merely point to a consistent
but nuanced understanding of certainty developed over the course of Vico’s career?¹⁵
A resolution of this apparent paradox can be found in Vico’s discussion of language
and its role in grounding “certain law” (certa lex). This interest in language reveals how
Vico, like Quintilian and Valla before him, understands its “certain” character through its
close ties to the consuetudo of broad public usage and the consensus of the grammatical
experts who provide norms for the proper use of language. Like Vico’s epistemological
discussions that define certitudo as a vulgaris or ordinary kind of knowledge—conscientia
rather than scientia—his discussions of language and the law reveal further parallels be-
tween Vico’s understanding of certainty and notions of consensus. And by pointing to
linguistically defined forms of consensus, Vico maintains a rift between what is certum
¹⁴in buon latino significa “particolarizzato” o, come le scuole cidono, “individuato”; nel qual
senso “certo” e “commune”, con troppa latina eleganza, son opposti tra loro, §322.
¹⁵The meaning of certainty in the Scienza Nuova continues to puzzle scholars. Recent work on
Vico characterizes the verum as “the true, the intelligible, the never eliminable possibility that the
actual and the equitable are distinct” in opposition to the certum, “the violent, the particular, that
which has appeared in place and time” (Marshall 2011, p. 158). For a discussion of the tension be-
tween verum and certum understood through the opposition of violence and equity, see Strassberg
(2007).
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and what is truly universal: communities defined by language rather than reason, he
suggests, can never be commune in the broadest possible sense.
When Vico introduces the notion of certa lex in the Scienza Nuova, he does so through
the well-known opposition between the letter and spirit of the law.¹⁶ Turning his attention
first to a critique of strict methods of interpretation, he notes that “men of limited ideas
take for law what the words expressly say” and then adds three paragraphs that link such
a scrupulous view of language to the notion of certainty:¹⁷
CX. Golden is the definition which Ulpian assigns to civil equity: “a kind of
probable judgment, not naturally known to all men” (as natural equity is) “but
to those few who being eminently endowed with prudence, experience, or
learning, have come to know what things are necessary for the conservation
of human society.” This is what is nowadays called “reason of state.”
CXI. The certain in the laws is an obscurity of judgment backed only by au-
thority (autorità), so that we find them harsh in application, yet are obliged
to apply them just because they are certain. In good Latin, certum means par-
ticularized, or, as the schools say, individuated; so that, in overelegant Latin,
certum and commune the certain and the common, are opposed to each other.
[The above axiom] and the two following definitions constitute the principle
of strict law. Its rule is civil equity, by whose certainty that is to say by the
determinate particularity of whose words, the barbarians, men of particular
[not universal] ideas, are naturally satisfied, and such is the law they think
their due. So that which Ulpian says in such cases, “the law is harsh, but it
is written” (lex dura est, sed scripta est), may be put in finer Latin and with
greater legal elegance, “the law is harsh, but it is certain” (lex dura est, sed
certa est).¹⁸
¹⁶For a discussion of the relationship between the letter and the spirit of the law, especially as
it appears in the works of antiquity, see Eden (2005, pp. 1–40).
¹⁷Gli uomini di corte idee stimano diritto quanto si è spiegato con le parole, §319. Giovanni
Consalvi here explains that “those who are unaware of ratio and well-educated fools who have
no historical memory understand as truth whatever is proposed to them with ornate language
(rhetoric) regardless of documentary facts” (2000, p. 275).
¹⁸È aurea la diffinizione ch’Ulpiano assegna dell’equità civile: ch’ella è “probabilis quaedam ratio
non omnibus hominibus naturaliter cognita (com’è l’equità naturale), sed paucis tantum qui pruden-
tia, usu, doctrina proediti didicerunt quae ad societati humanae conservationem sunt necessaria”; la
quale in bell’italiano si chiama “ragion di Stato.”
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Vico’s final sentence here bookends this discussion of certainty with two mentions of its
close ties to language: he prefaces these paragraphs by alluding to strategies of legal in-
terpretation aimed at “what the words [of the law] expressly say” and finishes with an
identification of scriptum with certum. While Vico earlier defines certainty for his read-
ers as what is “individuated” or “particularized,” he shows here how one can also render
it through the legal practices of “barbarians” and their slavishness to the “determinate
particularity” of positive law.¹⁹ And this devotion to language serves as the foundation
of Vico’s understanding of barbarian “civil equity,” which Vico explains is not “naturally
known to all men” (and thus not universally commune) but instead is shared by “those
few who [are] eminently endowed with prudence, experience, or learning.”²⁰ Rather than
extend its influence to all people as a kind of “natural equity,” Vico’s certa lex might be
seen as both politically and linguistically individuated—the “reason of state” grounded in
particularized language.
Vico’s close association of certainty and the language of the law is not wholly un-
Il certo delle leggi è un’oscurezza della ragione unicamente sostenuta dall’autorità, che le ci fa
sperimentare dure nel praticarle, e siamo necessitati praticarle per lo di lor “certo”, che in buon
latino significa “particolarizzato” o, come le scuole dicono, “individuato”; nel qual senso certum e
commune, con troppa latina eleganza, son opposti tra loro.
Questa degnità, con le due seguenti diffinizioni, constituiscono il principio della ragion stretta,
della qual è regola l’equità civile, al cui certo, o sia alla determinata particolarità delle cui parole,
i barbari, d’idee particolari, naturalmente s’acquetano, e tale stimano, il diritto che lor si debba.
Onde ciò che in tali casi Ulpiano dice: “lex dura est, sed scripta est”, du diresti, con più bellezza
latina e con maggiore eleganza legale: “lex dura est, sed certa est,” §320–321. Translations of Vico’s
Il Diritto Universale are adapted from John D. Schaeffer and Donald P. Verene, eds. and trans.
A Translation From Latin into English of Giambattista Vico’s Il Diritto Universale/Universal Law
(Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2011).
¹⁹Vico’s allusion to “barbarians” here recalls his theories concerning stages of human civiliza-
tion, the corso of historical development. For a more detailed discussion of Vico’s view of the
stages of human history and its bearing on “natural” and “real” law, see Morrison (1978a).
²⁰For recent discussions of Vico’s interest in language as a matter of educating lawyers, see
Danesi (2012) and Mootz (2009).
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precedented in the Latin tradition, for Quintilian’s Institutio similarly draws a connection
between what is certum and the conventions of language.²¹ As discussed in the third chap-
ter of this dissertation, Quintilian elaborates a theory of language that identifies consue-
tudo as the “most certain teacher of speaking” (certissima loquendi magistra), a definition
of consuetudo he clarifies by drawing a parallel between language and money: “indeed
one must use language as one uses a coin, for which there is a ‘public die.’ ”²² Quin-
tilian’s notion of language—situated within the terminology of custom, consensus, and
certainty—foregrounds Vico’s understanding of certa lex as a kind of law rooted in what
is scriptum rather than in the ratio of “true law.” And Quintilian’s association between
language and certainty is reiterated in the writings of Lorenzo Valla, whose works on lan-
guage Vico explicitly reveres.²³ Valla, too, repeats Quintilian’s analogical understanding
of language and money: “Who does not know that speaking is based mainly on usage and
authority? This is what Quintilian says about it: ‘In speaking, usage is the most certain
(certissima) teacher, and obviously language is to be used like money, sealed with a public
stamp.’ ”²⁴ Vico’s continuation of these predecessors’ coupling of certainty and language
²¹For a discussion of Vico’s broader conception of the sensus communis and its close relationship
with poetic and primaeval language, see Schaeffer (1990, pp. 80–99).
²²consuetudo vero certissima loquendi magistra, utendumque plane sermone, ut nummo, cui pub-
lica forma est, I.6.3.
²³Institutiones Oratoriae §35.290–292.
²⁴Nam quis nescit maximam loquendi partem auctoritate niti et consuetudine? De qua ita ait
Quintilianus: Consuetudo certissima est loquendi magistra, utendumque plane sermone ut nummo,
cui publica forma est), II.11.6. For an early modern example of further interest in Quintilian’s
comparison of language and money, see Camporeale (2002, pp. 8-9) on Lorenzo Valla’s theories
of language. Quintilian’s claim that there is a “public die” (publica forma) for coinage and lan-
guage alike captures Valla’s attention, shown in the three references he attaches to Quintilian’s
discussion in his commentary on this passage in his manuscript of the Institutio. First, he cites
Ulpian from the Digest: The material of the coin is chosen whose public and lasting valuation
reduces the difficulties of transactions through an evenness in weight. And this material, after
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is perhaps a development of his admiration for both of these earlier accounts.
Although Vico neither adopts the imagery of language-as-coinage nor repeats Quin-
tilian’s maxim that consuetudo is the certissima magistra loquendi, his works show that his
understanding of language stems from a reliance on Quintilian, a possible inspiration for
his own efforts to couple language and certainty. In his Institutiones Oratoriae, Vico begins
his discussion of language by pointing out that there is a “well-known and true saying of
Quintilian: it is one thing to speak grammatically, but another to speak in a Latin man-
ner” (aliud est grammatice, aliud Latine loqui).²⁵ Quintilian appears later in Vico’s text,
too, as part of his recommendations for learning proper Latin style, where Vico praises
it has been minted with the public die, allows for usage and ownership, not so much because of
the intrinsic value of the material as from its weight. And both [the substance and the weight]
were called not a commodity but rather were called another price (electa materia est, cuius publica
ac perpetua estimatio difficultatibus permutationum equalitate quantitatis subveniret. Eaque mate-
ria forma publica percussa usum dominiumque non tam ex substantia prebet quam ex quantitate,
nec ultra merx utrunque, sed alterum pretium vocabatur, I.4.3) Martinelli and Perosa (1996, p. 32).
According to Ulpian’s analogy, the standardization of material (materia) used in coins shifts the
value of money from its natural value as a precious substance (substantia) to its accustomed value
as a denominated currency (quantitas). Or as Ulpian explains here, people do not treat money as
a valuable commodity (merx) on account of its substance but as “another price” (alterum pretium)
for which one can purchase goods. On the shift in currency’s value from the value of the metal
itself to the value of its stated denomination, see Bransbourg (2011).
Valla’s second marginal note here also shows his interest in the “public die” used to stamp
coins and language. This second reference, a brief quotation from Consultus Chirius Fortuna-
tianus’s Ars Rhetorica from the fourth or fifth century, shows that the analogy between language
use and coinage was long-lasting: “Consultus, having followed Quintilian, also says this: one must
use words just as one must use money minted by the public die” (Consultus etiam Quintilianum
sequutus inquit: “Utendum verbis ut nummis publica moneta signatis.” ) Valla actually misquotes
Consultus Fortunatianus, who writes the following: Aperta quem ad modum erit elocutio? Si uta-
mur verbis propriis, usitatis, sicuti nummis, ut dixi, publica moneta signatis (Ars Rhetorica III.8).
For Valla’s commentary on this selection of the Institutio, see (Martinelli and Perosa 1996, p. 58).
Valla’s third marginal reference, Gellius’ citation of De Analogia, a lost work by Julius Caesar, reit-
erates this more descriptivist view of language: “Always keep in your memory and your mind that
‘you should avoid an unheard and unusual word just as you avoid a craggy cliff’ ” (habe semper
in memoria atque in pectore, ut “tamquam scopulum, sic fugias inauditum atque insolens verbum”,
Institutio I.4.3 (ibid., p. 32)).
²⁵praeclarum enim et verum est illudQuintiliani dictum: aliud est grammatice, aliud Latine loqui,
§35.6–8. Quintilian’s original statement can be found at Institutio I.6.27.
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Quintilian’s suggestion to learn Latin from comic poets who “employ a type of speech
used especially by the masses,” the “common manner of speaking Latin” (vulgaris Latine
loquendi ratio).²⁶ The reappearance of vulgaris in Vico’s discussion of language here is
telling: for Vico, Quintilian is a principal authority on the value of language as a practice
of the common man, a language Vico defines as vulgaris, the adjective he uses to define
the certitudo of ordinary knowledge in his critique of Cartesianism in the De Antiquissima.
Vico’s appeal to this “vulgar” conception of language even recycles some phrases from
Quintilian and Valla, pointing to a studied reverence for their earlier accounts. Vico’s pref-
erence for speaking Latine rather than grammatice is borrowed from Quintilian’s rhetori-
cal manual, and the same preference appears in Valla’s account of Quintilian’s recommen-
dations, where the early humanist advises that “we must speak according to a grammati-
cal standard, speaking not so much grammatically as in Latin (nec tam grammatice quam
Latine)—that is, following not so much the rules of an art as the usage of educated and
cultured people (consuetudo eruditorum atque elegantium), which is the best art of all.”²⁷
²⁶Si quis autem vestrum quaerat unde addiscenda haec vulgaris Latine loquendi ratio, quando lin-
gua intermortua est et ad nos nonnisi auctores Latini pervenerunt, ego dicam: a comicis. Ii namque
a solo argumento poetae sunt; caeterum dictionis genere omnino populari utuntur, §36.431–436. To
support his recommendation, Vico turns to Quintilian, who understands the necessity of learn-
ing such common language and “who prescribed that the poets had to be explained to children”;
even if Quintilian’s students “had already acquired the common language of the Latins when they
joined themselves to grammarians and teachers,” they still needed these teachers to explain the
language of poetry to them (nec ullum facessit negotiumQuintilianus, qui praecipit pueris ad linguae
doctrinam poetas esse explanandos. Nam Quintiliani tempestate Latina lingua per Romanorum ora
vivebat: quare pueri iam linguam vulgarem Latinorum tenebant, cum ad grammaticos seu litteratos
sese applicabant, qui poetas ipsis enarrarent, §36.459–465).
²⁷Nobis quidem ad normam grammatices loquendum est, nec tam grammatice quam Latine
loquendam—hoc est non tam ad praecepta artis, quam ad consuetudinem eruditorum atque elegan-
tium, quae optima ars est, II.11.6. Notably, Valla changes Quintilian’s expression consensus eru-
ditorum to consuetudo eruditorum. For Valla, an appeal to “usage and authority” is not uniquely
interested in the language practices of the public. His understanding of Quintilian’s image of
the public mint instead points to this more restricted notion of a consensus eruditorum that reg-
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And Vico, too, adopts the phrase that Valla has taken from his predecessor: as a matter
of concluding his discussion on the history of the Latin tongue in his Institutiones Orato-
riae, Vico notes that even in pronunciation one should defer to the consuetudo eruditorum,
the same authority cited by Valla for guiding the norms of language.²⁸ As discussed in
the third chapter of this dissertation, Quintilian points to the consensus eruditorum as the
proper guide of language, and both Valla and Vico follow Quintilian’s recommendation,
even approximating if not explicitly repeating his original terminology.
Vico’s reliance on notions of language that is vulgaris and the consuetudo at such
language’s foundation, along with his explanation of certa lex as a kind of law that is
both scriptum and rooted in the “determinate particularity of words,” all help to sketch
an understanding of language as a matter of certainty, as understood by these earlier au-
thors. Accordingly, one should read Vico’s definition of certum—what is “individuated”
and “particularized”—not as what is unique to one individual. That is to say, when Vico
contrasts certum with commune, it seems unlikely that he means to suggest that certainty
is that which is not shared at all. Rather, the certain is “particularized” to those who
ulates language use. This more restrictive understanding of consuetudo, rooted not in the use of
ordinary Romans, reminds readers that “the only truly authoritative consuetudo for Valla was the
classical Latin of the best authors, not the vulgar language of classical Rome or its fifteeth-century
descendent, the Roman Volgare of Valla’s own time” (Nauta 2009, p. 276). For more on Valla’s un-
derstanding of vulgar Latin and his preference for the style of classical authors, see Tavoni (1986).
Readers of Valla are thus left with a paradoxical picture of consuetudo: at times it is cited as an ap-
peal to common practices, but at others it defers to the careful consideration of a group of officials
or experts. Nauta recognizes this tension: “It is therefore not correct to state categorically that
for Valla consuetudo always means what the learned—the orators and the cultured—say, that is,
the literary practice of the best authors rather than ordinary people’s parlance. Valla’s arguments
naturally make use of classical Latin and often depend on it, but they are not always about classi-
cal Latin. Even when he makes a point about classical Latin, he treats it as a common language”
(Nauta 2009, p. 280).
²⁸Quamquam fuerint qui de orthoëpedia scripserint, tamen pronunciandum hodie est ex consue-
tudine praesenti eruditorum, §36.530–533.
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share a language in which civil laws are grounded. As his accounts of language in his own
rhetorical writings illustrate, Vico understands how language is vulgaris and coupled with
the consuetudo and consensus of its users. Like the certitudo of the De Antiquissima, then,
the certa lex of the Scienza Nuova is grounded in the ordinary and the widely available.
One can clarify this distinction between the commune and the broadest forms of con-
sensus in a later discussion of the Scienza Nuova, for there Vico’s language-based notion
of certa lex and its ties to consuetudo or local convention contrast with the vera lex of
universal human reason.²⁹ As a parallel to his claim about “men of limited ideas” and
their attention to written laws, Vico begins this discussion of vera lex with the claim that
“intelligent men take for law whatever impartial utility dictates in each case,” a brand of
utility that is grounded in “natural reason”:³⁰
CXIII. The true in the laws is a certain light and splendor with which natural
reason illuminates them; that jurisconsults are often in the habit of saying
verum est for aequum est.
…
Axiom CXII and the two following definitions constitute the principle of mild
law. Its rule is the natural equity which is connatural with civilized nations.
This is the public school from which, as we shall show, the philosophers
emerged.
Propositions CIX–CXIV establish that the natural law of the gentes was insti-
tuted by providence. In order that the nations might be preserved, and since
they had to live for centuries incapable of truth and natural equity (the lat-
ter of which the philosophers later clarified), providence permitted them to
cleave to certainty and civil equity—which guards scrupulously the words of
²⁹The distinction between certum and verum is central to Vico’s study of the law, for as Guido
Fasso explains, “the philosophical problem which law raised for Vico was precisely that of the
relationship between the true and the certain – between a natural, or rational, law that was uni-
versally valid and positive and historical laws, apparently valid only insofar as they are chosen by
human will, by auctoritas” (Fassò 1976, p. 9).
³⁰Gli uomini intelligenti stimano diritto tutto ciò che dette essa uguale utilità delle cause, §112.
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decrees and laws—and to be led by the words to observe them generally, even
in cases where they proved harsh.³¹
Vico highlights the “natural” character of true laws (la ragion naturale, l’equità naturale
della ragion umana) by contrasting their applicability to all nations with the specificity of
certa lex to communities that share a written legal code. Whereas the ratio of vera lex is
“natural” and its brand of equity is “connatural with civilized nations,” such nations were
“incapable of truth” before the arrival of philosophy and thus had to “cleave to certainty
and civil equity.” These individual nations, not participating in what is commune to all,
rely on their own, individuated certain law and are “led by words.” To clarify Vico’s note
on usage regarding certum, one might say that the certain takes as its opposite not the
commune but instead the universale. And returning to our original paradox presented
by a comparison of the vulgaris cognitio of the De Antiquissima and the “particularized”
certainty of the Scienza Nuova, one can understand how certum might be “individuated”
and vulgaris but also not “common” in this broadest sense of omnipresent natural reason.
This discussion of Vico’s understanding of certainty and its ties to “particularized”
law is in service of the argument that Vico’s general interpretation of certum relies on
the intellectual tradition of humanist certainty that takes as its most thorough account
³¹Il vero delle leggi è un certo lume e splendore di che ne illumina la ragion naturale; onde
spesso i giureconsulti usan dire verum est per aequum est.
…
Questa degnità con l’altre due seguenti diffinizioni costituiscono il principio della ragion be-
nigna, regolata dall’equità naturale, la qual è connaturale alle nazioni ingentilite; dalla quale scuola
pubblica si dimostrerà esser usciti i filosofi.
Tutte queste sei ultime proposizioni fermano che la Provvedenza fu l’ordinatrice del Diritto
natural delle genti; la qual permise che, poiché per lunga scorsa di secoli le nazioni avevano a
vivere incapaci del vero e dell’equità naturale (la quale più rischiararono, appresso, i filosofi), esse
si attenessero al certo ed all’equità civile, che scrupolosamente custodisce le parole degli ordini e
delle leggi; e da queste fussero portate ad osservarle generalmente anco ne’ casi che riuscissero
dure, perchè si serbassero le nazioni, §322–324.
158
Quintilian’s Institutio. Now turning to another discussion of the law in Vico’s writing,
we see how he couples his notion of certa lex with auctoritas, a concept whose definition
manifestly relies on discussions of certainty in Quintilian’s Institutio. Vico’s elaboration
of auctoritas, a term he perhaps borrows from Valla’s discussion of Quintilian’s advocacy
of consuetudo as a guide of language, provides the most powerful evidence of the Neapoli-
tan’s debt to his ancient predecessor.³² While the notion of “authority” seems to include
several aspects of culture other than language alone, Vico’s most explicit discussions of
auctoritas reveal near-imitations of Quintilian’s text within his discussions of certainty.³³
Now added to the several words Vico associates with certum—including consensus, consue-
tudo, and conscientia—the concept of auctoritas again illustrates how Vico’s fundamental
understanding of certainty bears the marks of Quintilian’s influence.
In his Il Diritto Universale, a 1720-1722 treatise on the law that precedes and in many
ways anticipates his Scienza Nuova, Vico remarks that vera lex is grounded in ratio while
certa lex is grounded in auctoritas, a term that Vico treats in great detail over several
chapters of the treatise.³⁴ In a more succinct account of the difference between verum
and certum in the treatise’s prologue, Vico’s definition of auctoritas—the foundation of
certainty—bears the unmistakable influence of Quintilian’s catalog of certa from the In-
³²Valla, we should recall, positions auctoritas and consuetudo as parallel guides in his discussion
of language in the Disputationes: Nam quis nescit maximam loquendi partem auctoritate niti et
consuetudine? De qua ita aitQuintilianus: Consuetudo certissima est loquendi magistra, utendumque
plane sermone ut nummo, cui publica forma est), II.11.6.
³³Vico provides a lengthy discussion of the many types of “authority” in the main text of the
Il Diritto Universale—types that include natural, monastic, and economic authority—in Il Diritto
Universale §88–101.
³⁴Note, too, the appearance of autorità in Scienza Nuova CXI, a discussion of certa lex, cited
earlier in this chapter.
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stitutio:
Truth (verum) arises when the mind is in conformity with the order of things;
the certain (certum) arises when consciousness (conscientia) is secure from
doubt. That which conforms to the order of things is called reason. Thus,
if the order of things is eternal, reason is eternal, from which it follows that
truth is eternal. But if the order of things is not permanent in every place for
everyone or everything, then reason will have only probable knowledge of
things and achieve only a degree of verisimilitude in cases requiring action.
As the truth rests on reason, so the certain rests upon authority (auctoritas),
whether of the senses, called αὐτοψία, or on the words of others, which is
called authority in particular. From both of these, persuasion is born.³⁵
Vico reuses several terms from his other works in this discussion. As in the De Antiquis-
sima, Vico here aligns certum and conscientia, and as in the Scienza Nuova, Vico defines
the true as a kind of univeral ratio, the “eternal order of things” that is “permanent in
every place for everyone or everything”—that is, what is ratio is understood as commune
in the broadest sense, rather than “particularized” or “individuated.” Vico gives similar
definitions for certum and verum in the Synopsis of Universal Law, a prefatory exposition
attached to his Il Diritto Universale, where Vico explains that what is verum is “that con-
forming to the order of things” (quod rerum ordini conformatur) and that what is certum is
“consciousness free from doubt” (conscientia dubitandi secura).³⁶ But when Vico turns to
auctoritas in the Il Diritto Universale itself, one finds an explanation of certainty not seen
in these other works. Like Quintilian’s study of certa which first defines the certain as
³⁵Verum gignit mentis cum rerum ordine conformatio; certum gignit conscientia dubitandi secura.
Ea autem conformatio cum ipso ordine rerum est et dicitur “ratio.” Quare, si aeternus est ordo rerum,
ratio est aeterna, ex qua verum aeternum est: sin ordo rerum non semper, non ubique, non omnibus
constet, tunc in rebus cognitionis ratio probabilis, in rebus actionis ratio verisimilis erit. Ut autem
verum constat ratione, ita certum nititur auctoritate, vel nostra sensuum, quae dicitur αὐτοψία vel
aliorum dictis, quae in specie dicitur “auctoritas,” ex quarum alteruta nascitur persuasio, Preface §31.
³⁶For a text of the Synopsis of Universal Law, not always coupled with the Il Diritto, see Cristo-
folini (1974, p. 13).
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“what we perceive through the senses,” auctoritas is first defined here as autopsia, one’s
own sense perception. Vico then turns from sense perception to “the words of others,”
a phrase that suggests the forging of agreements between parties. As a summary of all
kinds of auctoritas, in fact, Vico remarks that such “authority” effects a kind of “persua-
sion”; rather than couple certainty with objectivity or the universal reason of the truth,
Vico takes up his Roman predecessor’s insistence that the certain is tied to the persuasive
arguments of the rhetorician.
In these various discussions of law, language, and epistemology, Vico thus exhibits
the vestiges of Quintilian’s understanding of certainty throughout his corpus. Sometimes
explicit, as in his discussion of language education in the Institutiones, and sometimes
unmentioned, as in the definition of auctoritas as sense perception and persuasion in the
prologue to the Il Diritto Universale, Quintilian’s recurring presence in Vico’s work is
indisputable. Always emphasizing the common or shared nature of what is certum, most
evident in the appearance of his reliance on words beginning with con-, Vico relays the
notion of humanist certainty set forth in the ancient and early modern works that precede
him.
But Vico’s writings are not a mere reiteration of ancient rhetorical texts, and his no-
tions of the certain and the true depart from Quintilian’s original formulations in signifi-
cant ways. Vico’s definition of vera lex, for example, suggests that the true and the certain
are not entirely disjunct, for the fundamental concern of the Scienza Nuova is “the prob-
lem of ‘verifying’ the certain and ‘certifying’ the true universal, of grounding philology
in philosophy and philosophy in philology.”³⁷ Rather than draw a firm boundary between
³⁷Morrison (1978b, p. 591).
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the verum and the certum, Vico’s project is, at least in part, an effort to reconcile them, a
reconciliation he suggests in a later discussion in Il Diritto Universale:
The reason (ratio) of the law is that which makes the law true (verum), and the
true is the proper and perpetual concomitant of necessary law. The certain is
part of the true (certum est pars veri). The certain is a proper and perpetual
attribute of positive law but the certain is nevertheless a part of the true, as
in the definition of civil law by Ulpian we cited above. Lawgivers seize that
part of the truth and make it certain by means of their authority (auctoritas)
because men may not be able to hold to it merely from a sense of shame. This
is the rationale of Ulpian’s definition. Thus, in all legal fictions that ground all
positive law—for the natural law is both true and noble—there is to be found
a truth dictated by reason (ratio). Thus we have the well-known passage from
Ulpian: “The law is harsh, but it is written” by which he means “The law is
certain (certum), but does not contain the whole truth.” In other words, there
is some reason that does not permit the law to conform entirely to the truth.³⁸
This discussion reiterates some attributes of certainty discussed in the Scienza Nuova. Like
that later work, this passage couples certainty and language when it explains how Ulpian’s
maxim—durum est, sed scriptum est—applies to the notion of certain law. Vico also shows
how certainty is, at least to some degree, separate from the verum, for Vico’s closing
statement shows that what is certain does not “conform entirely to the truth.” Despite
these resonances, Vico blends the certain and the true by noting that the certain forms
part of it: certum est pars veri.³⁹ While Valla’s Dialecticae Disputationes explains how an
³⁸Ratio autem legis eidem dat esse verum. Verum autem est proprium ac perpetuum adiunctum
iuris necessarii. Certum est pars veri. Certum vero est proprium et perpetuum iuris voluntarii attribu-
tum, sub aliqua tamen veri parte, ut Ulpianus nuper ius civile definivit. Quam veri partem legislatores
arripiunt, ut certo teneant ea ex parte verum auctoritate, quod hominum pudore tenere non possunt:
quae est eius iuris voluntarii sunt—nam ius naturale est generosum et verax—subest aliquod verum
ratione dictatum. Quin eiusdem Ulpiani celebre illud. “Durum est, sed scriptum est.” tantumdem
sonat: “Certa lex est, sed vera prosus non est.” At aliqua tamen ratio eam veram omnino esse non
sinit”, §82.
³⁹“In general, Vico thought, ‘ancient jurisprudence neglected the true for the certain,’ that is,
equity for the ‘propriety and origin of words.’ On the other hand the medieval ‘interpreters’ tended
to dogmatize unhistorically without a proper understanding of philology and philosophy which
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uncertain truth can become certain by reconciling disagreements, a topic discussed in the
fourth chapter of this dissertation, here Vico suggests that the certain is inseparable from
the true (“the certain is nevertheless a part of the truth”) yet perhaps never fully aligned
with it.⁴⁰ While Valla’s conception of truth and certainty seeks to create an agreement
(that is, what is certum and confessum) about what the truth is, Vico scholars instead point
to the Neapolitan’s novel use of the certain to invent the true. As Vico himself explains,
the verum is the factum.⁴¹
One finds, in fact, a modification if not a rejection of Quintilian’s theory of certainty
elsewhere in Vico’s works. While Vico’s understanding of certainty as “persuasion” in the
Il Diritto Universale and as ordinary knowledge (vulgaris cognitio) in the De Antiquissima
both suggest Vico’s debt to Quintilian, one finds that certainty is alluded to but largely
absent from the discussion of status theory in the Institutiones Oratoriae. Even in his De
Antiquissima, which in its first chapters sets out its anti-Cartesian brand of certitudo built
upon hallmarks of Quintilian’s notion of certum, Vico ultimately advances two competing
Grotius, that philologist of universal understanding…began to repair” (Kelley 1976, p. 26). John
Schaeffer sees Vico’s general approach as one that attempts to discover the verum through the
rhetorical processes more aligned with the certum: “Natural law is not deduced from reason but
induced from history. This historical process, from auctoritas to factum, from factum to certum, and
from certum to verum (universal principles of justice) is essentially a rhetorical process involving
argument and negotiation rather than a rational or philosophical one ” (2011, pp. xxvi-xxvii).
⁴⁰Scholars have noted the originality (and oftentimes inscrutability) of Vico’s model of the cer-
tain and the true where the certain does not reveal a transcendent true law, but rather constitutes
it. Vico’s understanding of “true law” is nevertheless tied to “certain law” since “‘Vico’s basic
thesis is that natural law, rather than a nomothetic idea, on the Platonic model, paradoxically,
transcendent to, and yet normative to all conditions of time, place, circumstance and historical
process, refers to a principle of mediation between the basic structures of law, namely, authority
and ratio, certum and verum, particularity and universality” (Caponigri 1979, p. 3).
⁴¹The certain becomes the true through an “observable pattern of evolution of structures of
thought and feeling on the basis of which humanity creates its institutions” (Bedani 1989, p. 202).
For recent scholarship on Vico’s understanding of the verum and its manufactured nature, see note
10 of this chapter.
163
definitions of certainty, one of which is the “well-tested and indubitable.” These founda-
tional changes to status theory and rendering of certum as unimpeachable knowledge, as
we shall see in the remainder of this chapter, both point to Vico’s ambivalent position in
the tradition of humanist certainty: on the one hand, he carries this ancient understand-
ing into the eighteenth century, but on the other, he suggests its fading relevance among
European thinkers during the rise of empirical science.
Vico’s reverence for Quintilian’s work is evident throughout his Institutiones Orato-
riae, not only in his discussion of the customary nature of language and his pedagogical
recommendations. Like Quintilian’s original work, Vico’s Institutiones treats a variety
of topics over sixty-seven chapters, including the nature of rhetoric, the divisions of a
speech, and the verbal figures at the heart of rhetorical eloquence. But these topics are not
all treated with the same emphasis or interest, and Vico’s Institutiones Oratoriae shows
that its debt to Quintilian’s original book is not just in its title: its interest in forensic
rhetoric—treated over the course of six full pages in the most recent English translation—
far outweighs its treatment of the epideictic and deliberative genres, each of which he
treats in just a few paragraphs.⁴² From Quintilian’s work, the Institutiones borrow their
“fundamental juridical orientation.”⁴³ In its discussions of status theory and rhetorical
proof, too, this manual for university students of rhetoric borrows heavily from Quintil-
ian’s extensive discussions on the topic in Book III of the Institutio.⁴⁴
⁴²For Vico’s discussion of the demonstrativum and deliberativum genres of oratory, see §20 and
§21, respectively. For Vico’s discussion of the forensic or “judicial” genre of oratory, see §22 (Pinton
and Shippee 1996, pp. 254–259).
⁴³Pinton and Shippee (ibid., p. 254).
⁴⁴As part of a comparison of Vico’s Institutiones and the texts of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian
164
Even if Vico’s text shows a clear debt to his Roman educational predecessor, how-
ever, it does not always look back to Quintilian’s Institutio in unconditionally favorable
terms. Compared with the second book of Valla’s Disputationes Dialecticae, where one
finds an unbridled admiration for Quintilian, Vico’s Institutiones Oratoriae can feel quite
critical in its treatment of Quintilian’s manual, despite its heavy reliance on this earlier
work. Whereas Valla compares Quintilian to God for his rhetorical expertise and master-
ful prose style, Vico laments the complex theorization of rhetorical invention in the orig-
inal Institutio.⁴⁵ Like Aristotle, who in Vico’s eyes “collected innumerable propositions”
that “burdened the student more than equipping and instructing him,” Quintilian too in-
undates his students with an excess of propositions and tactics.⁴⁶ Quintilian’s rhetorical
manual, Vico remarks, provides “rules for the study of rhetorical loci more befitting some
laborer rather than an orator.”⁴⁷ In an even more pointed rejection of Quintilian’s rhetor-
ical methods, Vico writes that “in every single case, Quintilian enumerates propositions
(propositiones) which are so certae…that from them the orators may make credible any
cause. And so that the propositions might proceed more certainly (certius), Quintilian,
by means of a very long chapter which added weightiness to an already boring book, as
well as Hermogenes, by means of an entire book of his own, pursued the handling of the
from which it borrows heavily, David Marshall notes that “like many other early modern conduits
of ancient rhetoric, Vico’s reception of rhetoric is at times mechanical” (Marshall 2010, p. 77). For
a larger discussion of Vico’s particular interest in ingenium as theorized in these earlier treatises,
see Marshall (ibid., pp. 76-79).
⁴⁵For Valla’s estimation of Quintilian as the consummate rhetorical theorist, see Dialecticae
Disputationes II.19.
⁴⁶nam innumeras colligit et tamen omnes colligi non possunt, cum infinitae rei infinita regula sit:
itaque sua multitudine tironem onerat magis quam ornat et instuit, §19.23-26.
⁴⁷locos rhetoricos vestigandos praecipiunt tamquam fabum aliquen non oratorem, instruerent,
§19.39-41.
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thorny treatment of the status of causes.”⁴⁸ While Quintilian’s place next to Aristotle here
confirms his canonical authority on the topic of rhetorical invention, Vico criticizes them
both for their unnecessary complexity, burdensome pedagogy, and even unstimulating
prose.
This criticism does not prevent Vico from borrowing much of his own treatment of
status theory from this ancient Roman manual. Vico’s allusion to the certae propositiones
of Quintilian is perhaps intended to recall the prominent place of certainty in Quintilian’s
rendering of status theory in Book III of the Institutio and perhaps even the more exten-
sive treatment of certainty in Book V.⁴⁹ Like his Roman predecessor, Vico structures the
paradigm of status around the three status rationales found in Quintilian’s original text:
“The status, therefore, is where the cause stands which, as we have seen, is threefold—of
fact, of name, and of law; that is, the conjectural, the definitional, and the qualitative.”⁵⁰
And “conforming to Quintilian,” Vico enumerates five status legales: “conflicting laws, the
letter and the spirit of the law, ratiocination, ambiguity, and continuance.”⁵¹ Even if Vico
understands Quintilian’s manual to be “befitting some laborer rather than an orator,” he
⁴⁸nam in unaquaque causa certas propositiones enumerant…ut ex iis orator cuiquecausa faciat
fidem [De statibus causarum iudicium] et, quo certius procederent, de statibus causarum spinosissi-
mam tractationemQuintilianus, longissimo capite quod iniusti libri molem excrescit, et Hermogenes,
integro libro, exequuntur, §19.41-49.
⁴⁹For a discussion of Quintilian’s use of certum in his discussion of status, see the third chapter
of this dissertation. It is perhaps unsurprising that Vico’s rhetorical manual devotes so much
attention to the theory of status, for Vico acquired his academic position of the chair of rhetoric
in Naples on account of his disputation on the De Statibus Caussarum, the chapter of Quintilian’s
Institutio devoted to the history and systematization of status theory. As David Marshall reports,
“there is no record of what Vico actually said” in this lecture (2010, p. 86).
⁵⁰status igitur estin quo stat causa, et, ut vidimus, triplex est, facti, nominis, iuris; seu coniecturae,
definitionis, qualitatis, §22.20–22.
⁵¹Pinton and Shippee (1996, p. 254).
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has nonetheless imported some of these alleged burdens into his own work.
In fact, Vico’s further discussions of status theory seem to be rooted in Quintilian’s
concern with consensus and agreements seen throughout his framework. For example,
Vico shows how the definitional issue—quid sit—is related to the sensus communis of the
definition of words: “In the status of the definitional, the loci are common to both parties
so that each may give a definition in the best way possible according to common sense
(sensus communis) and the proper meaning of the words (vis verbi).”⁵² Vico’s approach to
the qualitative issue—quale sit—similarly relies on notions of consensus, and his collection
of circumstances relevant to this issue approximates Quintilian’s original catalog of certa
in its concern for laws, local customs, previously proven statements, and even naturally
shared sentiments:
We defend straightforwardly in an absolute manner that what is done has
been rightly because of natural instinct, the consensus of nations (nationum
consensus), the judgment of the most wise men (sapientium virorum iudicium),
and according to laws (leges), the customs (mores), the institutions (instituta),
the accepted covenants of our commonwealth (pacta conventa), precedence,
and previous judicial rulings.⁵³
Despite the appearance of consensus throughout these discussions of status theory, how-
ever, Vico never explicitly adopts the language of certainty in these discussions. As part
of his complaint of Quintilian’s burdensome complexity, Vico does once refer to the certae
propositiones that Quintilian uses to “make credible any cause,” but aside from this one
⁵²in statu finitivo, loci utrique parti communes sunt: ut deiniat uterque quam maxime potest ad
communem sensum et vim verbi accommodate, §22.88–90.
⁵³Absolute, cum simpliciter quod factum est recte factum esse defendimus, naturae instinctu, na-
tionum consensu, sapeintum virorum iudicio, nostrae civitatis legibus, moribus, institutis, pactis con-
ventis, exemplisque et rebus iudicatis, §22.109–113.
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allusion to Quintilian’s interest in certa, the term is absent from Vico’s adoption of this
treatment of status from his predecessor.⁵⁴
The absence of a discussion of certainty from these accounts of status theory and
rhetorical argumentation more generally, however, does not prevent Vico from adopting
a host of concepts from the Institutio for his own educational manual. In fact, as Vico’s
broader discussion of rhetorical proof shows, he relies on a theory of argumentation that
largely parallels Quintilian’s understanding of enthymemes, audience psychology, and
widely held beliefs.⁵⁵ This debt is most obvious in Vico’s formulation of the enthymeme as
a kind of rhetorical proof that allows the rhetorician to omit “general statements” familiar
to the audience for the purposes of ensuring the emotional receptiveness of one’s listeners,
a concern treated at length in Quintilian’s discussion:
Orators, for the purposes of variety, may omit general statements (effata ex
genere) most of the time so that the one who is listening would never be aware
of the technique or be bored by the repetition (similitudinem fastidiat), and
so that the listener may supply the argumentation with something of his own
in which he will take delight.⁵⁶
Instead of continuing with a discussion of certae propositiones, Vico instead appeals to
⁵⁴In the following section on “The selection of loci or the art of criticism,” Vico notes that the
loci related to status theory “are the elements for convincing, all of which the orator must examine
when he takes on the defense of a cause so that he will be certain to have found that in the cause
which is verisimilar” (Haec sunt elementa docendi, quae orator ubi causam suscipit defendendam,
percurrere omnia debet, ut quidquid in causa sit verisimile, invenisse certus sit, §23.3–5. It is not clear
whether this appearance of certus is a subtle connection of certainty to Quintilian’s understanding
of status theory, but there is not real evidence for such a claim.
⁵⁵And this inheritence from Quintilian naturally incorporates elements from Aristotelian
rhetoric on which Quintilian bases his own discussions. Even if “Vico and his Enlightenment
contemporaries” turn away from Aristotle, “we must understand Vico’s rhetoric relative to the
Aristotelian tradition which frames it” (Hobbs 1996, p. 561).
⁵⁶Et oratores varietatis gratia, neve cognoscat artem quit audet neve similitudinem fastidiat et
ut de suo argumentatione aliquid suppleat, unde ea tamquam sua delectetur, effata ex genere fere
plerumque omittunt, §30.114–117.
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“general statements” (effata ex genere) in rhetorical proof, an understanding of rhetoric
that returns to the Aristotelian roots of homolegoumena and Quintilian’s understanding
of rhetorical argumentation built upon widely accepted beliefs. Vico’s understanding that
one may omit such effata in order to effect emotional pleasure in an audience—or at least to
avoid boredom—recalls Quintilian’s commentary on the proper function of enthymemes
at the conclusion of Book V of the Institutio.⁵⁷ There Quintilian cautions against “definite,
frequent, and monotonously structured formal arguments” that include so much material
as to inspire “satiety” and “boredom” (ex similitudine fastidium), a concern Vico seems to
have borrowed here in both sense and phrasing (similitudinem fastidiat).⁵⁸ It is better, so
Quintilian and Vico both advise, to omit ordinary knowledge for the sake of facilitating an
audience’s receptiveness and specifically for avoiding monotonous, dry argumentation.
And like Quintilian’s own account, Vico’s conception of enthymematic proof does not
simply parrot Aristotelian doctrine; instead, it shows the same awareness of Stoic devel-
opments that Quintilian incorporates into his own writings.⁵⁹ Just as Quintilian includes
within his several definitions of the enthymeme the formal Stoic frameworks that he later
sets aside in favor of a more Aristotelian understanding of rhetorical argumentation, Vico
⁵⁷David Marshall has already studied how in these rhetorical discussions Vico also take a great
interest in the sententia, “an utterance that states in a compact, abbreviated form a combination
of the key premises or conclusions in a rhetorical argument,” a concept that uses “concetto…[as]
the Italian equivalent; there the emphasis is on the cryptic quality of the utterance’s compactness”
(2010, p. 79).
⁵⁸Locuples et speciosa vult esse eloquentia: quorum nihil consequetur si conclusionibus certis et
crebris et in unam prope formam cadentibus concisa et contemptum ex humilitate et odium ex quadam
servitute et ex copia satietatem et ex similitudine fastidium tulerit, Institutio Oratoria V.14.30.
⁵⁹Vico nevertheless positions the syllogism as an Aristotelian form of argumentation: “As the
Platonists have used induction and the Aristotelians the syllogism, so the Stoics have used their
own proper weapon of argumentation. It is called the sorites” (§30.263–265).
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also cites the competing understanding of the enthymeme as a “proof from contraries.”⁶⁰
In his adoption of Quintilian’s sources and language as well as his fundamentally Aris-
totelian notion of rhetorical argumentation, then, Vico follows his Roman educational
predecessor in crafting his own system of rhetoric. Despite this incorporation of so much
material from Quintilian, however, the Institutio’s notion of certainty is almost entirely
absent from Vico’s work.
Over the course of his own lessons, Vico thus exhibits a debt to Quintilian that is at
once undeniable but also ambivalent. His criticism of what he sees as the complex, tech-
nical instruction of the Institutio leads Vico to differentiate his own rhetorical manual
from Quintilian’s as a simpler, purer alternative. In lieu of a mastery of “burdensome”
frameworks, Vico’s student should instead learn “moral philosophy in which the nature
of all virtues and vices, the character of customs, and the duties of this life are discussed in
order and with method.”⁶¹ But even while Vico announces his support for a kind of moral
education that avoids what he sees as the overly technical nature of classical rhetorical
manuals, he nevertheless advises that his readers grasp the concept of status “so that
[they] will not be totally unaware of how the rhetoricians teach how to find the argu-
ments in whatever kind of causes, concerning the three types of which we will touch
upon.”⁶² Vico’s alleged alternative to the ancient Institutio thus seems to be a false one:
⁶⁰Sed enthymema per excellentiam, ut aiunt, illud in rhetorica dicitur quod ex contrariis constat,
§30.137–138.
⁶¹morali philosophia condisci, ubi de virtutum omnium et vitiorum natura, de morum charac-
teribus, de omnibus huius vitae officiis ordine et ratione disseritur, §19.58–61. Vico’s call for moral
education as the primary goal of rhetorical training could be seen as a parallel to Quintilian’s aim
of crafting a “good man skilled in speaking,” as he discusses in the first chapter of Institutio Oratoria
XII.
⁶²verum ne omnino expertes sitis quo pacto rhetores in quoque causarum genere argumenta inve-
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it similarly urges its readers to become a “good man skilled in speaking,” particularly in
a kind of speaking that relies on the mastery of status theory. For all its interest in ful-
filling a separate, superior pedagogical aim, Vico’s manual appears to be quite similar to
Quintilian’s original work in both sense and language. But this early modern casting of
ancient rhetorical instruction—at least as far as certainty is concerned—does not wholly
adopt the terminology of its predecessor. Humanist certainty, in fact, has almost entirely
vanished from Vico’s treatise on the art of rhetoric.
To conclude our study of Vico, we return to the De Antiquissima and its epistemolog-
ical discussions of certainty and its rejection of the Cartesian search for scientia alone.
Even in this early work, however, one already sees the foundational changes Vico makes
to both status theory and the sometimes-peripheral importance of certainty within this
framework. As part of a combined discussion of status theory and Aristotelian categories,
Vico offers not the three essential status questions that one finds in the Institutiones but
instead a five-part division that innovatively and even radically expands Hermagoras’
original system:
In point of fact, on what basis could a clear and distinct idea of our mind
(clara ac distincta mentis nostrae idea) be the rule of truth unless one had
already perceived all that is involved in some thing, all that is connected with
it? For who can be certain (certus) that he has perceived all this, unless he
has run through with all the questions which can be proposed concerning
some thesis? To begin with, he runs through the questions, “is it?” lest he
makes up words about nothing; next, through the questions “what is it?” lest
there be disagreement about its definition; then, “how much is it?” whether in
terms of extension or weight or number; next “quality” and, in this regard, he
contemplates color, taste, flexibility, durability, and everything else belonging
to touch; and thereafter, “when does it come to be?”, “how long does it last?”,
nienda praecipiant, de tribus causarum generibus aliqua attingamus, §19.74–77.
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“into what does it decompose?”; and in the same way, he runs through the
remaining categories.⁶³
Still working to contrast his own epistemological positions against the Cartesian search
for “clear and distinct ideas,” Vico positions certainty at the front of his modified render-
ing of status theory: without answering all its questions, one cannot be certus of one’s
knowledge.⁶⁴ But Vico’s treatment here avoids discussions of forensic debate or rhetorical
persuasiveness, and it instead positions status theory within a scientific investigation of
extension, color, and other properties. Catherine Hobbs underscores the particular nov-
elty of the fifth question—that of birth, lifetime, and decomposition—within Vico’s larger
interests in the history of civilization, for here “Vico’s key insight was that humans have
not simply changed by degrees over time, but have passed through qualitatively different
transformations, evidenced by changes in their use of language and parallel institutions.”⁶⁵
Status theory, at least the vestiges of it here, suggests that certainty is a matter of the sci-
ence of human history, not merely the concerns of the courtroom.
Perhaps in Vico’s time, then, the concept of certainty is similarly passing from one era
to the next, for his Institutiones Oratoriae and refutations of Cartesianism clearly acknowl-
edge this ancient notion but nevertheless show signs of radical changes underway. While
⁶³Etenim quonam pacto clara ac distincta mentis nostrae idea veri regula sit, nisi ea, quae in re in-
sunt, ad rem sunt affecta, cuncta perspexerit? et quanam ratione quis certus sit, omnia perspexisse, nisi
per quaestiones omnes, quae de re proposita institui possunt, sit persecutus? Principio per quaestione
an sit, ne de nihilo verba faciat: deinde per eam quid sit, ne de nomine condendatur: tum quanta sit,
sive extensione, sive pondere, sive numero: porro qualis, et heic contemplari colorem, saporem, molli-
tudinem, duriciem, et alia tactus: praeterea quando nascatur, quamdiu duret, et in quae corrumpatur:
et ad hoc instar per reliqua praedicamenta conferre, §113–114.
⁶⁴The notion of certainty here points not to an agreement itself but to one’s own mental assur-
ance of a something’s validity. For this sense of certus, see OLD 11.
⁶⁵Hobbs (1996, p. 570).
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Quintilian’s ancient notion of humanist certainty is perhaps disappearing from the works
of Vico and his contemporaries, an alternative notion of certainty is taking its place. In
the De Antiquissima, Vico admits that
for [the ancient philosophers of Italy], certain (certum) refers to two things,
first what is well-tested and indubitable, second, what is particular as opposed
to what is common, as if to say the certain is what is particular (particulare),
but the doubtful what is common (commune). Also, for them, the true (verum)
and the equitable (aequum) are the same.⁶⁶
The ascendant understanding of certum as what is “well-tested and indubitable (explo-
ratum indubiumque),” as Vico suggests here, is not a new meaning of certum.⁶⁷ But what
Vico’s ambivalence about certum here shows is that even in an author whose works are
thoroughly indebted to Quintilian’s rhetorical manual—in matters of language, law, and
epistemology—the ancient notion of certum as consensus has started to lose its influence
in the early modern period. Or as Vico might understand it, after its long life of nearly
two millennia, Quintilian’s original formulation of humanist certainty finally begins to
decompose.
⁶⁶Atque ita sensisse antiquos Italiae Philosophos haec in lingua latina extant vestiga: quod certum
duo significat, et quod est exploratum indubiumque, et peculiare, quod communi respondet: quasi
quod peculiare est, certum sit, dubium autem quod commune. Iisdemque verum, et aequm idem, §47.
⁶⁷As noted in the introduction of this dissertation, the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae’s third major
category of the meanings of certus aligns with verus, the true.
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Conclusion
Over these five chapters, I have shown how the notion of certainty—what is certum—often
assumes a definition radically separate from the modern concept of the same name. Even
if certum is often aligned with verum, an alignment attested not just in the Thesaurus Lin-
guae Latinae and the Oxford Latin Dictionary but even in the seventh-century Harleianus
glossary, Quintilian’s text and his readers show one prominent tradition of certainty that
stands at odds with this coupling. I have shown not only how Quintilian adopts a skep-
tical conception of rhetorical argumentation and several other intellectual endeavors, all
of which aim at the merely certum rather than the indisputably verum, but also how this
measured understanding of the epistemic value of certainty persists for nearly two mil-
lennia. Indeed, Valla and Vico, while perhaps not household names in the twenty-first
century, are nevertheless decisively influential early modern thinkers, and their debt to
Quintilian’s fashioning of certainty, as this dissertation has demonstrated, is unmistak-
able.
While the primary goal of this dissertation has been to lay out as clearly as possible this
tradition of “humanist certainty,” both in its sources and in its influence, a second thread
related to the categorization of knowledge runs throughout my study, and as a conclud-
ing gesture, I would like to address how the questions at the center of this dissertation
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bear on this other topic. The impulse to categorize different kinds of knowledge and argu-
ment appears in the first chaper of this dissertation, where Aristotle separates apodeictic
demonstration from dialectical argument. And this effort to distinguish apodeixis from
dialectic, while not unique to Aristotle, is emblematic of his consistent interest in defin-
ing various types of knowledge and the particular methods used to acquire them.⁶⁸ In
his Nicomachean Ethics, for example, Aristotle similarly distinguishes mathematics and
oratory on account of their differing capacities for precision:
Precision of the same kind must not be sought in all accounts of things.…It
is a mark of an educated person to look for precision in each kind of inquiry
just to the extent that the nature of the subject allows it; it looks like the same
kind of mistake to accept a merely persuasive account from a mathematician
and to demand demonstrations from an expert in oratory.⁶⁹
Paralleling the separation one sees in the Topica, where Aristotle sets apart apodeictic
demonstrations with their “true and primary” premises and dialectical arguments rooted
in endoxa, the Nicomachean Ethics similarly carves out two categories of inquiry, one that
produces “demonstrations” and another that produces “merely persuasive accounts.” And
Aristotle, it should be noted, is not belittling the study of ethics or advocating for a kind
of ethical relativism: he merely addresses the general regularity of ethical thinking that—
unlike mathematical proof—accommodates a kind of variability.⁷⁰
⁶⁸For the Platonic effort to categorize kinds of knowledge and belief, see Plato’s metaphor of
the divided line in the Republic (509d6–511e5). For a discussion of some competing interpretations
of this metaphor, see Smith (1996).
⁶⁹τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον…πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ
τοσοῦτον τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται·
παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν
ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν, 1094b12–1094b13, 1094b23–1094b27. Translation of Nicomachean Ethics
adapted from S. Broadie, ed., and C. Rowe, trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
⁷⁰For a discussion of Aristotle’s understanding of the relative imprecision of ethical inquiry
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Quintilian, however, makes no such distinction regarding the relative precision of dif-
ferent intellectual enterprises, for all arguments merely conclude what is certum. Against
the backdrop of Aristotle’s Topica, Quintilian’s rendering of all kinds of argumentation—
including natural philosophy, geometry, and forensic rhetoric—as arguments rooted in
the epistemically modest category of certainty is a radical departure from the Peripatetic
division of demonstration and dialectic. And even if Quintilian adopts Aristotelian under-
standings of the enthymeme, emotional appeal, and (as this dissertation has argued) the
place of homolegoumena in rhetoric, he nevertheless collapses these foundational Aris-
totelian categorizations of types of arguments and their respective varieties of conclu-
sions. As his most enthusiastic reader Lorenzo Valla confirms, Quintilian rejects these
distinctions when he calls his readers to understand all kinds of inquiry as applications
of status theory: “In each kind of inquiry—rational, moral, natural, and many others—our
practice is to ask whether it is, what it is, and what it is like, which is almost explicit in
the words of Quintilian.”⁷¹
One need only look to medieval thinkers like Augustine or early modern reformers like
Descartes to see how Quintilian’s broadly skeptical approach does not completely infil-
trate the thinking of post-classical Europe. But as Vico’s text suggests, Quintilian’s efforts
to collapse epistemological distinctions strangely foreshadows a parallel flattening of such
categories among authors of the early modern period. According to the first chapters of
and fiction compared to the exactness of scientific demonstration, see Eden (1986, pp. 32–54) and
Trimpi (1983, pp. 118–129). I am grateful to Katja Vogt for sharing a chapter draft from her forth-
coming book, Desiring the Good: Ancient Theory and Contemporary Proposals, whose terminology
of ethical “variability” and “general regularity” I have adopted here.
⁷¹praeterea in singulis—rationali, morali, naturali, et sique sint alia—quaerere solemus an sit, quid
sit, quale sit, ut propemodum ex Quintiliani verbis palam est, II.19.25.
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Vico’s De Antiquissima, Descartes venerates only scientia, the rigorous knowledge of the
philosophical meditator, while rejecting claims that fall short of its strict requirements.
Looking to rehabilitate certitudo and conscientia as valid if deficient kinds of knowledge,
Vico rejects the “all-or-none” attitude of the Cartesian skeptic: a second category of vul-
garis cognitio can ground probabilistic thinking that may not constitute “knowledge” but
nevertheless proves valuable for managing one’s life. Paralleling Quintilian’s combina-
tion of geometry and rhetoric into one investigation of the certain, Descartes similarly
concerns himself with a study of scientia alone. And against this radical combination of
categories of knowledge and the methods for acquiring such knowledge, Vico advocates
for different types of inquiry that can produce conclusions of varying degrees of epistemic
assurance.
In one way, then, Vico’s methodology seems closer to Aristotle’s than Quintilian’s in
its effort to define a role for certitudo alongside the Cartesian conception of the true. While
Quintilian equalizes all argumentation as a study of mere certainty and while Vico’s early
modern adversaries elevate the status of proof to a study of unassailable knowledge, Vico
himself recognizes the value of these two approaches, perhaps in the spirit of Aristotle’s
careful divisions at the outset of the Topica and Nicomachean Ethics. For all his debt to
Quintilian, Vico’s manifold inquiries—into scientia and conscientia, into vera lex and certa
lex, into ratio and auctoritas—set his method apart from the Institutio’s uniform approach
to all investigations, both inside and outside the courtroom.
This unexpected parallel between Quintilian and Descartes should suggest in no way
that Quintilian’s theory of argument is proto-scientific. To be sure, one can see how
Quintilian’s understanding of certum is incompatible with the definition of certainty in
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Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which claims that “the highest prob-
ability, amounts not to certainty; without which, there can be no true knowledge.” The
contrast has been clear from this study’s first pages. But perhaps these early modern
reformers and Quintilian are not so dissimilar, despite their nearly opposite approaches
to the assurance of argument. Like Quintilian in his anti-Aristotelian conflation of sev-
eral types of argument into an investigation of mere certainty, these later thinkers show
a similar impulse to collapse distinctions. In Vico’s eyes, Descartes attempts to assimi-
late certainty into a monolithic vision of scientific or objective argumentation, uprooting
the modest confidence in the merely certum that Quintilian especially is responsible for
instituting. While demonstrating the longevity of the notion of humanist certainty, there-
fore, this dissertation also shows how Quintilian’s flattening of epistemological categories
foreshadows those later authors who would come to reject his understanding of certum
through combinations of their own.
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